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CHINA:
THE PITY OF IT

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CHINA :

THE PITY OF IT

J. O. P. BLAND



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I desire to thank the Editors of the *English Review* for their courtesy in allowing me to reprint certain passages from articles contributed to that journal at various dates since 1925; also for the encouragement which I have continually received at their hands in setting forth views, in regard to the course of events in the Far East, which the exigencies of our political circumstances have combined to make unfashionable and sometimes unpalatable in official circles.

I have also to thank the Editors of the Literary Supplement of *The Times*, of the *National Review* and the *Atlantic Monthly*, for permission to reproduce certain extracts from articles originally published in their columns.

J. O. P. BLAND.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE purpose of this book is to describe and discuss the forces and tendencies which have chiefly determined the course of events in China since the Washington Conference of 1921. It is not intended to give any detailed chronological account of these events, but rather to set forth and interpret the dominant causes and results of the anarchical condition of affairs at present existing. In two earlier works, as some of my readers may recollect, I endeavoured to explain the permanent causes of unrest which are inseparable from China's deep-rooted social system, and my grounds for the belief, which the passing years have fortified, that a democratic or parliamentary form of government is wholly inapplicable to the actual condition of the Chinese people. In the first of those works* were summarised the causes, economic and political, which had combined to create the situation in which a comparatively insignificant anti-dynastic movement succeeded in compelling the abdication of the Manchus and in establishing the Chinese Republic. The second† contained a brief survey of the first ten years of the Republic, tracing the growth of civil war as a profession and the rapid demoralisation of the civil administration of the country resulting from the absence of any effective central authority.

The opinions expressed in the second of these attempts

* *Recent Events and Present Policies in China.* (Heinemann, 1912.)

† *China, Japan and Korea.* (Heinemann, 1921.)

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to analyse the forces at work and their probable results were generally regarded at the time of their publication, coincident with the Washington Conference, as unjustifiably pessimistic. Belief in the regenerative influence of Western learning was at that time the dominant factor in determining the attitude of the Powers, which found expression in the Washington agreements. The policy of patient conciliation, thereby inaugurated, was based on the assumption that the new class of Chinese official which had come to the front since the Revolution, the Western-educated Intellectuals, was capable of bringing order out of chaos and giving China, within a comparatively brief space of time, a stable and effective government, organised on Western lines. The widespread acceptance of this assumption was due to the effect on public opinion of Kuomintang propaganda and to the great influence exercised in political circles, in America and England, by the great missionary and educational organisations. The assumption itself, as events have proved and must continue to prove, was fallacious; it was inspired by optimistic idealism and sympathies of a kind which persistently ignored the structural character of the people to whom they were applied.

The reasons which prevented me from accepting the belief that a New Era had dawned for China with the new-born Republic, were expressed, shortly after the abdication of the Monarchy, as follows:

Remembering the ancestry and genesis of Young China, being personally acquainted with many of its leading spirits, having followed its operations and activities in every province from the beginning of the present Revolution, I am compelled to the conviction that salvation from this quarter is impossible, not only because Young China itself is unregenerate and undisciplined, but because its ideals and projects of government involve the creation of a new social and political

structure utterly unsuited to the character and traditions of the race; because it is contrary to all experience that a people cut off from its deep-rooted beliefs and habits of life should develop and retain a vigorous national consciousness.

This was written in 1912. A decade later, at the Washington Conference, the aims and claims of China's diplomatic delegates had notably increased in bold assertiveness, not because of any visible progress achieved in the matter of a stable and effective government, but because the Great War had placed the United States in a position to take the lead in Far Eastern affairs and made the exhausted European Powers instinctively inclined towards a policy of *laissez-faire* and optimistic idealism in that region. Nevertheless, the course of events in China during the first ten years of the Republic was of a nature to demonstrate the truth that the Chinese people are neither fitted nor anxious for the exercise of self-government; unfortunately, the Powers chiefly concerned were not in a position to devote their attention to the increasingly grievous plight of the inarticulate Chinese masses. During a survey of the actual situation in 1921, carried out on the eve of the Washington Conference, I could find no reason for abandoning or modifying the opinion above quoted. On the contrary, observation of the forces and tendencies at work, from Canton to Chihli, led me, after carefully reviewing them, to amplify it, in the following words:*

"Under existing conditions, therefore, a democratic form of government, as understood in Europe and America, is impossible in China. To encourage the small minority of foreign-educated Intellectuals who profess to wish to apply it can only result in making unrest,

* *China, Japan and Korea*, p. 28.

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civil war and brigandage widespread and endemic, instead of local and epidemic.”

At the present juncture, the disorganisation of China's civil administration, the aggressive chauvinism of her politicians and students, and the inefficiency of her military forces, all combine to create a situation which threatens once again, by fomenting international suspicions and racial jealousies, to involve other nations in her troubles.

The moment seems opportune therefore to review the course of events during the last ten years and to draw from it such further conclusions as may be justifiable. I do not propose to burden the reader with any biographical list of the war-lords and politicians, whose short-lived triumphs and defeats have punctuated the monotonous history of these years, but rather to direct attention to the fundamental realities which lie beyond the stage on which these actors strut and fret their little hour. My chief purpose now, as in the earlier works that I have cited, is to emphasise the duty of reparation which, as I see it, the Western world owes to the oldest civilisation of the East; to contribute something to the formation of a public opinion, whereby the conscience of the civilised world, which finds expression in the League of Nations, may be led to desist from experiments in political idealism and to apply measures of a practical humanitarianism, with a view to putting an end to the long-drawn sufferings of the Chinese people. If there be any element of sincerity behind the eloquent professions of goodwill towards China recorded by the signatories to the Washington agreements, anything vitally humane in the counsels of idealism proclaimed by the leaders of liberal thought in this country and

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America, the pitiful spectacle now presented by the Chinese people, reduced to depths of misery by oppressive misrule since 1921, should lead the Anglo-Saxon race to display more concern for their unhappy fate and less for the vain doctrines of racial equality and ineffective sovereignty. Forsaking the futile phrases of conventional formulæ, the civilised world should concern itself in China, while there is yet time, with the realities, with the "weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and truth."

As we look back over the course of events in China since the beginning of the century, we must, I think, admit that the chief cause of the rapid demoralisation of the body politic has been the sudden substitution of western learning for the old classical system of national education in 1905. The collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1912 was probably inevitable, because its leaders had lost the capacity, and even the will, to govern; but the subsequent dislocation of the whole machinery of government by the Revolution need not have been so serious or so protracted had the overthrow of the central authority not been preceded by the abolition of the social and moral restraints of the Confucian system. The violent indiscipline and chronic unrest displayed by the new generation of scholars, who have replaced the old-type *literati*, undoubtedly constitute one of the chief factors in the nation's present dangers and disabilities, and these beyond all question are direct results of the forceful intrusion of the western world upon China's patriarchal civilisation, of the introduction of disruptive forces, which that civilisation could not resist, and of political ideas which could not possibly be adapted to its deep-rooted social system.

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In the course of his career of conquests and invasions, since the Genoese navigators opened up the highways of the sea to maritime adventures, the triumphant white man has inflicted many grievous pains and penalties, in the sacred names of religion and progress, upon red men and black and brown, who could not cope with his man-killing devices. Looked at in this light, the lamentable results of the impact of the West upon the ancient civilisation of China are part of a process of evolution, which became inevitable when first the active self-helping races of Europe came into direct contact with the passive non-resisting races of Asia. But the Chinese, by reason of their vast numbers, of their economic efficiency, and their peculiar qualities of mental solidarity and physical endurance, have repeatedly proved in the past their ability to endure prolonged periods of alien domination or internal chaos, without impairing their national cohesion or the foundations of their philosophy. That the race will in time find an issue out of its present afflictions cannot be doubted, but the length of time required, and the amount of suffering which the masses must endure in the meanwhile, are matters in great measure dependant upon the collective wisdom and goodwill of the Powers chiefly concerned, upon their sympathetic understanding of the Chinese people's real needs, and upon the substitution of realism for idealism in concerting measures to protect their helplessness through the necessary period of adjustment and reconstruction.

Generally speaking, the scope of this work is confined to the statement and examination of the most important features of the China problem, with special reference to their development during the past ten years,

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and to their effect upon the present and future well-being of the Chinese people. It contains, therefore, little or no reference to a number of events which, at the time of their occurrence, loomed large in the world's Press, events such as the Shanghai student riot incident of May, 1925, the murderous attacks on Europeans at Nanking in March, 1927, and Japan's military intervention in Shantung in 1928. Nor does it contain any account of the various phases of the civil wars which have devastated the country during this period, or of the diplomatic negotiations which have taken place between the Kuomintang Government and the representatives of the various Treaty Powers, with regard to tariff autonomy, the administration of justice at Shanghai, the abolition of extra-territoriality, the retrocession of the Foreign Settlements, the Government of Manchuria and other kindred subjects. Any detailed consideration of these subjects is omitted, for the reason that, regarded against the dark background of China's current history, they are all essentially transient, and of secondary importance—each in its way being an incidental result, and at the same time a symptom, of organic disease in the body politic. It is the main purpose of this book to examine into the abiding causes and results of this organic disease, to show how its symptoms have recently been aggravated by unwise treatment, unsuited to the constitution of the patient; and finally, to consider whether, things being as they are, it is possible to apply any remedial measures, calculated to afford temporary alleviation of the patient's sufferings, and to give time for the beginnings of the social re-organisation, whereby alone the nation can be restored to the condition of an organised State.

CHAPTER II

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND AFTER

“Behold, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed.”—*Oxenstiern*.

THE significance of the Washington Conference was twofold. It was, in the first place, an outward and visible sign of the American nation's consciousness of its new rôle of predominance in world affairs; in the second place, it inaugurated a new alignment of the Powers, in substitution for that of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, pledged under American initiative, to a policy of non-interference and patient conciliation in China. Although its primary purpose was the limitation of naval armaments, it was apparent from the outset that the chief objective of the United States Government was to secure a settlement of the Far Eastern situation. In the end, the main result of the Conference was that Great Britain and the Dominions gave their tacit approval to a policy which was manifestly intended to put a check on Japanese expansion on the Asiatic mainland. The effect of the Treaties and Agreements signed by the four and nine Powers respectively concerned, was practically an intimation to the world in general, and to Japan in particular, of America's intention to establish a moral guardianship over China and, by virtue thereof, to challenge Japan's position of ascendancy in Manchuria and Mongolia. The contracting Powers bound themselves “to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and main-

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tain for herself an effective and stable government," and this pledge was accompanied by pious resolutions, expressing the sympathetic readiness of the Powers to withdraw their armed forces from China and to remove "immediately, or as soon as circumstances will permit, existing limitations upon China's political, jurisdictional and administrative freedom of action."

For those who were not carried away by political or religious enthusiasms, the policy imposed by these Washington agreements was inherently impracticable and bound to defeat its own ends. It was a policy which could only hope to succeed, and be justified, on the assumption that, by adopting the formulæ of democracy and a framework of progressive institutions, the Intellectuals and Modernists of Young China could create in the Chinese masses not only a desire, but the capacity for self-government on western lines. It involved, moreover, the further assumption that these westernised Intellectuals did in fact represent, as they claimed, a united and effective government—a government not only able, but ready, to maintain law and order, and to administer justice in accordance with the practice of modern civilisation. The fallacious nature of these assumptions was sufficiently obvious to everyone possessing direct knowledge of the actual condition of China and her rulers.

In so far as England was concerned, the policy imposed by the Washington agreements involved the tacit acceptance of these assumptions; at the same time, it necessitated attempts to purchase China's goodwill by graceful concessions, in order to conciliate that of America. It was a policy of dangerous experiments which, as events have proved, was bound to sacrifice

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the interests of our Far Eastern commerce and something of our self-respect, in the hope of creating and consolidating new bonds of amity between the English-speaking peoples. It was a policy, perhaps inevitable, in view of the political and economic changes which the Great War had made in the international situation and which found justification of expediency in the minds of those who initiated and directed it, on the principle that wisdom lies in sacrificing the lesser to the greater end. But as regards its avowed central purpose, that of enabling China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government, and thus eliminating a source of constant danger to the world's peace, it was a policy which, as the passing years have proved, was foredoomed to futility. Moreover, there was every reason to anticipate that the ultimate course of strife—namely, rivalry for a position of advantage in the Far Eastern markets, would not only remain untouched but would probably be aggravated as the result of the *laissez-faire* régime imposed by the Washington treaties and resolutions. The Far Eastern problem remains today, as it was at the beginning of the century, the problem of the Sick Man of Asia, whose dwindling estate of sovereignty is only preserved from spoliation by the jealous rivalries of claimants in waiting.

The atmosphere in which the Conference was held, the tone of its deliberations and the nature of its findings reflected three distinct, but for the moment converging, influences. These were, in the first place, the influence of the traditional, unswerving national policy which, through successive administrations, has always asserted and jealously safeguarded American interests in the Far East; secondly, the influence of American

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pacific idealism in politics, chiefly manifested on this occasion by the Women's League for Peace and Freedom, the missionary and educational societies and other similar organisations; and thirdly, the influence of China's skilfully organised and widespread political propaganda. The combined effect of these influences was to manœuvre Japan (and with her the Anglo-Japanese Alliance) into the position of a defendant, confronted by an Assembly in which, beneath the conventions of international courtesy, an undercurrent of moral censure was ever perceptible.

On the surface, the procedure of the Conference was marked by sweet reasonableness and devotion to the ideals of the new post-war era, in which "harmonious and friendly co-operation" was to take the place of competitive rivalry. The delegates were invited by Mr. Secretary Hughes to approach the solution of their problems "with the full consciousness that they were working in the service of mankind." Mr. President Harding, setting forth the achievements of the Conference in an eloquent peroration, rejoiced that these had been supreme, "because no cause of conflict had been sown; no reaction in regret or resentment can ever justify resort to arms. The very atmosphere has shamed national selfishness into retreat." Mr. Frank Simonds, whose knowledge of foreign affairs and politics places him in the front rank of American journalists, declared, nevertheless, his opinion that, in seeking to revitalise the principal of the "open door," Mr. Hughes was actually asserting a moral guardianship over China and definitely limiting Japanese expansion in the only direction left open to them by the Asiatic Exclusion Acts of the Anglo-Saxon world—a policy which, according to every

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historical precedent, must inevitably lead to war, sooner or later. But such was the atmosphere created for, and by, the Conference, that Mr. Simonds's voice was that of one crying in a wilderness of complacent optimism. Mr. Senator Lodge summed up the results of the Conference from the practical politician's point of view, by observing that its success was chiefly due to the fact that its scope was strictly limited to matters of immediate concern to the United States.

Inasmuch as America's Far Eastern policy has now become the paramount factor in the immediate and future problems of that region, let us briefly consider the genesis, tendencies and implications of that policy.

Imprimis, we are confronted by the anomalous fact that, while excluding all European political influences and activities from the American continent and all Asiatic immigration into the United States, while declining to share the White Man's post-war burdens at Versailles and Geneva, and insisting upon complete aloofness from European affairs, the statesmen of Washington should have been in a position to sponsor and direct an international conference* clearly intended to place the Far Eastern question upon a new basis, determined in advance by America's conception of its nature and needs. Needless to say, the explanation of this peculiar combination of circumstances lies in the fact that national policies are not inspired by logical consistency but by the fundamental instinct of survival, which compels those who direct these policies to seek and preserve national security, present and future, by

* According to the evidence, based on decoded British and Japanese official telegrams, as set forth in *The American Black Chamber* by Captain Yardley of the American Secret Service, the first initiative in convening the "Pacific" Conference was taken by Lord Curzon.

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all means and at all costs. Thus regarded, the traditional policy of America's statesmen since the days of President Monroe, is revealed as not only natural but necessary, wholly consistent in its unchanging purposes though often inconsistent in the manner of their presentment. Tracing the development of this policy, we observe that, almost at the same time that President Monroe declared that America's interests necessitated complete detachment from the affairs of Europe, Washington despatched its first envoy to the East to make treaties of peace and goodwill with Annam and Siam. Next came the mission of Caleb Cushing, who negotiated the first American Treaty with China (1844); and thereafter, the opening of Japan to the western world by Commodore Perry and his squadron. Under President McKinley, America became possessed of the Philippines. Mr. Roosevelt, in his turn, manifested America's continuity of interest in the affairs of Asia by intervening as peacemaker at the close of the Russo-Japanese war. Thereafter followed a period of diplomatic manœuvres, during which America's statesmen, confronted first by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and then by the Russo-Japanese *entente*, were content to mark time, reiterating, whenever occasion offered, their adherence to the principles of the "open door" and equal opportunity, without insisting upon their immediate or too rigid application.*

With the Great War came, on the one hand, Japan's opportunity to advance her outposts and consolidate her position on the Asiatic mainland; at the same time,

* In his letter of 27th February, 1932, to Senator Borah on U.S. policy in China, Mr. Secretary Stimson once again declares America's insistence upon the policy of the "open door" and refuses to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by China or Japan in violation of the Washington Treaties.

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there gradually developed an unmistakable foreshadowing of America's emergence as a great military Power and impending domination of the world's economic activities. In October, 1916, when both Russia and Japan were seizing the opportunity to encroach upon China's defenceless territory and ineffective sovereignty, the State Department at Washington announced its intention of reserving consideration of the questions thus created until the end of the war, "no matter what conditions might arise in China," contenting itself, for the time being, to the collection of information and records.

It was wholly in accordance with the parochial and practical traditions of American statesmanship that, on the conclusion of the war, Washington repudiated President Wilson's commitments in respect of the League of Nations and European "entanglements." It was equally in accordance with the nation's traditional policy that, having done so, it should take the lead in sponsoring a Conference of the European Powers and Japan, to discuss the affairs of the Far East, that is to say, of the region in which America's special interests and overseas possessions lie.

Viewed in this light, the Washington Conference emerges as the natural and inevitable conclusion of a national policy which, with occasional lapses, may be traced back, through successive administrations, to George Washington's definition and justification of purely American national interests. As a logical proposition, it was no more calculated to impress other nations than the subsequent manifestation of that policy which enjoins the necessity for disarmament upon the rest of the world while spending more upon military

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equipment than any other nation. Yet if, disregarding the idealism of internationalism, we face the simple truth that the first aim of every statesman must always be national security, the men who direct the affairs of the United States are manifestly doing their duty. They are merely acting upon recognition of the fact that, for the great industrial nations, security in the future will depend more and more critically upon control of markets and raw materials. This, in effect, was what Roosevelt meant when, in 1903, he declared that the future of the United States lies in the Pacific. A far-seeing realist, he perceived that, within the lifetime of the present generation, America must be confronted, though in a lesser degree than England or Japan, by the problem of devising ways and means for selling abroad, under increasingly severe competition, enough of her industrial products to provide daily bread for vast masses of town-dwelling workers who consume, but do not produce, food. And the most hopeful solution of that problem, as he saw it, lay in preserving access to the greatest of undeveloped markets, China.*

President Harding's action in inviting the Powers to confer at Washington may therefore be ascribed to the unbroken continuity of an instinctive national policy. At the same time, there is justification for the opinion recorded by the American Press, that, as regards the convening and conduct of the Conference, his action was partly influenced by the exigencies of domestic politics. A strong element of public opinion, voiced by Senator Borah, supported the Conference—indeed it

* Considering the increasing political instability of China and its condition of economic exhaustion, there appears to be little justification for the generally accepted belief that her undeveloped markets are likely to provide important outlets for the congested industries of the West in the near future.

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may have initiated the Administration's action—hoping that it might expiate President Wilson's failure to vindicate American idealism in world politics at Versailles, and especially his share of responsibility for the arrangement which gave to Japan the reversion of German rights and privileges in Shantung. This body of public opinion, represented to a very large extent by organised religious, benevolent and educational societies, such as the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the Y.M.C.A., and the Women's League for Peace, displayed as a rule more sentiment than sense in its political activities. On the one hand, for example, it urged that America should take the lead in a world movement of complete disarmament; on the other, it expected the American Government to protect not only China, but Mongolia and Eastern Siberia from Japanese aggression. Its widespread influence was chiefly responsible for the atmosphere of hostility towards Japan which, beneath the euphemisms of statecraft, pervaded the proceedings of the Conference; at the same time, it displayed its whole-hearted sympathy for the political aspirations of Young China, and an implicit belief in the roseate visions of enlightened progress insistently proclaimed by China's official and semi-official propagandists. I shall have occasion to refer to this aspect of the matter again, when considering the position and prospects of missionary enterprise in China. For the present, suffice it to say that, in so far as American political idealism at the Conference was inspired by missionary and educational influences, it represented a normal tendency, protective of vocational interests. So far as the general, uninformed public was concerned, it naturally responded to the appeal of that highly vocal

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element of Young China which professed its fervent faith in American ideals and institutions; much of its support was instinctively and impulsively given to the cause of so intelligent an "under-dog." But the sympathy extended to that cause by the missionary and cultural organisations undoubtedly represented their professional pride and confidence in the rising generation of western-educated Chinese; it was only natural that they should sympathise actively with the aspirations of their pupils and protégés to become the dominant force in Chinese politics. Indeed, unless they were prepared to confess that all their labour had gone for nought, they were bound to profess their unbounded belief in the product of western learning, to pin their faith to the westernised type of Chinese citizen, upon whose evolution they had relied for half a century as the only hope of reforming the country's administration upon western lines, and providing the material for its "stable and effective government." In saying this, I have no desire to suggest that this kind of idealistic optimism is peculiar either to Americans, or to professional "uplifters." We in England have seen a Manifesto of the Labour Party of Great Britain, calling for the withdrawal of all armed forces from Chinese territory, at the height of the crisis in 1927, and recommending the immediate surrender of the Treaty Port Concessions, on the ground that "the Chinese Nationalist movement is developing Trade Unionism for the benefit of Chinese workers." But the initiative of the policy of patient conciliation and (as Senator Borah defined it) of "rendering such aid to China as may help her to secure real independence," was essentially American in its origins. England's foreign policy at the time, and

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until quite recently, was dominated by the cardinal principle "that nothing should be done which might impair the friendliness of, or give offence to, the United States."* In terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and in pledging itself to the policy laid down in the Washington agreements, the British Government was practically admitting one of the first and most momentous effects of the changes which the war had wrought upon the whole structure of world economics and finance.

In proclaiming itself at the Washington Conference as the inaugurator and promoter of a new dispensation of high moral principles in politics, founded "on peace, goodwill and good works," the State Department undoubtedly represented the political opinion, which, since 1910, had come to regard Japan's ambitions in Asia as a potential menace to America's heritage in the Pacific region; it represented also the religious or sentimental opinion which supported Young China's urgent claims and aspirations. The resultant policy was bound, in the nature of things, to identify itself with benevolent theories and to shut its eyes to the uncomfortable facts of the Far Eastern problem.

Writing on this subject, shortly before the Conference,† I pointed out that, because of these facts, the only hope of achieving a satisfactory or permanent settlement of the problem lay in an international agreement for the restoration of law and order in China by some concerted action of the Powers; furthermore, that America's benevolent ideas of international co-operation

* Colonel Harvey (American Ambassador in London) in the *North American Review*.

† *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1921.

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for China's benefit could only be carried out by means of some such action. At that date there was good reason to believe that Japan, having everything to gain from the restoration of financial and administrative order in China, was prepared to welcome an American-Anglo-Japanese *entente*, which should make this its avowed object. Moreover, *pace* the idealists, it was manifestly futile, then as now, to talk of restoring the unfettered authority of the Chinese Government, by abolishing the foreigners' rights of Consular jurisdiction, until financial and administrative measures had been taken to make a stable and effective government possible. In other words, the Conference provided an opportunity of achieving results immediately beneficial to the Chinese people and ultimately to the world at large, but only on condition that President Harding and his colleagues proved more far-seeing than the sentimentalists, and strong enough to disregard the Press campaign organised on behalf of China by her own official propagandists, aided by a number of American publicists such as Mr. Thomas Millard, Mr. Alexander Powell, "Upton Close," etc., etc. Had the requisite knowledge and resolution been there, the Conference might have faced realities and addressed itself to the only solution of the Far Eastern problem, namely, a policy of self-denying co-operation, by virtue of which the Powers concerned might endeavour to arrest the progress of disintegration wrought in China by various disruptive influences, and most notably by the effects of "Western learning." But, as the event proved, the type of sentimental idealism which is associated with the name of President Wilson was destined to play a decisive part in the proceedings and conclusions of the

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Conference. With consummate skill China's diplomatic representatives, Mr. Alfred Sze and Mr. Wellington Koo, exploited, for the purposes of their government, the body of public opinion organised on their behalf by the religious and benevolent societies; with equal skill they availed themselves of the jealousies, rivalries and post-war weariness of the commercial Powers. Thus, as the policy expounded by Mr. Secretary Hughes began to assume definite shape and direction, it speedily became apparent that the proceedings of the Conference could have little or no bearing upon the crucial problem of the Far East—the increasing disorganisation of China—and equally evident that their immediate result was to place Japan in the position of a defendant at the bar of international opinion.

The energy and ability displayed by the agents and publicists of the Kuomintang, in their use of the platform and Press for purposes of propaganda, gave proof of remarkably intelligent adaptability. The machinery and methods adopted for this propaganda revealed an accurate perception, not only of the trend of international affairs, but of the exigencies of domestic politics in the United States. As this machinery has lately been brought to an even higher standard of efficiency for use at World Conferences—especially those of the League of Nations—the manner of its working, and the brains behind it are matters deserving of more than cursory attention. With these I propose, therefore, to deal in a later chapter. As far as their activities and results at the Washington Conference are concerned, it is sufficient to say that the Chinese delegates succeeded in “putting across” a glowing picture of a purely imaginary Chinese Republic, successfully progressing towards orderly con-

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stitutional government by virtue of liberal ideas and democratic institutions. In the name of democracy, they made eloquent appeal to the sympathies of the western world, inviting its moral and material support for an imposing programme of wholly visionary reforms. Thus was created the atmosphere in which the Conference eventually pledged itself to "render such aid to China as may help her to secure real independence." The realities of the situation were tacitly ignored by all concerned, united in the determination to regard Messrs. Sze and Koo, and the Young China of "western learning," as genuinely representative of the aspirations and convictions of the Chinese masses. Thanks chiefly to the powerful influence of the religious and educational societies, public opinion throughout America (and to a considerable extent in England) allowed itself to be deluded into the belief that the political activities of the Cantonese party represented a genuine awakening of national consciousness and constructive patriotism. It is a delusion which comes naturally enough, and gratefully, to those who believe that western education can implant in the oriental mind the Anglo-Saxon's standards of conduct and religious beliefs, and to those who can persuade themselves that the most profoundly conservative of Asiatic races can be persuaded to substitute government by laws (of foreign origin) for the government by human volition, to which it has been accustomed from time immemorial.

As far as the Western Powers were concerned, the net result of the Conference was to revitalise the principle of the "open door" and equal opportunity, by virtue of the Nine Powers Treaty, and in so doing to substitute for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a rearrange-

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ment of policies and Powers in the Far East, wherein American leadership was tacitly admitted. As far as China was concerned, the result was a personal triumph for her diplomatic representatives. They had achieved, once again, the time-honoured object of Chinese statecraft by "setting one barbarian against another"; they had succeeded in committing the Powers to a policy of benevolent non-interference and the eventual restitution of all the rights, concessions and privileges which encroached upon China's sovereignty. Last, but not least, they had established the definite ascendancy of their own class, the western-educated officials, as rulers of China. The seed sown broadcast by their indefatigable propagandists had borne fruit beyond their expectations, inasmuch as the resolutions adopted by the Conference amounted to a general acceptance of the delusive idea that a nation, unfitted by character and circumstances for representative government, may suddenly become equipped with the qualities requisite for the successful working of democratic institutions. To the influence of this idea, and of the equally delusive theories underlying the doctrines of racial equality and self-determination, may be ascribed in large measure the accelerated process of disintegration which has taken place in China during the past ten years. China's delegates left the Conference convinced that they might proceed with impunity to ignore or denounce the foreigners' extra-territorial rights and to abolish the "unequal Treaties." Everything that had occurred at Washington justified the "Nationalist" Government, and especially the Cantonese element, in determining (as they did) to take every advantage of the post-war reaction of sentimentality, which made public opinion in England and

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America increasingly sensitive and sympathetic with regard to the rights of weaker nations. Messrs. Wellington Koo and Alfred Sze went their ways rejoicing. Not a voice had been raised during the Conference to suggest, on humanitarian grounds, that a genuine effort should be made to stem the tide of anarchy in China; no delegate had disturbed the harmony of the proceedings by drawing attention to the pitiful plight to which the defenceless people had been reduced by ten years of devastating misrule; none had even hinted at the fact that the chief and abiding cause of China's parlous state lies in the nepotism and corruption of her official class. By common consent, the crucial factors of the Far Eastern problem remained untouched. In solemn agreements the Chinese recorded their Government's "intention and capacity to protect the lives and property of foreigners in China," its "earnest desire to bring her judicial system into accord with that of western nations," and other well-worn sterilities; and the Conference, filled with zeal for "adventures in liberalism," cheerfully overlooked the notorious fact, that the widespread and increasing rapacity of the new mandarin class constitutes in itself an insuperable obstacle to the production of that effective government, for which the Powers were determined to provide "the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity."

The opportunities thus provided were certainly full, and the war-lords and professional politicians of the new dispensation showed no hesitation or embarrassment in exploiting them. The history of the next decade in China is the harvest of the seeds of error sown, with the best of misguided intentions, at Washington, the crop of calamities reaped from pursuance of idealistic aims

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which failed to make allowance for the actual condition—social, political, and economic—of the Chinese masses. The rise to power of the “Nationalist” Party—the unruly Cantonese wing of the Kuomintang—in 1927, was undoubtedly as much a result of the Washington Conference as it was of Bolshevik influence and subsidies.

Thus were sown the winds of unrest. How fiercely they have since blown throughout the length and breadth of China, only those know who have seen with their own eyes the abomination of desolation that has been wrought in the last ten years. As I have already said, it is not the purpose of this book to describe in detail the process of demoralisation, to recount the sorry record of these years, which the locusts have eaten. Its object is to analyse and explain the various forces, influences and tendencies, native and foreign, which have contributed towards this unhappy result. But before closing this chapter it may be useful to put before the reader a pen picture of the general results of this process of demoralisation, as summarised by a highly competent American observer, five years after the Washington Conference. Particularly enlightening is his concluding paragraph, which in twenty words explains the root cause of all the ills from which China is now suffering (and from which she has continually suffered in the past) in the absence of a strong central authority, organised and administered upon principles of paternal despotism.

Thus writes Mr. Walter H. Mallory, in his *China: Land of Famine*.*

* *China: Land of Famine*. By Walter H. Mallory. American Geographical Society, New York (1927).

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The central authority has grown weaker and weaker until at present its mandates are practically without effect. In the meantime the military leaders in the various provinces, realising their power and subject to no restraining influence, have worked each for himself, rising and falling like the tide. Temporary combinations are effected for the purpose of eliminating anyone who appears to be gaining the ascendancy; but when this is accomplished, the allies split up to fight among themselves, until the time is ripe for another effort at military consolidation.

All men are equal; all claim the same privilege of preying on their fellows. The idea of responsibility to the State, in the absence of a monarch, is not yet envisaged; it hardly enters at all into the consideration of modern Chinese leaders, for the reason *that the old spirit of family enrichment at the expense of other families is the paramount motive.*

The atmosphere of idealism, which enfolded and clouded the deliberations of the Washington Conference, precluded any reference to this paramount motive. That which another competent observer, the late Mr. Thomas Taylor Meadows, has called the "dominant morality" of China's ruling class, an essentially important factor of the situation, was also by common consent ignored. The pious resolutions of the Nine Powers Treaty may therefore be regarded as in the nature of remedies prescribed for the patient's nervous condition, without concern for the symptoms of his deep-rooted organic disease.

CHAPTER III

THE INFLUENCE OF THE CANTONESE

"The temper of the Cantonese is overbearing and violent; iery banditti are numerous; an idle vagrant lot, who set in motion innumerable schemes, so as to disturb the peace between China and other countries."—*High Commissioner Ki Ying to Mr. Caleb Cushing, June, 1844.*

It is an interesting fact, not generally recognised, that one of the causes contributory to the present chaotic confusion of affairs in China, lies in the monopoly long since established by the Cantonese in the matter of emigration overseas. Two results, arising out of this fact, are worthy of note. Firstly, that the conception of China and things Chinese in America, is erroneous, because it is largely based upon superficial observation of the only type of Chinese which has gained a footing upon the Pacific coast—namely, the Cantonese—and because this type represents a comparatively small section of the nation, by no means respected or beloved of the rest. Secondly, that the recently established predominance of the Cantonese politicians in the Government of China is a by-product of the post-war ascendancy of the United States in Far Eastern affairs.

Unless one has sufficiently studied the antecedents of the Cantonese element in Chinese politics to be able to appreciate the significance of its recent history and present ascendancy, it is not possible to form a balanced judgment on any aspect of Far Eastern racial problems. For, as I propose to show, the forces and tendencies

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which have enabled the Cantonese faction to establish its predominance in China's internal affairs and foreign relations since the Washington Conference, are forces and tendencies whose scope and effect are bound to increase and eventually to constitute the dominant factor of the whole Pacific region, far exceeding in importance all the permutations and combinations of Kuomintang politics. Before proceeding to consider the latest manifestations and results of its preponderant influence, let us briefly examine the characteristics which especially distinguish the inhabitants of the South-Eastern, or Kuang, provinces from those of Central and Northern China.

In the first place it is important to note that in the latter days of the East India Company, from the time of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung down to the first war with Great Britain in 1840, Canton was the only Chinese port open to foreign traders. The attitude of its people towards foreigners was always one of arrogant superiority and the East India Company's servants were forced to conduct their trade under conditions of humiliating indignity, which eventually became so intolerable that hostilities were inevitable. Nevertheless, in spite of this attitude, the Cantonese, by virtue of this monopoly of overseas trade, gained a start over the rest of China in the matter of contact with the western world; also, because of the several reprisals which this attitude brought upon them, the pains and penalties of two disastrous wars, they acquired, before their fellow countrymen, a conception of the military efficiency and scientific achievements of the outer barbarian. Thus the intellectual and political activities of the present-day Cantonese may fairly be ascribed, in the first instance,

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to the cumulative effect of their experience and direct relations with foreigners, resulting from their trade monopoly in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

When, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the introduction of steamships and the welcome extended to Chinese immigrants by the United States in the Burlingame Treaty (1868), provided an outlet for the millions of China's teeming population, the Cantonese, thanks to their geographical position and acquired knowledge, were in a position to seize the opportunity thus provided and, with their clannish instinct, to develop it for the exclusive benefit of the inhabitants of the south-eastern maritime provinces. From the city of Rams they poured forth in their thousands, to find new places in the sun and new sources of wealth, in the United States, in Canada, the Philippines, Burmah, Siam and Hawaii. Between 1870 and 1904, when America's Asiatic Exclusion Act became law, over ten million Chinese found homes and profitable employment overseas, practically all of whom were natives of the Kuang provinces and Fukien. The action of the United States and Canada, first in limiting, and finally in forbidding, immigration, was fiercely resented by the Cantonese, who gave vent to their feelings in 1905 by an organised boycott of American trade. Their leading men—and none more bitterly than those who had received their education abroad—denounced, as evidence of race antagonism, measures which were imposed by instincts of self-preservation as natural and imperative as the emigrating instinct of the Chinese coolie, the real issue being between irreconcilable forces, manifestations in both cases

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of the struggle for survival amongst races. The exclusion of the Cantonese from the Philippines and Hawaii (1902) was the unkindest cut of all. The expression of hostile feeling which it evoked derived new features of strength and purpose from the fact that, by this time, the large and wealthy committees of Cantonese overseas had acquired new democratic ideas concerning racial equality and "the inalienable rights of man," and new methods of asserting them by means of political organisation. The tide of emigration ceased perforce to flow; but its cessation left the Cantonese, to whom it had brought increase of wealth and knowledge, imbued with feelings of hostility towards foreigners, much more violent and vocal in their utterance than those displayed by their countrymen of the central and northern provinces.

Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century, in addition to this rankling grievance, the Cantonese found themselves possessed of two assets, which placed them in a position to make a successful bid for leadership and effective control of China's affairs and government—these assets being their superior knowledge of foreign relations and the financial support provided by the wealthy Chinese committees overseas. But in order to appreciate the significance of the subsequent developments of the situation thus created, it is essential to bear in mind the fact that, owing to certain physical and mental characteristics which distinguish these southerners from other Chinese, Canton has long been a fountain head and focus of political unrest, and a breeding ground for conspiracies and rebellions against constituted authority. In the course of a series of lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute of Harvard twenty

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years ago, and in a work published at that time,* I traced the geographical and economic origins of these distinctive characteristics and showed how, throughout the period of Manchu rule, they had found continual expression in political agitation and insurrections, culminating in the Taiping Rebellion. Describing the nature of their political activities, I observed that the Cantonese have been called the Irish of China. "They are traditionally and by temperament 'agin the government,' heirs of ages of revolt against the constituted authority of Peking; individually courageous, no respecters of persons, impatient of restraint, sullen in their political antipathies, invincibly cheerful in their daily lives. Rebellion-makers in ordinary to the Chinese people, their intellectual alertness and clannishness have fitted them naturally for leadership in treasons, stratagems and spoils; their camarilla instinct, developed by centuries of secret society organisation, attains in practice to scientific precision. They have learned the successful politician's secret of profitably directing the labours of other men, and their contempt for the slower-witted northerners is never very carefully concealed."

"As politicians, their proceedings are marked by an emotional and often infectious fervour of enthusiasm; behind this, unfortunately deep-rooted in economic duress, frequently lurk instincts as predatory in their way as those of the pirates of their coasts; a fierce lust of office which, if balked, often outweighs all sense of patriotic duty and endeavour." This last characteristic is by no means peculiar to the Cantonese—the army of the place-seekers is thoroughly national—but the Can-

* *Vide Recent Events and Present Policies in China.* (Heinemann, 1912.)

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tonese have developed it with all their peculiar energy and with a measure of success, which constitutes a very considerable factor in the constant antagonism between North and South. It is a characteristic which accounts, not only for their chronic opposition to the political factions of the north, but for the private animosities and public feuds which divide them amongst themselves.

Even in the golden age of the Manchus, under the Emperors Kang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung, when the power and prestige of the Dragon Throne were at their zenith, Canton, the irreconcilable, was ever a sharp thorn in the side of the dynasty and the ceaseless activities of its secret societies a constant source of unrest. But until the twentieth century, the Cantonese element in the public service of the Empire enjoyed no particular advantage in the official hierarchy; their provincial clique was, if anything, less powerful at the centre of government than those of the Anhui, Hunan and Chihli parties. But after the passing of the Empress Dowager, and the death blow inflicted on the Confucian mandarinat by the introduction of western learning, the political ascendancy of the Cantonese became inevitable, because of those special advantages to which I have referred. The anti-dynastic activities of Sun Yat-sen and his fellow conspirators prior to 1911 were in themselves negligible, and commanded little or no support, even in his native province; but when, as the result of an almost accidental *coup de main*, what was left of the dynasty collapsed, the Cantonese were not slow to perceive their opportunity as the founders and expounders of the Republic. At the first national assembly held at Nanking in March, 1912, Sun Yat-sen's adherents declared

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that, as the South had been the first to raise the banner of Republicanism, it could lawfully claim to enjoy the spoils of the Revolution. It was not long before the leaders of the other political groups at Peking and Nanking began to resent this claim and to suspect that Sun Yat-sen's conception of a Republic meant "China for the Cantonese"—which it undoubtedly did.

They were soon to learn that, with the new era of internecine strife inaugurated with the Revolution, certain new factors and conditions had come into play, which had placed the southerners in a position of great advantage. The Kuang provinces had come to represent intellectual activities and financial resources drawn from overseas, with which no other provincial combination could hope to cope successfully; also they had established channels of communication with the outside world, which enabled them to speak with authority on foreign affairs. They were marked out, at home and abroad, as a rapidly growing force of a new type, with which the older political factions were unable to compete.

Commenting on this aspect of the Chinese situation at Harvard in 1912, I ventured to predict that Canton would either succeed in dominating the interior politics of the Republic, by virtue of its superior organisation and knowledge of international affairs, or that it would speedily insist upon conditions of provincial autonomy, which would make an effective central government impossible. The course of events, during the twenty years which have since elapsed, has justified this prediction. The history of this period may fairly be described as a ceaseless struggle for supremacy between continually shifting groups of political adventurers, supported by

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purely mercenary armed forces, but throughout this struggle the Cantonese party has continually opposed the policy of the central authority and endeavoured to dominate the machinery of government. Beginning with their war to punish Yuan Shih-Kai, declared by Sun Yat-sen and his Constitutionals against the President of the Republic in June, 1913; continuing with their political and military campaigns against Tuan Chijui and the northern "militarists," and ending with the successful cabal of last year against Chiang K'ai-shek as chief of the executive at Nanking, the Cantonese party has given continual proof of its determination either to control the central government or to declare its independence of that government and to establish its own at Canton. Up to the time of the Washington Conference, the struggle for supremacy was waged in general accordance with time-honoured principles, and its inconclusive results were achieved rather by financial than by military arguments. The very length of the struggle and the monotonous similarity of the incidents, together with the clamorous propaganda of all concerned, combined to create the impression abroad that the revolts of Canton were merely passing phases, preliminary to that complete unification of the country which all proclaimed as their patriotic purpose. But the Washington Conference having made it clear that none of the Powers would intervene to stem the tide of anarchy in China, and that they were, moreover, prepared to make self-denying sacrifices to the principle of self-determination which gave promise of material advantages to the party in power, Sun Yat-sen and his supporters of the Cantonese Kuomintang lost no time in taking advantage of the new situation thus created.

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The vigorous initiative, cohesion and political acumen which they displayed at this juncture emphasised not only all the old ambitions, but a definite consciousness of new powers and remarkable skill in adopting western ideas, even those of Bolshevism, for the furtherance of their political ends. The triumphant progress of the southern "Nationalist" forces through Central and Northern China in 1926-8 may be regarded, roughly speaking, as a manifestation of the same impulses and instincts as those which brought the Taiping hordes of the "Heavenly Prince" to Nanking in 1853. Their leader, law-giver and prophet, Sun Yat-sen, displayed the same fanatical belief in himself and his mission, as that which inspired the Taiping "Princes," but the resources at the command of modern Canton, backed by the wealthy committees overseas and by highly organised propagandist activities abroad, were new phenomena, of great significance to the future of China.

The claim to supremacy in national affairs on which, since the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking, Canton has based its prescriptive right to interpret Sun's "Three Principles" and to define Kuomintang principles and policies, is significant, not so much because of its immediate results in China, as because of the indication which it affords of the rapidly increasing strength of the modernised—and largely Americanised—China of the south. The forces opposed to Cantonese domination of the machinery of government (the combined deadweights of national conservatism and provincialism) are probably stronger in China to-day than they were when Yuan Shih-K'ai dissolved the Kuomintang in 1913. They have recently

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been consolidated by the extreme aggressiveness which the Cantonese have displayed at Nanking, and by their cynical opportunism, ever ready to enlist the aid of foreigners—Russians yesterday, Japanese to-day—in order to impose their authority. Much of the prestige which the Cantonese politicians and Intellectuals have acquired in the eyes of their fellow countrymen since 1922, by their effective handling of China's foreign relations and skilful propaganda, is offset by the fact that, when it comes to a crisis of domestic politics, every man of them (and most notably those who loudly proclaim the unity of the country achieved by the Kuomintang) invariably proves himself to be Cantonese first and a patriot afterwards. Thus, when it came to a trial of strength between the leaders of the southern section of the Kuomintang and Chiang K'ai-shek last year, and when Chiang, manœuvring for position, had detained in custody the person of Hu Han-min, Cantonese chairman of the Legislative Council, as a hostage for the good behaviour of his colleagues, the separatist movement which followed received the immediate support of all the Cantonese politicians hitherto identified with the Nanking Government, including the Chinese Minister at Washington (Dr. C. C. Wu), the Minister of Railways (Sun Fo), Wang Chung-hui, the international jurist, and Tang Shao-yi, elder statesman and adviser to the Government. These men, be it observed, have all been prominently associated in the public mind with a patriotic movement, pledged to devote itself to the unification of China under a constitutional government. Yet when the Cantonese provincial party, failing to impose its will upon the "Soong dynasty" at Nanking, declared

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its usual hostile independence, these same men, the fine flower of western enlightenment, displayed a parochialism as inveterate as that of any Hunanese Han-lin of the old régime, combined with an almost Irish quality of intransigence. Herein, it may be said, they run true to type, as the records of the East India Company amply prove; the natural disposition of the Cantonese was succinctly described by the harassed Manchu Government, in the course of Kiying's negotiations with Mr. Caleb Cushing in 1844, as "overbearing and violent, habitual disturbers of the peace." But the latest manifestations of this characteristic arrogance, which have occurred during recent phases of the struggle for supremacy at Nanking, reveal an increasingly aggressive consciousness of the advantages which have accrued to Canton, as the *fons et origo* of the new dispensation proclaimed by Sun Yat-sen, and as the ancestral home and chief beneficiary of the wealthy and influential communities overseas.

This "violent and overbearing temper" is one of the defects of the qualities which distinguish the Cantonese. Another is that cynical opportunism, to which I have already referred, and of which the career of Sun Yat-sen provides many typical examples. A notable exhibition of their tendency to slim expediency in politics occurred last year, when the independent Canton Government dispatched its Foreign Minister, Mr. Eugene Chen, on a mission to Tokyo. It was wholly in keeping with the traditions of Cantonese statecraft that they should attempt to intrigue with the Japanese Government, in order to weaken the government at Nanking through its ally, the ruler of Manchuria; equally typical that, having thus intrigued, they should then proceed

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to make common cause of patriotism with Nanking against Japan, on condition that Chiang K'ai-shek surrendered his leadership into the hands of the Southern party. From the Chinese point of view, these things are normal incidents in the ruthless, ceaseless struggle for place and power. At the same time, by their very cynicism, and by the evidence which they afford of the Cantonese party's determination to get control of the central authority at all costs, they must serve to give new cohesion and solidarity to the provincial groups which oppose this ascendancy of the Southerners, and new justification for so doing. For these reasons, the prospect of a China united under the effective authority of a Canton-controlled Government, is one which is not likely to materialise in the immediate future. It is more probable that, while civil war drags out its weary length, the separatist tendencies of the Southern provinces will be intensified and accelerated, because of the cumulative effect throughout this region of American and other foreign influences that are incompatible with, and impatient of, the inert conservatism of the masses in Central and Northern China. Such being the case, it would seem inevitable that Canton's repeated secessions must eventually lead to the permanent establishment of a separate Southern Republic, governed from the City of Rams, whose shifting frontiers, intrigues and policies will continue, as at present, to be largely matters of stratagems and spoils.

But whatever may prove to be their ultimate effect upon the actual struggle for predominance in China (which will certainly not cease unless the Powers intervene), the influence of these communities overseas already constitutes a factor in Far Eastern affairs, far

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exceeding in its potential importance all the political programmes and *pourparlers* of Nanking. As regards the nature and evolution of this factor, I have already referred to the significant fact that the tide of Chinese emigration which, in the middle of the nineteenth century began to flow towards the Straits Settlements, the Dutch Indies, Burmah, Indo-China, Siam and the Pacific coast, was from the outset practically confined to natives of the Kuang provinces and Fukien, and that this monopoly has been jealously protected and skilfully directed ever since by their guilds and secret societies. Very few political economists to-day realise how swiftly this silent-flowing tide has increased in range and volume since the passing of the American Exclusion Acts, towards the end of the nineteenth century; unfortunately, no comprehensive or authoritative statistics are available on the subject. The numbers of Chinese resident in the colonial territories or protectorates of the Western Powers and on the Pacific seaboard can only be estimated, as a rule, from the census figures, given from time to time in uncorrelated government reports. But from these, and from works, such as M. Dennery's *Foules d'Asie*, and Professor Toynbee's survey of *Chinese Immigration into Tropical Territories*, certain general inferences may be drawn.

Chinese immigration into the United States, freely permitted by the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, was rigorously limited by agreement in 1883, and finally ended by the Asiatic Exclusion Law in 1904. After that date, the tide of emigration, abruptly checked in its eastward movement, flowed with rapidly increasing force towards Malaya, Siam, Indo-China, Burmah, and the

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Dutch Indies. The latest reliable statistics give the following results in each of these countries:—

BRITISH MALAYA.—In 1921, the Chinese population (census return) amounted to 1,174,777, as against 1,651,051 Malays. The actual figure at the present day can only be estimated, but as the net immigration for the years 1925 to 1928 was over a million, the native population must have been in the minority for some time past.

SIAM.—According to the census of 1920, there were 260,464 Chinese in Siam at that date. In 1925, the number was estimated at 500,000 (*Ency. Brit.*) and in 1930 at 2,000,000. The immigration recorded between 1918 and 1926 amounted to 643,000.

INDO-CHINA.—In recent years Chinese immigration into Indo-China appears to have been discouraged and checked by the French authorities. In 1910, their number was officially given as 232,000. The latest estimates place it at about 370,000.

BURMAH.—According to the census of 1901, there were then 62,486 Chinese resident in the Province; in 1911, the number was 123,000 and in 1921, 149,060. They intermarry freely with Burmese women, and the male children of such marriages are held to be Chinese.

DUTCH EAST INDIES.—In 1900, the Java Bureau of Statistics gave the number of Chinese in Java, Sumatra, Borneo, etc., as 537,000. In 1920, it was 809,000, at which date the total European and Eurasian population amounted to 169,708.

The number of Chinese in British North Borneo in 1930 was estimated at 60,000.

THE PHILIPPINES.—The number of "persons of Chinese parentage" was estimated in 1928 at about 150,000. These are mostly natives of Fukien.

The most significant feature presented by each and all of these Chinese communities overseas, is the economic superiority which they display over the inhabitants of the countries in which they establish themselves. Given a fair field of opportunity, their racial

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solidarity, ready adaptability, sobriety and thrift, combined with a standard of living which defies all competition, enable them to underlive and undersell all other races; and the same qualities, combined with shrewd business ability, tend to concentrate wealth in the hands of their merchants, bankers and shipowners. The British Colonies of Hongkong and Singapore are virtually Chinese-owned to-day; were it not for the Asiatic Exclusion Acts, the Pacific coast of North America would have become a Chinese colony long ago. Where once these sons of Han have taken root, nothing short of physical violence (such as California resorted to in 1904, and the Koreans have used quite lately) can save the native lord of the soil from being ruined by Chinese cheap labour, and eventually dispossessed. Moreover, so long as there is a right of entry and a living to be made, every Chinese community overseas will draw unto itself masses of new recruits from the overcrowded Canton delta. It requires, therefore, no special gift of imagination to foresee that either the nations concerned will protect themselves in the near future by legislating against Chinese immigration, or that, within a comparatively short space of time (say fifty years), Canton will have become the capital city and spiritual home of a New China, whose commercial and political activities will be the predominating factor of the whole Pacific region. As time goes on, as this Cantonese centre becomes more and more representative of the emancipated modernity of the communities overseas, its social and political structure must become more and more sharply differentiated from that of the rest of China. At the same time, because the modification of racial characteristics is necessarily a slow process of

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evolution, it may safely be assumed that the power of the Secret Societies, wielded by inner directorates with headquarters at Canton, will not be greatly different, in machinery and methods, from that of former days; through these, the Cantonese Kuomintang will therefore continue to command allegiance, collect the subscriptions, and control the international relations of these communities overseas; in other words, it will develop and exercise immense power over a very wide area. The recent brief-lived proscription of the activities of the Kuomintang by the British authorities of Malaya may be regarded as a cloud, no bigger than a man's hand, which is destined eventually to overshadow all other problems of the Far East. Regarded in this light, the Cantonese party's activities in the arena of internal politics, and the repeated assertion of their right to secede from any government which they do not control, are matters whose significance lies rather in the future than in the present, and more in the field of world economics than in that of Chinese politics.

For the present, the struggle for supremacy must continue because, for all their solidarity and efficiency, the quick-witted Southerners cannot hope to overcome the deep-rooted antagonism of the North and to organise a new United China under their undisputed control. But even while the struggle continues, they will continue to enjoy the prestige which they have acquired in the eyes of their countrymen as organisers and leaders of the Kuomintang policies associated with the name of Sun Yat-sen, and particularly with that which aims at recovering the rights and privileges conferred upon foreigners by the unequal Treaties. In these matters all China has practically recognised the

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intellectual ascendancy of the South; and a new national philosophy is in progress of evolution, around and about the already legendary figure of the author of the "Three Principles," which reflects the peculiar genius of the Cantonese for political organisation, their abounding energy and their inveterate chauvinism. Because of the light which it throws upon this new national philosophy, and upon the mentality of the western-educated "Intellectuals" who have evoked it, let us now consider the remarkable phenomenon of the cult of Sun Yat-sen, and thereafter examine the nature and results of the propaganda for foreign consumption which the Kuo-mintang, under Cantonese influence, have based upon that cult.

CHAPTER IV

THE CULT AND LEGEND OF SUN YAT-SEN

"The whole career of the great Dr. Sun is a kind of quest of a philosopher's stone. Not only do his analyses of political, social and economic forces appear weirdly irrational to western thought, but they have never affected, by any power of reason, the political thought of China. He was always distrusted, while he was alive, by the majority of his countrymen. He will be remembered in time as an historical figure of tragic irony."—*Owen Lattimore*.*

CLOSELY examined, the apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen, since his death in March, 1925, affords evidence of the mental confusion and political demoralisation which have resulted from the sudden abolition of the Confucianist system of education and of the Throne, the foundation and apex respectively of China's ancient civilisation. The legend of his political wisdom and patriotic virtue, which his relatives and adherents have ingeniously created, and which the southern section of the Kuomintang has deliberately exploited, for their own ends, are phenomena deserving of study. The whole story of the canonisation, on the initiative of the Cantonese Radicals, of their "late revered leader," presents features of unusual interest, not only for the student of modern politics but for every observer of human affairs. It illustrates and emphasises in a remarkable degree the truth, that the real causes and significance of political events in Asiatic countries lie deeply hidden beneath the surface on which the publicists so glibly expatiate.

* From *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*. Reproduced by permission of the publishers, the Macmillan Co.

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The western world of diplomacy and politics, with little opportunity or incentive to look beneath that surface, has generally been disposed to accept Sun Yat-sen and the posthumous legend of his "Three Principles," at the face value placed upon them by the propagandists of the Kuomintang and by the inner clique of Sun's relatives and in-laws, familiarly known in Chinese political circles as the "Soong dynasty." But a careful study of the Cantonese leader's career and writings must convince every dispassionate observer that there is nothing in either to justify his canonisation as a national prophet and law-giver, and very little in the "Three Principles" (except it be his continual appeal to racial pride) that can convey any message intelligible or comforting to the mind of the Chinese masses. Such being the case, it follows, and I propose to show, that the personal apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen and the importance ascribed to his political doctrines are artificial phenomena, deliberately created by the westernised section of the modern mandarinat, in order to strengthen their own position as rulers of China and to create the impression of a popular and progressive government, rightly entitled to be relieved of the humiliating burden of the "unequal Treaties."

First, as to Sun's personality and career. It is not necessary for our present purpose, to describe the earlier stages of his career as a political agitator—generally in exile—working for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and sowing the seed of revolutionary sentiment amongst the Chinese communities overseas. The plain story of his early life, as told "by reliable men of excellent memory now living in Honolulu, who knew Sun Yat-sen from his boyhood to his death," has recently

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been published by Bishop Restarick.* It conveys a much more accurate impression of the mentality and morality of the revolutionary leader than that which English readers derived from the emotional work produced by Dr. James Cantlie in collaboration with Mr. Sheridan Jones, shortly after the declaration of the Republic.† In the absence of more accurate knowledge, Dr. Cantlie's unbalanced panegyric created at the time a considerable amount of sympathy for Sun Yat-sen's professions and projects of reform and belief in his capacity, so to carry them out, that China might speedily advance and take her rightful place on a footing of equality with the western world. True, he confessed at the outset that his judgment might have been affected by personal regard for Sun Yat-sen as "the most perfect character he ever knew," and by the "inexplainable influence of his remarkable magnetism and charm." The influence in his case appears indeed to have been of an almost hypnotic character, for it led him to assure his readers *inter alia* that the triumph of his hero and of the Revolution had put an end for ever to "the day of corrupt and impossible mandarins." "If there is one result of the Revolution more certain than another," he wrote, "it is that the relations between China and Europe have entered definitely upon a new chapter, free from the irritating absurdities, the suspicions and hostilities of the past, and to be characterised by candour and cordiality." And again, "the prescience of the man who has for twenty years directed operations against the Manchu despotism will be in nothing more apparent

* *Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China.* By Bishop Restarick. Yale University Press, 1931. (London, Milford, 1931.)

† *Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China.* By James Cantlie and Sheridan Jones. (Jarrold, 1912.)

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than this: that now the crash has come, he has his men ready for all the positions of trust and danger, on whose fitness the State must depend." Fantastic as it now appears, Dr. Cantlie's enthusiastic belief in Sun Yat-sen's vision of Celestial socialism and in the miracle of a sudden and complete change in the structural character of the Chinese people, found a ready response amongst sentimental enthusiasts in this country and in the United States. Their opinions, founded on similar delusions, probably contributed, as much as the reactions of the Great War, to produce the policy of benevolent *laissez-faire* prescribed by the Washington Conference. A significant manifestation of the prevailing influence of these opinions was afforded shortly before the Conference when, at a banquet given by the Pan-Pacific Association at Shanghai to a large party of American Congressmen and their wives, Sun Yat-sen held forth on the subject of his political activities against the central government at Peking. Replying for the guests, Dr. Paul Reinsch, American ex-Minister to China, declared that "out of all the world, Dr. Sun stood out as the representative of the Chinese ideal, true to her inner traditions and the ideals Americans believed in. First of all, he was a true and great Chinese Liberal."

Writing shortly after Dr. Cantlie's book was published, I ventured to express the opinion that, while Sun's personal magnetism, patriotic energy and courage were undeniable, his ideals of government and reform were the result of undigested socialistic theories, combined with a purely imaginative and idealised conception of China and the Chinese, he himself being an unusually exotic type of Young China, reared and

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trained amongst Europeans. Even at that time, his political speeches and writings had begun to reveal the peculiar lack of historical consciousness, and the fluent opportunism unhampered by facts, which characterise the "Three Principles." Also, as I observed, had it not been for the naïve sincerity of the man himself and his untiring energy, the splendid vagueness and extravagance of his reform schemes would have made them and him ridiculous, as indeed they soon became. It was inevitable that he should be compared with Danton, for he resembled the great Jacobin, not only in possessing the restless and energetic energy of the born conspirator, but in his robust faith in the reformation of mankind by virtue of political institutions, and in himself as the Heaven-sent Reformer. Finally, I pointed out that his artless enthusiasm for ideals had by no means deprived him of the practical common sense of the Cantonese; his most fervent orations would have been incomplete without taking up a collection for the good cause. Sincerely simple in his private life, he displayed, from the first moment of his rise to power, a weakness for uniforms, imposing ceremonies and processions; a man of the people, he surrounded himself, as President elect, with suites and bodyguards, with pomp and circumstance. Towards the end of his career, as head of the independent Government at Canton in 1923-24, he developed megalomania of an acute type, which, in the opinion of many observers, including missionaries, verged on sadic insanity.

Until his triumphal appearance upon the scene as Provisional President of the new-born Republic at the end of 1911, Sun Yat-sen's romantic career as a political conspirator abroad had earned for him amongst

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foreigners in the Far East the reputation of a resourceful and courageous rebel, patriotic according to his lights and honest as China's political world goes. He appealed to the popular imagination at a time when any symptom of sincerity in the direction of constructive reform was doubly welcome. Many of those who had come into contact with his engaging personality before his rise to power, were disposed to hope and believe that in him Young China had at last found a leader who would set a convincing example of disinterested devotion to the public service, and thus achieve the most urgently needed of all reforms, a raising of the standard of mandarin morality. The hope was foredoomed, for the reason that every man, no matter how great or good, is necessarily a product of the antecedents of the society which gave him birth. "We are what suns and winds and waters make us," as Landor says, and the ancestral *feng shui* of Kuangtung, which determined the type of Sun Yat-sen's mind, were far too deep-rooted to be radically modified by residence abroad or by western learning. The whole of his career, after his return to China in 1911, affords instructive testimony to the biological truth, that the social and moral ideas born and bred in an Asiatic people are not to be eradicated (they merely become latent) as the result of a western education. In due season the atavistic instincts and mentality of the race-mind assert themselves and the individual reverts to the type of the society which produced him. The nature of the instincts and impulses underlying Sun Yat-sen's personal ambitions was fully understood and appreciated by his own countrymen. When, for example, the Kuangtung merchants, driven to desperation by the ruthlessness of his methods for extracting

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money from them wherewith to pay his Yünnanese troops, raised their own volunteer bands in 140 towns throughout the province and planned the overthrow of the revolutionary leader in the autumn of 1924, Sun's ferocious reprisals, carried out by Labour bands organised by the left wing of the Kuomintang under the advice of Comrade Borodin, destroyed the wealthiest section of Canton with great loss of life. Borodin's own reports, prior to this period, show that he regarded Sun as an ambitious visionary, afflicted with megalomania. At the time of his death, the hero of the revolution had completely lost the confidence and support of the Chinese communities overseas, on account of his Bolshevik associations and ruthless methods of government. No better evidence could be cited of the audacity and skill, displayed by the Kuomintang propagandists since his death, than the fact that all such unfortunate incidents have been obliterated from the official records and that the legendary figure of "our late revered leader" imposed upon China to-day, is that of a prophet and law-giver, well beloved of his people.

Sun Yat-sen's eulogists lay stress upon his personal honesty and upon the fact that, considering his opportunities, he died a comparatively poor man. Judged by Chinese standards, he was certainly not grasping or avaricious, and was ever more engrossed in his political schemes than in his private affairs. But in the pursuit of those schemes he continually displayed an expediency as unprincipled, and an opportunism as supple, as that of Yuan Shih-K'ai, Tuan Chi-jui or any other of his political opponents. Thus, in 1911, he did not hesitate to obtain financial assistance and military advisers from Japan, though in later years he denounced with patriotic

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indignation the politicians of the Anfu persuasion for doing precisely the same thing. After his resignation of the Presidency in favour of Yuan Shih-K'ai in 1912, it was only the opposition of his southern colleagues which prevented him from accepting a highly-paid post as Director General of Railways, under the Dictator at Peking. That he was freehanded and personally indifferent to wealth is true, in the same way that it was true of the great Viceroys Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-yi; nevertheless, it is also incontestably true that in his case, as in that of every party leader since 1911, politics proved a remunerative profession. The main objects of his ambition were power and fame, but in achieving them he certainly attained also the object instinctively pursued by every son of Han, namely, that of placing his own kith and kin beyond the menace of poverty for several generations. According to common repute, his son, Sun Fo (lately Minister of Railways under Chiang K'ai-shek, and now the leading figure in the Cantonese Government) is one of the wealthiest of China's modern millionaires, while the position of ascendancy achieved by his second wife and her sister, in the councils of the Kuomintang Central Committee under Chiang K'ai-shek, might almost be described as dynastic.

As regards the conduct of his private life, Sun Yat-sen affords an instructive example of reversion to type, and evidence of the truth that a western education cannot greatly modify the deep-rooted atavistic tendencies of the Oriental. Bishop Restarick's biographical sketch of the "Liberator" was obviously inspired by feelings of admiration, approaching emotional hero-worship; but for all that, impartial accuracy compels

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him to record, on the evidence of reliable witnesses, that the Father of the Republic frequently showed himself to be lacking in those qualities which, judged either by Chinese or by Western standards of morality, are expected of the Good Ruler, the Superior Man. Thus, for example, the Bishop admits that, where there was an important object to be gained (as in the case of his affidavit, applying for American citizenship, on false grounds, in 1904) he did not hesitate to pervert the truth; that while professing Christianity he practised polygamy; and that he was a past master in the arts and crafts of political propaganda. The story of his life, as told to the Bishop by his relatives and early associates, leaves the impression of a restless, undisciplined but curiously impressive and sympathetic personality, wholly unscrupulous as to the means and methods by which his ambitious ends were attained, yet different from the common run of political agitators because of his indifference to personal wealth, his untiring activity, and the sincerity of his endeavours to remove some of the causes, which he dimly perceived, of China's economic and political inferiority.

The ambition which manifestly inspired all his activities, after the overthrow of the Manchus, was to make the Cantonese rulers of China, with himself at their head. In pursuit of this ambition he displayed an inexhaustible capacity for intrigue, combined with complete indifference to public opinion and to the fact that his proceedings were irreconcilable with his professed principles and pledges. Considered in this light, his relations with Moscow, which began in January, 1923, and continued until his death in March, 1925, were incidental and, in a sense, accidental; certainly they were

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no more indicative of a sincere acceptance of Bolshevik principles than his profession of Christianity was proof of genuine conversion to that faith. He was always ready, even as his successors in control of the Cantonese party are to-day, to intrigue with whichever foreign Power, Russia or Japan, England or the United States, seemed most likely at the moment to supply material assistance against his opponents and rivals. From the time of the death of Yuan Shih-K'ai (1916) until his own, his years were spent in a struggle for power, far more acute than anything he had experienced when conspiring against the Manchus. During these strenuous years of treasons, stratagems, and spoils, he was alternately either head of the independent Government of Canton, in rebellion against the Northern "militarists," or, when driven from Canton by cabals amongst his own followers, a refugee in the Foreign Settlement at Shanghai, ceaselessly plotting his return to power. It was in January, 1923, when Sun, "in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes," was living in the French Concession at Shanghai, that the Bolshevik agent, Abram Joffe, made overtures to him which laid the foundation of "most cordial and friendly relations"; their result was to bring the Southern armies in triumph to Peking, sowing as they went evil winds of unrest throughout the land, whose harvest is still in the reaping. Until his association with the agents of Moscow, Sun's political programmes had not been conspicuously marked by the violent manifestations of ill-will to foreigners which characterised his utterances after his return to Canton in February, 1923, and which led him, shortly before his death, to give his retrospective blessing to Boxerism. But when it is borne in mind that the shorthand notes of the

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lectures which comprise the "Three Principles" were collated into the final text under Comrade Borodin's supervision, and when the nature of the close co-operation between the Soviets and Canton, from 1924 onwards, is examined in the light of the documents seized in 1928 at the Soviet Embassy at Peking, it is justifiable to conclude that the Moscovite atmosphere, which permeates the text of China's "political Bible," was rather an expression of the author's obligations and lively sense of favours to some, than of genuine political convictions. The text itself proves conclusively that its author took many of his ideas ready-made from sources which he had never seriously studied, and that neither he, nor the final editors of the "Three Principles," were at pains to reconcile his earlier doctrines, borrowed from Henry George and Karl Marx, with those which he acquired at later dates from Dr. Maurice William and Comrade Borodin. How much of the book, which the Kuomintang has imposed on the nation as its political Bible, is Sun's own work and how much was interpolated under Borodin's direction, must remain matter for surmise, but the moving finger of the Moscovite can be clearly discerned throughout the text, which may be described as a patchwork, in which an artless fantasia on contemporary Chinese politics is adapted to the propaganda of the Third International. According to the propaganda of the Kuomintang Intellectuals, who have canonised Sun as the national prophet and law-giver, his "Three Principles" accurately represent the mind of modern China, but the fact remains, that the shorthand notes of the original lectures were taken down by Borodin's secretary, Huang Ch'ang-ku, later Mayor of Wuchang and a leader of the Red Directorate to which the British Government

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surrendered the Concession at Hankow. The final editing of the work was done, not by Sun Yat-sen himself, but by Chou Lu, the ultra-red President of the Chung-Shan University of Canton. It is stretching credulity too far to suggest that Borodin and his associates failed to avail themselves of such an opportunity to present the new Gospel of Young China in a form calculated to promote the ends of Bolshevism.

The thing was very skilfully done. Over the heads of the inarticulate masses, the "Three Principles" were acclaimed by the westernised section of Young China, and especially by the Cantonese element in the Kuomintang, as the inspired Gospel, by virtue of which China was to throw off the humiliating yoke of the "unequal Treaties," recover her unfettered sovereignty, and finally vindicate the principle of racial equality. The doctrines proclaimed in the name of the founder of the Republic supplied a background and justification for the Kuomintang's organised campaign to secure the expropriation and eventual eviction of the foreigner; in other words, they provided new and promising methods of achieving the ambition which, naturally enough, has always inspired the rulers of China. Under Comrade Borodin's adroit direction, the campaign assumed definite direction and violent expression; to his advice were due the slogans whereby the ever-latent chauvinism of the masses was stirred to activity, and the adoption by the Cantonese leaders of those Bolshevik methods of propaganda, which eventually proved mightier than the sword, in their triumphant progress, first to the Yangtze, and then to Peking.

It is necessary to bear this fact in mind because the imposing edifice of make believe, constructed by Chiang

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K'ai-shek and the Southern section of the Kuomintang, for the beguilement of Europe and America, depends largely for its success and stability upon their ability to convince the outside world of the reality of the Cult of Sun Yat-sen and of its genuine appeal to the masses. After Sun Yat-sen's death it became the first concern of the Kuomintang's spokesmen and publicists, at home and abroad, to inculcate the belief that the apotheosis of the Cantonese leader is a spontaneous and sincere manifestation of the nation's newly-awakened political consciousness. Their intensive propaganda was skilfully directed to this end through the Press, through students at foreign centres of learning, and carefully selected diplomatic agents, and it was greatly assisted by the influential support of religious and educational societies in England and America. It proved remarkably successful. By sheer force of reiteration, public opinion abroad was led to believe that the personality and political opinions of Sun Yat-sen had swept the Chinese people into new courses of conscious patriotism and an enthusiastic acceptance of the social and political doctrines of the "Three Principles." For all that, it remains demonstrably true, that the original idea of Sun worship, and most of its subsequent developments as the political faith of the Southern Nationalists, originated in the brain of Comrade Borodin and that its appeal was originally confined to the westernised section of the Kuomintang, and particularly to Sun Yat-sen's relatives and entourage, who saw in it an instrument designed to consolidate power in their own hands. Under their direction, the Cult assumed form and substance, until at last it became the only true faith and the recognised test of patriotism. Its sponsors made good use of the

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emotional quality which distinguishes Young China's political enthusiasms; with equal success they appealed to the racial pride of the Cantonese communities overseas, all eager to see their native province assume the lead in raising China to a footing of equality with the Powers of the West. The Cult, carrying all before it, swept northwards, with the Cantonese Nationalist expedition, in the summer of 1926. At that date, its doctrines were strongly coloured with the Communism which Sun Yat-sen had introduced into his reorganisation of the Kuomintang, under Joffe's advice, in 1924, in retaliation for the naval blockade which the Powers instituted at Canton in 1923 to frustrate his intention of seizing the revenues of the Kuangtung Customs. When the Northern expedition started, Chiang K'ai-shek, its leader, was apparently dominated by the influence of Comrade Borodin, and the Cult, as he proclaimed it, was frankly red. Addressing the Whangpoa Military Academy in April, 1926, he declared that the Chinese Revolution was organically related to Lenin's world-revolution and that the Kuomintang should therefore accept the direction of the Third International. Most of the political propaganda work of the expedition was entrusted by him to members of the Communist section of the Kuomintang and the Communist Union of Military Youth. Eventually, as events proved, Chiang's faith in the Kuomintang and in his own ability to lead and control it, led him to abandon Communist principles and to dispense with his Russian advisers. In July, 1927, after the capture of Nanking and Shanghai, he expelled all Communists from the ranks of the Kuomintang and broke with the Third International. The Russians had served his ends, and those

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ends were achieved; henceforward the Cult of Sun Yat-sen, and the national policy proclaimed in his name by successive Kuomintang Congresses, ceased to reflect the direct influence of Moscow, and became the national creed embodying the political aspirations and opinions of the new ruling class. The ease and rapidity with which this cult and the *koran* of the "Three Principles" have been imposed upon the nation and the world at large, by the politicians of the Kuomintang, is a phenomena which not only demonstrates the political inertia of the Chinese masses, but emphasises the ignorance of the western world with regard to the forces and tendencies at work beneath the surface of the Nationalist movement.

Commenting on Sun Yat-sen's spectacular State funeral at Nanking in June, 1929—four years after his death—a writer in the *Peking Leader* accurately, though perhaps unconsciously, summed up the significance of the imposing ceremonies at which the representatives of eighteen nations paid uncomfortably obsequious homage before the six-million-dollar mausoleum on the side of Purple Mountain.

"These past four years," he wrote, "have seen Sun Yat-sen transformed from a starkly determined but fallible revolutionary leader into the all-wise founder and guiding spirit of the Revolution, before whom all should bow and to whom all should turn for guidance and inspiration. Other men, after their death, have been transformed in much the same way and have become the symbols of unity and loyalty, around which political or social or religious movements have turned. . . . It is no small gain to China that it should have acquired such a symbol, to which all eyes can turn, as the *transformed* Sun Yat-sen has become. Through the centuries, the visible symbol of the Throne served as the focal point for governmental activities and for such sense of national unity as existed. With the establishment of a Re-

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public, this symbol disappeared and there was nothing to take its place . . . affairs were in the hands of ordinary men, behind whom stood no semi-mystic authority in whose name they could speak. That lack of a unifying symbol was one of the serious handicaps on the efforts to get the new régime going. In these four years since he died, Dr. Sun has come in no small measure to supply that lack. The leaders of to-day can and do speak and act under his ægis. They get from that association an authority which would otherwise not be theirs."

When it is borne in mind that, at the time of his death, Sun Yat-sen's unpopularity was so great that Canton had cast him out and his influence overseas had become almost negligible, this "transformation" of the Republican leader into a unifying national symbol and a "semi-mystic" authority is a feat which speaks volumes for the acumen and energy of the Kuomintang politicians and Intellectuals. Their birthright of acute political instincts has evidently suffered no elimination in the process of acquiring western learning. In replacing the sovereignty of the Manchus by that of the Kuomintang, and substituting the pontifical authority of Sun Yat-sen for that of the Dragon Throne, the perspicacious Cantonese recognised the unmistakable truth, that no aspirant to power in China can hope to retain it without a background of moral authority, and the equally important truth that the origin and nature of that authority will never be closely scrutinised by the politically unconscious masses. Hence the apotheosis of "the all-wise founder and guiding spirit of the Revolution"; hence the gradual creation, by China's new rulers, of the cult and legend of the canonised leader, deliberately composed and imposed by semi-religious laws and ceremonies, all calculated to impress the "stupid people." Hence the weekly memorial services

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in honour of "our late revered leader," the mass production of his photograph for the use of schools and public offices, and the invocation of his authority in justification of every phase and feature of Kuomintang activity. In the elaborate machinery which they have devised for bringing and keeping his name before the public at home and abroad; in the semi-sanctity ascribed to his last will and testament, and in the continual invocation of his political programme of national reconstruction, the Kuomintang leaders are simply conforming to immemorial tradition, by supplying the nation's instinctive need of some object of veneration, some rallying point to replace the Dragon Throne and the doctrines of the Sages. In creating a general belief in a moral authority higher than their own, the Cantonese Intelligentsia have conformed to Chinese ideas of what is expected of rulers. Incidentally, they have served their own political ends, and raised their own prestige and influence at home and overseas, by virtue of the fact that the moral authority thus created was of Cantonese origin and western education. Finally, it is wholly in accordance with the Chinese conception of the fitness of things, that the men and women who took the lead in creating and propagating the Sun Yat-sen legend, the originators and chief beneficiaries of the Cult, were either his own family or relations by marriage, or individuals closely identified with his political fortunes.

It is also in accordance with the immemorial traditions of mandarindom that when, in the tumult of the Revolutionary period, the semi-westernised Intelligentsia became the only organised political force in the country, and cast aside the canons of the Sages in favour of western learning, they should have adopted the

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"Three Principles" as the gospel of their new creed. For the writings of China's modern sage, for all their garb of modernity, fulfil all the requirements of the classical standard in the matter of incomprehensibility. The political skies have changed, but the mind of the Oriental scholar continues to display the abiding influences of Celestial traditions. In the "Three Principles" of Sun Yat-sen, it has canonised a very fitting successor to the *Book of Changes*, of which it may truthfully be said that none of its commentators who have discussed it since the days of Confucius, has ever discovered a satisfactory clue to the purpose or meaning of the illustrious author who composed it. It is a shrewd political instinct which surrounds the ark of its covenant with an atmosphere of mystery and expounds the tablets of its laws in language that conveys nothing to the vulgar, except the voice of authority. The political Bible bequeathed to the nation by Sun Yat-sen (*cum* Borodin) possesses, moreover, for scholars who are also frequently politicians, the advantage that, being written around and about contemporary affairs, it lends itself even more readily than the ancient classics to interpretations which may be made to serve immediate and practical ends. Already, judging by the number and the Character of the Commentaries* which the new gospel has evoked (largely for consumption abroad) it is evident that, from the confused mass of its obscure ideology, vague political theories and crude economics, every man can extract the creed he seeks, according to his nature and his needs.

This eminently adaptable quality of Sun Yat sen's

* e.g., Those by Chou Fu-hai, editor of the *New Life*, Shanghai, and by Tai Chi-tao, President of the Board of Examiners in the National Government.

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doctrines is curiously exemplified by their effect upon the minds of European observers. I do not refer to those who like Dr. Cantlie and Professor Reinsch) came under the direct influence of his persuasive personality, nor to the get-wise-quick type of journalists and publicists who write as they run, but to the serious-minded people—missionaries, students of politics and sinologues—who have studied the origin and tendencies of China's new Cult. Most of these (especially the missionaries) find in the text of the "Three Principles" confirmation of their hopes or fears, evidence of the long-deferred dawn of a New Era, or proof of the beginning of the end. A most notable illustration of this catholic adaptability occurred last year in a work* published with the formal benediction of the Holy See, a complete and profusely annotated translation of *The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen*, by the Rev. Father d'Elia, S.J., of which the Nanking Government expressed its approval by purchasing 5,000 copies for distribution. The worthy Father is not greatly concerned with the interpretation given to the "Liberator's" writings by his own political adherents and the Nationalist Government during the period immediately following his death. He ignores the wave of anti-foreign and anti-Christian feeling which swept through the country, converting Mission Chapels into Sun Memorial Halls, and uprooting the results of half a century of missionary effort, as the Cantonese armies fought and bought their triumphal way to the Yangtze, in the name of the new Prophet. It is enough for him that Sun's family insisted (*malgré tout*) upon his being buried with benefit

* *The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen*. By Pascal M. d'Elia, S.J. (The Franciscan Press, Wuchang.)

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of Christian clergy. Proceeding from the indisputable premises that "the text of Sun Yat-sen lends itself to false interpretations," and holding firmly to the belief that whenever it seems to be wholly irreconcilable with the Catholic faith, its errors can be explained away, either by other passages in the text or by a 'sympathetic appreciation' of its author's character, he finally succeeds in producing "a version of the new ideas which is compatible with Christian morals." To the trained mind of a dialectician with a definite purpose in view, the process could present no serious difficulty, for Sun Yat-sen was never at pains to reconcile the ideas which he borrowed from abroad before 1924, with those which he proclaimed as China's new gospel after turning to Russia for help against his enemies. His was the eager, emotional type of mind which despises consistency: whether as conspirator, Christian, or Muscovite Communist, he was everything by starts, and nothing long. Therefore, after dealing with the "Three Principles" in some 600 pages of 'conciliatory explanations' the worthy Father arrives quite comfortably at the conclusion that:

"... at the risk of seeming to utter a paradox, we think that, with his *Triple Demism* in hand, we may tell Sun Yat-sen that, no matter what he says, he is neither a Communist nor a Socialist, but simply a Demist, and that once cleared of the obscurity of formulæ and the somewhat intentional ambiguity of terms, his *Demism* can, by means of a few corrections be presented in such a way that it does not oppose the Catholic teaching."

Other similar examples might be cited, though none perhaps so artless, of the effect of the Cult of Sun Yat-sen upon educated western minds, all tending to show that the prophet whom the Intellectuals of Young China have canonised, and the book of which they have made

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the national Koran, are, on the whole, not ill-suited to the requirements of her ruling class and to present-day conditions in China. For every aspirant to power can find moral justification for his purposes by appealing to the doctrines of 'our late revered leader,' and each of the rival factions can—and does—claim that its own particular policy represents the only genuine fulfilment of those doctrines. Thus, when M. Emile Vandervelde, the voluble Belgian Socialist, made a rapid tour of China last year the courteous *Ciceroni*, who personally conducted him on his pious pilgrimage to the holy places of the Revolution, were quite ready to confirm him in conclusions, diametrically opposed to those reached by Father d'Elia and approved by the Government at Nanking. He was convinced that the "Three Principles" represent "a revolutionary creed which, by Sun Yat-sen's own admission, is nothing more nor less than Socialism—an adaptation of Socialism to the special conditions of China.* He went away from China greatly comforted by the belief that the doctrines of Karl Marx (which Sun had definitely abandoned before his death) had been the inspiration and driving force of the Nationalist movement.

We shall have occasion again to refer to the nature and effects of the Cult of Sun Yat-sen when considering the position of the missionary in China. Suffice it here to say, that the inchoate mass of crude ideas which formed the original matter of the extemporaneous lectures (delivered in 1924 and subsequently edited into the "Three Principles," for purposes of Kuomintang propaganda) has certainly never reached the illiterate masses

* *A Travers la Revolution Chinoise*. By Emile Vandervelde. (Paris, Alcan.)

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and that its effect upon the mind, as distinct from the politics, of the educated ruling class, is negligible. It is quite safe to assert that not one in a thousand of the politicians and officials who bow each week before Sun's portrait, has seriously studied his "Three Principles," and probably not one in ten thousand has ever attempted to make sense of their arguments and conclusions.

I need not labour the point; but it may usefully be illustrated, by reference to the "Outline of National Reconstruction," a summary of Sun's political programme which, by order of the Kuomintang, has been carved upon the wall of his Memorial Hall at Nanking. In this particular chapter of China's new Bible, the process of reconstruction is divided into three periods, viz., the period of military operations, the period of political tutelage, and the period of constitutional Government—a process evidently compounded by Sun out of Lincoln's Gettysburg formula of government and the Confucian ideal of political evolution, from national states to enlightened cosmopolitanism. According to the myth which the Kuomintang successfully imposed upon a credulous world in 1929, the period of military operations came to its appointed end with the capture of Peking by the Southern Nationalists and the removal of the capital to Nanking. The period of political tutelage, or as the Kuomintang prefer to call it, the educative period, then began. According to the decision promulgated by the second plenary session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in June 1929, this period is supposed to terminate in 1935, by which time the education of the nation in self-government should be sufficiently advanced to permit of the delegation of constitutional powers to the people. The in-

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ventory of the educative work, to be completed during this period of tutelage, as set forth on the wall of the Memorial Hall, reads as follows:—

Article VIII. During the period of political tutelage, the Government shall appoint trained men, who have passed the civil service examinations, to assist the people in the several administrative districts (*hsien*) in preparing for local self-government. When a census of any district shall have been taken, the land therein surveyed, an efficient police force organised, roads built throughout the district, the people trained in the exercise of their political rights and accustomed to the performance of their civic duties, according to the principles of the Revolution, and when officers shall have been elected to serve as district magistrates and councillors, then the district shall be deemed fit for full self-government.

I have selected this particular article out of twenty-five similarly fantastic flights of imagination, because it provides a very typical example of the mandarin mind's capacity for regulating in advance every conceivable development of purely imaginary and impossible situations. Such things do not deceive, and are not intended to deceive, the native born; but it is a matter of tradition, and part of the political game of make-believe, that such utterances should be treated with the solemnity and deference due to Imperial Edicts, for the better beguilement of the outer barbarian. The writing on the wall of Sun's Memorial Hall was never meant to impress the Sons of Han; they, poor devils, know only too well that if the period of political tutelage is to continue until every district has its roads built, its efficient police provided, and its citizens trained in the exercise of their political rights, the Kuomintang's 'pacific dictatorship' is likely to last their time. Those who give the matter a thought are well aware that a Constitution, to provide government of the people by the people and for the

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people, is no more intended or possible in 1935, than it was in 1911; they know that most of the 'trained men,' who are supposed to be 'assisting the people in preparation for local self-government,' are actually filling their pockets with the illicit revenues of the government-protected opium traffic, and that the bandits and pirates who infest the land are not more dangerously predatory than the self-elected leaders of the local Kuomintang Committees. Every Chinese merchant, every member of the educated class, knows perfectly well that all this official Cult of Sun Yat-sen, and his "Three Principles" is part of the elaborate edifice of make-believe, calculated to create the impression in England and America, that China is rapidly progressing towards the stable and effective government of Washington's imagination. For them, it is all 'wind in the ear,' with no more bearing on realities than the programme promulgated in 1929, by Sun-I'fo (Sun Yat-sen's son), for spending 500 million dollars a year on railways for the next fifty years, or the Nanking Government's "enlightened scheme for the housing and assistance of the poor," to be carried out at once "in every city and town of China." Such gestures make no serious impression on the Chinese masses, merely confirming their opinion of the unchanging nature of mandarindom. But there is no denying that, thanks to the assistance rendered by their paid and unpaid propagandists abroad, especially in England and America, the Kuomintang has succeeded in creating a widespread belief in the 'national Cult,' and all that it implies. Of all the many American professors, missionaries and publicists, who have written about Sun's scheme of national reconstruction for the enlightenment of their country.

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men, the number of those who have pointed out its inherent impossibility, and the consequent insincerity of its sponsors, is extremely small, whereas the name is legion of those who have taken it in all seriousness, and commended it as the constructive work of earnest patriots. The result, especially at Washington and Geneva, has been to make of Sun Yat-sen a heroic figure and of his "Three Principles" a revolutionary gospel, as genuine as Rousseau's *Contrat Social*. For the dissemination of these and other errors, missionaries are greatly to blame; but responsibility in this matter attaches chiefly to those writers who, because of their political inclinations, religious beliefs, professional duties or vocational idealism, have sinned against the light, benevolently ignoring facts and features of the situation which, had they been stated, must have revealed the inherent absurdity of the Kuomintang's grandiloquent programme. Many of those who have eulogised Sun Yat-sen's plan of national reconstruction, have cited the inscription thereon in the Memorial Hall at Nanking as proof of its fundamental wisdom and of the value placed upon it by the Chinese Revolutionists, and applauded it accordingly; yet very few have drawn attention to the obvious fact that there is no sense in talking of training the people to the exercise of their political rights, so long as the Government deliberately suppresses the liberty of the Press and proceeds on the principle (laid down by Sun himself) that "only the revolutionists are entitled to enjoy political rights." Few if any, emphasise the elementary truth that it is absurd to talk of providing roads and police, public health authorities and garden cities, so long as the Government is manifestly incapable of protecting the masses against

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bandits, gunmen, and other despoilers.

If, as the Kuomintang leaders aver, the "Three Principles" interpret the mind of modern China, then indeed is China in a parlous state. One prefers, on the whole, to believe that the Cult of Sun Yat-sen is merely a manifestation of the Chinese mandarin's adroitness in protective mimicry, and that, in the secret depths of the minds of those who profess to reverence the Cult, it really represents nothing more than an imposing jerry-built façade, behind which the Chinese people, leaders and led, may continue to pursue the changeless ways prescribed by immemorial tradition.

CHAPTER V

THE MISSIONARY FACTOR

"The greatest vicissitude of things amongst men is the vicissitude of sects and religions."—*Francis Bacon*.

"A people is no more capable of suddenly receiving a higher form of religion than it is capable of suddenly receiving a higher form of government."—*Herbert Spencer*.

BROADLY speaking, most of the calamities, which together make the tragedy of China in the twentieth century, may be ascribed to the impact of the West, to the undermining of the old social order by the military, economic and political forces brought to bear upon it from overseas since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The long-drawn tragedies of civil strife and administrative chaos are no new experience for China, whose history has been fittingly described as a series of paroxysms, where the passing of a dynasty has repeatedly been followed by periods of anarchy and where the annihilation of millions by flood, famine or disease has always been accepted as part of the inevitable destiny of mankind. But the cataclysm of China in the twentieth century differs from those of former days, in that the nation is now threatened with the permanent destruction of those things which heretofore constituted its unfailing preservatives of cohesion and recuperative energy. So long as the ethical foundation of the old social order remained intact, calamitous periods such as those which occurred at the close of the Ming dynasty or during the Taiping rebellion, left no visible mark on the national life. To-

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day, because of the sudden uprooting of the old system of education and the abrupt withdrawal of moral authority from the Confucian *literati*—the class which for centuries had given the nation its rulers and law-givers—China confronts the future like a rudderless ship upon uncharted seas. Suddenly, for lack of a rallying point and recognised leaders, the basis of the nation's culture, morals and discipline was rudely shaken; the cohesive element in the structure of society was threatened, and with these, for a generation at least, disappeared all hope of the nation's being able to adjust itself successfully to its changed and changing environment, as Japan has done, while preserving the basic fabric of her own civilisation. As far back as 1898, the Great Viceroy, Chang Chih-tung, had warned his countrymen of the perils of any sudden and complete change in the national system of education; in his *Exhortation to Learning*, he recognised the necessity for modifying the old 'classical' examinations by the addition of a modern curriculum, and for providing schools and colleges in which the classic and western learning would be simultaneously taught. A like prescience was shown by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the Cantonese classical scholars who inspired the Emperor Kuang Hsü's Reform Edicts, which precipitated the *coup d'état* of 1898. If the Dynasty had not collapsed, or if, after the Revolution, the Government of the country had passed into the hands of leaders possessed of the necessary authority and wisdom, the process of adaptation, of grafting western science on to native wisdom, might have been gradually and successfully accomplished. As it was, the structure of Government was undermined, the ancient foundations rocked under the assault of an undisci-

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plined iconoclasm and there was no statesmanship or leadership in the land to erect on the solid basis of China's own civilisation a new system of Government adjusted to a changed environment. Herein lies a root cause of the tragedy of present-day China, and the pity of it.

The evidences of disintegration and disruption are many and increasing. The ascendancy of the Cantonese faction, culminating in the dictatorship of the Kuomintang, the hybrid Cult of Sun Yat-sen, replacing the moral authority of the Confucian code, the aggressive indiscipline of the Student Movement and the sinister character of Kuomintang propaganda, are each and all phenomena that can be traced back to the impact of the West. To some extent, no doubt, the process of disruption may be ascribed to causes latent in the nature of the Chinese people, to the inevitable pride of race and the deep-rooted conservatism which have hampered them in acquiring, as Japan has done, the material technique and the machinery of western civilisation. To some extent, it must also be ascribed to the fact that the first impact of the West occurred at a time when the authority of the Throne—focus of the Chinese social system—was shaken and visibly weakening. But the invasions of China's territory by armed forces with which she was unable to cope, the imposition of Treaties which limited the full exercise of her sovereign rights, the shrinking of her frontiers as, one by one, her outlying Dependencies succumbed to the political schemes or the economic necessities of her neighbours—all these were surface ills from which she might, in time, have recovered, as she had often done in the past. But the alien forces which have led the dominant section of

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the educated class to abandon at this critical juncture the basic principles and traditions which have kept China true to herself throughout all the vicissitudes of her history, the insidious invasions of subversive ideas, undermining the nation's reverence for those things which have given such stability and harmony to her civilisation—for these and other results, there is at present no apparent remedy. These constitute, indeed, the most disruptive force which the impact of the West has produced, and the chief cause of the prevailing chaos. And for these the Missionary Societies must be held chiefly responsible. The religious and humanitarian element of western civilisation which, wisely directed, would have provided a guiding and restraining force for the Chinese in their hour of need, has actually aggravated the perils inseparable from a revolutionary period and hastened the process of disruption.

It is difficult, amidst the conflicting sympathies and antipathies inevitably evoked by the discussion of missionary activities, to preserve the even tenor of philosophic enquiry and to avoid incurring the *odium theologicum*. It is not my intention, nor is it necessary for the purposes of this book, to trace the history of Europe's cultural contacts with China through missionary enterprise, or to strike a balance sheet of the resultant benefits and penalties which have accrued to the Chinese people, inasmuch as our purpose is confined to consideration of the course of events in China since the Washington Conference and to an analysis of the principal causes of the political and administrative disorganisation which has prevailed and increased during the last decade.

At the outset, we are confronted by the fact that responsibility lies chiefly with the powerful religious

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and educational societies in the United States, and to some extent in Great Britain, for the errors and misconceptions upon which the Washington Conference proceeded to its conclusions and agreements. To the activities of these societies, combined with Kuomintang propaganda, must be ascribed the false ideas about Chinese "Nationalism," which inspired the hope that, guaranteed by international covenant from foreign aggression, China would develop "the free institutions of a self-governing Republic." When, without fear or favour, the future historian comes to allot the blame for the anarchy which has followed in the wake of this Nationalist movement, and for the violently anti-foreign and anti-Christian spirit which it developed after 1924, he is likely to ascribe it in a very large measure to the educational and political activities of the missionary organisations, and especially to those of the American Protestant Societies. The policy adopted at Washington, as I have already shown, reflected a combination of altruistic ideals with the pursuance of purely American interests, but the misconceptions, by virtue of which this policy was imposed on the Conference, are directly traceable to the influence of the missionary and 'uplift' societies in America and Great Britain. I propose to show that this influence, inspired by well-meaning but misguided sentiment, has already done infinite harm, and that, in spite of a noticeable reaction of opinion since 1927, its unfortunate activities still persist. It is an influence which errs, on the one hand, from the very fervour of its benevolent intentions; on the other, from failure to appreciate the immutable character of the mentality and morality which have been produced by centuries of severe economic

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pressure in China, and which find continual expression in every phase and movement of the national life. It errs because the theological bias, which inevitably prejudices sociological questions, in China's case persistently ignores the elemental truth, that "a people is no more capable of suddenly receiving a higher form of religion than it is of receiving a higher form of government" and that any "attempt to impose such a religion or such a government inevitably leads to a process of degradation which eventually reduces it to something different only in name from its predecessor."*

Before proceeding to discuss the part which the Protestant Missionary organisations have played in calling from China's vasty deep the unruly spirit of "Nationalism," which now threatens to destroy the body politic, and with it the fruits of a century of missionary labour, let us consider briefly the historical record of that century, and its evangelical results. The first Protestant Missionary to gain a footing in China was an Englishman, Robert Morrison, who came to Canton in 1807. Confined within the narrow limits of the factory 'compounds,' he and those who came after him were unable to make any progress with evangelistic work; they contented themselves therefore with learning the Chinese language and translating the Scriptures. When the first Treaty Ports were thrown open to foreigners, after the war of 1842, the number of converts enrolled was six. When, by the Treaty of Tientsin, after another war, missionaries obtained the right to reside in the interior, there were twenty-four societies in the field, employing some two hundred missionaries. Between 1860 and the Boxer rising of

* Herbert Spencer. *The Study of Sociology*.

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1900, the field expanded and the number of workers steadily increased; again, after the Empress Dowager, chastened by defeat, had returned to Peking in 1902, interest in China was greatly stimulated and resulted in a rapid extension of missionary enterprise. This was further accelerated by the abolition of the Confucian Classics as the foundation of learning in 1905 and by the course of events which culminated in the Revolution of 1911. In 1906, a century after Morrison's arrival at Canton, there were sixty-four societies with 3445 workers in the field, 52 per cent of these being British and 43 per cent American; the number of baptised converts was then given as 178,261, and the total of professing Christians at 256,779. In 1918, the total number of Protestant missionaries in China was 6325. At the National Christian Conference of 1922, it was reported that the Christian Community numbered 806,000; there were 130 societies in the field, many of which were devoting special attention to educational and medical work. At the end of 1925, when the Nationalist forces and their Bolshevik allies were preparing for their campaign against the Northern Militarists, the number of missionaries had increased to 8158. In the words of the anonymous author of the article on Protestant Missions published in the China Year Book for 1931:

... the period 1907-1922 registered a tremendous advance in organisational Christian relationships and in the range of Christian activities. It should perhaps be noted also that during this period the relative strength of British and American work and workers changed. In numerical strength and educational effort, American missionaries took the lead, though in literary effort and medicine, the British still retain it. This change correlates with, and is to some extent due to the rapid rise in economic power of America during this same period.

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The same writer observes that at the National Christian Conference of 1922, half the delegates were Chinese, and in all institutions and Christian organisations their initiative was increasingly in evidence. "The mission, as such," he wrote, "is gradually being merged into the Chinese Church, though the process is far from being finished. It is also of interest to note that Christians play their part in the National Government. This is one of the important indirect ways whereby Christianity influences and contributes to the rebuilding of China." To the part which Christians have played in the National Government, and to the political fruit born of missionary activities in the field of education, we shall refer in due course.

It will be observed that the first notable expansion of Protestant missionary labour coincided with China's defeat at the hands of the foreign invader. To this circumstance must be ascribed in large measure the fact that the propagation of Christianity excited the hostility of people and rulers from the beginning, and that the good seed of the Gospel was foredoomed to fall, as a rule, on stony ground. In 1868, when Anson Burlingame visited the United States as China's Envoy Plenipotentiary, he aroused the enthusiasm of the American people by declaring that China was "ready to invite their Missionaries to plant the Shining Cross on every hill and in every valley"; with the eye of faith he descried "China extending her arms towards the shining banners of western civilisation." A year later, Prince Kung, bidding farewell to Sir Rutherford Alcock on his departure from Peking, expressed China's real sentiments by saying, "Take away your opium and missionaries and you will

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be welcome.” The Chinese Government of that day had good reason to feel resentment and apprehension—resentment because of the support given by certain missionaries to the Taiping rebels, and because the alleged Christian aspiration of that movement was still fresh in their minds; apprehension, because they regarded the missionaries as the instruments of powerful nations, bent on despoiling the Empire. As a well-informed writer put it, in the eyes of the Chinese,

. . . they enter the country with the talisman of extra-territoriality their persons are sacred; the law of the land cannot touch them . . . many missionaries are really zealous in alienating the Chinese from their natural allegiance. . . . Thus a revolution of the most vital nature is in progress, and is being pushed on with all the energy which Christian, combined with ecclesiastical and political, zeal can throw into the work. So formidable, indeed, have the missionaries become, that most of the provincial authorities are afraid as well as jealous of them.*

Anti-Christian riots and outrages in all parts of the country synchronised with Mr. Burlingame’s assurances of China’s eagerness to welcome Christianity and western civilisation, and a violently abusive leaflet, circulated throughout the Empire from Hunan in 1869, emphasised the hostile attitude of all classes. From the date of the Tientsin massacre of missionaries in 1870, down to those which followed the Boxer rising of 1900, the whole history of missionary enterprise bears undeniable evidence of the truth that, regardless of creed or nationality, it was cordially detested by the Chinese people, and feared by the official class.

Such was the political aspect of the question at the close of the nineteenth century; let us now glance at the

* Alexander Michie. *The Englishman in China*. (1900.)

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evangelistic results of a hundred years of labour in the Celestial vineyard. In 1906, the number of baptised Christians, as reported to the Centenary Conference, was 178,261, and the total Christian community 256,779. In general, the Report stated, "opposition had waned; Christianity had won a foothold in China." A foothold which was represented by a proportion of less than one convert per 1500 of the population, could only satisfy vocational optimism of the type which attaches less importance to the experience of a hundred yesterdays, than to its visions of a miraculous tomorrow. The Conference was greatly encouraged by the fact that the Boxer rising and massacres had stirred Western Christianity to renewed efforts on an increased scale. But these new efforts, and the policy of those who directed them, were, generally speaking, inspired by consciousness of the sterility of the Celestial vineyard as regards purely evangelistic work. During the period between the Missionary Conference of 1906, and that of 1922, the number of societies represented in China increased from 64 to 130; at the same time, educational work, which in the nineteenth century had been subsidiary to the preaching of Christianity, assumed more and more importance. In 1905, the number of Protestant Mission Schools was 2585, of which 14 (12 American, and 2 British) were of collegiate standing; the number of pupils was then 58,000, of whom 9909 were girls. In 1920, the number of schools and colleges had increased to 7046, with 213,000 students.* During this period the number of communicants increased by about 100 per cent, a result unmistakably ascribable to

* In 1926, before the policy of the Kuomintang became violently anti-Christian, the number had increased to nearly 300,000 and in Roman Catholic schools to 250,000.

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the readiness of students to accept the profession of Christianity as incidental to their education in western learning. The remission of part of the Boxer indemnity by the United States Government in 1908, and of the balance in 1924, 'in order further to develop the educational and other cultural activities of China,' provided a notable stimulus for the movement which, in the absence of a direct demand for Christianity, hoped to supply it as a by-product of secular education. The National Christian Conference of 1922 emphasised the necessity for putting missionary establishments upon a Chinese basis, and for building up a unified Chinese Church, controlled by native Christians, to whom the mission work would eventually be entrusted. As the Nationalist movement developed, under the nominally Christian Sun Yat-sen, and with it the violently anti-foreign and anti-religious sentiments of the Kuomintang leaders, these tendencies were rapidly stimulated.

Under these conditions, as the interest of the missionary and cultural workers concentrated on the education of Young China, as the number of Chinese students under American tuition increased in China and in the United States, and as the finished product of this education, the present-day Intellectuals, came to assume more and more importance in their country's politics and public affairs, the sympathies of the Missions concerned, both in their Home Boards and their *personnel* in China, were bound to become more and more closely identified with the political and patriotic aspirations of their intellectual offspring, the shock troops of their cultural conquest.* It was equally inevitable, as events speedily proved, that these sympathies should find expression

* *Vide* Nathaniel Pfeffer, *China, The Collapse of a Civilisation*, p. 133.

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in active support for these political aspirations tendered by a highly organised body of opinion representing religious, educational and cultural organisations in the United States and (on a smaller scale) in Great Britain.

"What you put into the School, you get out of the State," says Humboldt. The immediate future of China, inextricably bound up with the mentality and morality of her rulers, the educated class, was evidently dependent in large measure upon the nature of the education thus supplied, and the qualifications of the men who supplied it. There were many missionaries, especially amongst the older men, who realised that, in order to produce an orderly and stable evolution in the rising generation a gradual fusion of Chinese with western culture, it was essential not to destroy the foundations of intellectual discipline and morality provided by the old national culture, but to build upon them a superstructure of new knowledge and new ideals, that would carry conviction to the Chinese mind. In other words, that, for western learning to be a constructive and not a destructive force, it must be imparted by men possessed of a sound knowledge of Confucian literature and sympathy for the system of ethics and morals which it represents. This aspect of the case was clearly recognised by a number of men prominently identified with the educational activities of British Missions. It was particularly emphasised by the group of University professors and divines which, in 1916, endeavoured to raise funds in England and America with a view to founding a great central University in China, for the provision of education conducted on sociological principles and with due regard to the things worth preserving in the national traditional culture and morality. The aspira-

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tion, however, came to nought.

Without endorsing in its entirety the opinion of the British ex-Ambassador, referred to by Professor Paul Monroe,* which ascribes all China's present troubles to the influence of American Mission Schools and to the Chinese students educated in America, it is safe to say that, in so far as they have striven to undermine the old morality, based on the Confucian system of ethics and the family, they have been, and are, powerful instruments of social disintegration and therefore responsible for much of the indiscipline prevailing in the younger generation and the general disorder thereby produced. Broadly speaking, every Chinese youth educated in American Mission Schools has been a carrier of the germs of disruption. He has usually been taught to despise the wisdom of his forefathers, reject the cult of ancestors and with it the traditions and standards which, as a French observer† rightly says, "have given to China's civilisation and to the life of her people a stability and harmony never excelled in the history of mankind." In place of the traditional principles of the Confucianist family and clan system, his mind has been imbued with the doctrines of a denationalised individualism, with results that have been plainly demonstrated by the self-assertive indiscipline and frank materialism of the student class, and by the violent hostility to foreigners displayed by the younger generation of politicians educated in American schools.

It is worthy of note, and a sign of good omen, that, in the Report compiled by the League of Nations' Mission of Educational Experts to China, published by

* Paul Monroe, *China, a Nation in Evolution*. (1927.)

† Emile Hovelague, *La Chine*. (1920.)

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the League's Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (Paris, 1932), the four professors engaged in this Mission definitely deprecate the attempt to Americanise, or even to Europeanise, China by means of imported educational systems. They deplore the fact that "the officials responsible for public education in China have allowed the teaching programmes and methods of the United States to supersede, without transition, the centuries-old wisdom and learning of China."

"A considerable number of young Chinese Intellectuals," they observe, "imitate the outward forms of American life without appearing to realise that Americanism springs from conditions that are peculiar to America and entirely different from those that prevail in China. . . . The old Chinese traditions are rightly considered out of date. Most of the springs of China's own civilisation have run dry. At the same time one cannot but deprecate the tendency to misunderstand and under-estimate their educational value. It is in its literature, whether it be philosophical, historical or poetical, that the spirit of a nation is expressed. To replace these traditions by the products of a foreign civilisation, would be to disregard the spontaneous relation between the mentality of a people and its cultural manifestation."

Furthermore, these four professors *in partibus*, "representing four different springs of European culture," came to the significant conclusion that "the cultural conditions of Europe are more suitable than American conditions for adaptation to Chinese requirements because, precisely, American civilisation has developed *in spite of* a total absence of local traditions, whereas European, like Chinese, civilisation, must

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always take count of local traditions dating back thousands of years. There should be no misunderstanding here; we do not wish to see European educational methods substituted for those imported from America. We merely wish to emphasise our belief that no form of civilisation which has developed in another land, and in different conditions, can become the cultural tradition of the China that is now entering upon an era of reform. New China must mobilise its forces, and from its own history, from its own literature, from all that is truly indigenous, extract the materials for a new civilisation that will be neither American nor European, but Chinese."

It is impossible to overlook the uncomfortable fact that the unfortunate results of misguided proselytising zeal are often attributable to the personal factor, to the character and mentality of many of the men and women—earnest, hard-working altruists, though they be—who have laboured to uplift and save Young China by means of an American education. On a delicate subject such as this I refrain from invoking the results of my own fairly wide observations of missionary educational methods and their results, but will confine myself to quoting the opinions of American observers, qualified by direct experience to write with knowledge on the subject.

After studying the actual conditions in China in 1928 and 1929, Mr. Nathaniel Pfeffer, a graduate of Chicago University, wrote as follows:—*

The curriculum of an American college, duplicated exactly in a Chinese college, does not have the same content. It does

* *China, the Collapse of a Civilisation*. By Nathaniel Pfeffer. (Routledge, 1931.)

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not communicate the same meaning or spirit. It cannot, for it lacks the background, which cannot be translated into words, and for which words are lacking, for it is the heritage of a race. . . . What has happened, then, in China is that for all practical purposes there is now no education at all and there has been none for a generation, none that is, that carries the conviction of the old.

Reference has already been made to the missionaries' share in exposing the weakness of the Chinese Government to the Chinese people and thus contributing to its loss of authority. They have had a much more active share in the more serious disintegration now under discussion. . . .

Referring to the desire for western learning, which began after the Sino-Japanese war, he observes:—

Every Mission School was an instrument of denationalisation. The pupils were taught, not as Chinese children preparing to share in the life of the Chinese race, but as American children, and with all the limitations of American schooling before it was vitalised by the unorthodox theories of the last twenty-five years. Of literature, the Chinese children learned English literature. Of history, they learned American history. . . . Except in the English Mission schools, which were a minority and could not command such lavish donations from the pious at home, the cosmology was that of a world which began in all earnestness in 1776. And it is not too much of a caricature to say that thousands of Chinese children grew to the age of sixteen without any clear knowledge that there had ever existed on this planet more than three men worthy of emulation—Christ, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. . . .

Again, Dr. Paul Monroe, Professor of Education at the Teachers' College of Columbia University, through whose classes have passed a large number of Chinese students, observes:—*

"The disintegration of the family unity is the most significant change now going on in modern China. This change underlies and accompanies all the economic, political, industrial and social changes and in a large degree, missions have

* *China, a Nation in Evolution*. By Paul Monroe. (Macmillan, 1927.)

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contributed to this disintegrating force. Whatever of unity and stability the new China may possess, replacing the well-knit unity and stability of the old, will depend upon the quality of the individualism dominating the new order. Modern missions have had a large share in creating this new individualism; have attempted to develop some of the new requisites. Whether this effort has been sufficient to withstand the strain, is now being tested and will ultimately be revealed."

These words were written in 1927, that is to say, at a time when the new individualism of the Nationalist movement was beginning to express itself in manifestations of violent hostility to foreigners and to Christianity, with results which led to the withdrawal of the great majority of missionary workers from the field of their labours and to the confiscation or destruction of schools, churches, hospitals and mission property generally. Throughout the critical period which began with the Association of militant Nationalism (under Sun Yat-sen and other nominally Christian leaders of the Kuo-mintang), with the anti-Imperial doctrines of Bolshevism, the type of individualism displayed by the westernised section of Young China, has been such as to vindicate completely the opinion expressed of it by Prince Ito twenty years before. The "crudity and violence of the doctrines which they teach" he ascribed chiefly to the fact that, while imbued with western ideas, they had become so largely estranged from the old Chinese conceptions, that they lost contact with the Chinese point of view almost as if they were themselves foreigners by birth. "They have therefore scarcely any roots in the country, and can hardly be regarded as a class capable of directing and controlling any practical course of action." Whatever might be the fears and misgivings of a minority, it was inevitable that the majority of

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missionary educators should identify itself with the political aspirations of Young China, especially as, in the case of the Americans, these aspirations were the direct and natural product of their own teachings. Without antagonising the student class and exposing themselves to the charge of Imperialism, they could not consistently refuse to subscribe to the political programme, based on the doctrines of self-determination and racial equality, which they themselves had inculcated. They had hitched their wagon to the star of Chinese Nationalism, and pinned their faith to the regenerating influences of western learning and Christianity, to produce a type of official able and willing to build up the Republic on the foundations of American principles. This being their position, they were irrevocably pledged to optimism, compelled to shut their eyes to such facts and phases of the Nationalist movement as might conflict with it. They were bound to hope, if not to believe, that the Young China of their making, inspired by the traditional loyalty of the pupil to his teacher, would justify the faith that was in them and eventually give to China the honest and effective government she needs. They were bound, by the very nature of their vocation, to believe that every Chinese Christian must have the makings of a good official; and even when the careers of notable leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen and Feng Yu-hsiang, and even of prominent Chinese evangelists, proved the delusiveness of this belief, they were compelled to find excuses for the backslider's fall from grace. As an American observer of great experience has expressed it, "the missionary misrepresents conditions in China to justify his own continued existence and residence in the country and to earn the goodwill of the

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Chinese for his movement. A missionary who is indiscreet enough to say publicly what he really knows and thinks of the Chinese and their mental processes, is raising barriers against the Christianisation of China, by engendering hostility to his society or his Church among the Chinese, and is therefore little better than a traitor to the cause.”*

The missionary workers in the interior and their Home Boards, being thus vocationally identified with the Nationalist movement, devoted themselves in many cases to promoting it, by active and direct intervention in China's domestic and foreign politics, and generally with more zeal than discretion. Even before the Washington Conference, the nature and force of this intervention had been unmistakably manifested. For example, at the critical juncture of Yuan Shih-kai's attempt to re-establish the Monarchy in his own person, it was brought to bear against him with marked effect. Professor Holcombe of Harvard (himself conspicuously identified with Kuomintang policies) records the fact that “Americans took a sentimental interest in the Republican experiment in China and their missionaries especially were filled with regret at its imminent failure and extended sympathy and encouragement to the opponents of a restoration of monarchy.”†

From 1923 to 1927, even after the Republican experiment had become dangerously entangled with Bolshevism, this ‘sympathy and encouragement’ became more and more actively manifested. Discussing it, and the general effects of missionary interference in China's

* Rodney Gilbert, *What's Wrong with China?* (Murray, 1926.)

† *The Chinese Revolution*. By A. N. Holcombe. (Harvard University Press, 1930.)

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international relations, another American writer* explains the missionary policy by observing that they were constrained to make one concession after another, in all good faith, rather than see the work, to which they had devoted their lives, swept to destruction. Ever hoping to avert that destruction, they adopted a course of action which, as events proved, brought it swiftly upon them. To quote this writer:—

“By letters to their Boards and Churches and friends at home, by newspaper and by magazine articles, and by lecture tours when they visited their homelands, the Missionaries have been the unwitting tools and invaluable assistants of the propagandists who were trying to hoodwink the rest of the world about China. They tragically assisted in their own undoing, and helped to build up, particularly in the United States, in Great Britain and Canada, a public sentiment decidedly averse to any intervention in China, no matter how severe the provocation. The Missionary meddling in political affairs, in many unfortunate cases, went even farther than this. In many missionary institutions, the Nationalist programme was secretly encouraged in territories not yet under the Nationalist control, and hundreds and hundreds of Young Chinese in Mission Schools, Colleges and other institutions came to believe that the Nationalist movement was China's only hope.”

Here let me digress to observe how faithfully history has repeated itself in this matter. For the situation thus created runs parallel, in all essentials, to that which existed at the time of the Taiping Rebellion. Referring to the support then given by many missionaries to the rebel cause, *The Times* Correspondent, George Wingrove Cook, wrote, in 1857, that “amidst the outpourings of blood, in famine and pestilence, in the wreck of all the physical good which antiquity has wrought, our missionaries think they see a hope for the religion of

* *Tortured China*. By Hallett Abend. (Allen and Unwin, 1931.)

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the Bible." Now, after seventy years of experience has resulted in persuading a large majority of the Missionary Societies to subordinate evangelical to educational activities, we find them fervently supporting Young China's claims for the immediate abolition of extra-territoriality and the 'unequal Treaties,' in the hope that, having achieved its political and patriotic aspirations, the Nationalist leaders will display their gratitude in gestures of goodwill, or at least of tolerance, towards Christianity.

Early in 1926, the anti-foreign direction of the Nationalist movement, instigated and directed by the Left Wing of the Kuomintang and its Russian advisers, assumed an anti-Christian attitude of unmistakable violence, which found significant expression in the shameful treatment meted out by the Cantonese to the Christian College and Hospital at Canton and to the Stout Memorial Hospital at Wuchow. Nevertheless, all through the summer of that year, the Missions, as a whole, continued to render active support to the Nationalist cause. It would be difficult to cite a more amazing paradox than that which was presented at this period by the central directorates of powerful American educational and religious societies, openly extending their sympathy and moral support to a Chinese revolutionary movement, organised and financed by that anti-Christian Soviet Government, with which Washington had declined, on moral grounds, to hold any relations. This sympathy and support, energetically reinforced by Kuomintang propaganda, led to a very general misconception in the American and British Press, with regard to Chinese affairs in general and the Nationalist movement in particular.

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There were, of course, many trustworthy observers of the situation—journalists, missionaries and merchants—who realised the real tendencies and significance of the Nationalist movement, and who endeavoured to break through this conspiracy of silence; but all their efforts were of no avail against the mass production of the Mission Boards' organised propaganda on the one hand, and the measures of repression and intimidation adopted by the Kuomintang on the other. For reasons to which I shall refer in due course, the actual conditions, as reported by American Consular officials and other competent observers, were never made available for the information of the general public. As one independent American journalist* indignantly observed, "American officialdom in China has been abominably treated by the Washington Administration. Consular and diplomatic reports have furnished more than enough material to shape public opinion, if the Government cared to face conditions honestly by giving out the information at its disposal. Instead of which, the Administration suppresses facts, denies knowledge of them in public utterances, and smugly pretends to follow public opinion in its policy." Public opinion, in this case, consisted chiefly of the Middle West Church vote. Mr. Frederick Moore, Correspondent of the *New York Times*, definitely charged the Mission Boards with influencing the missionaries "to save face for China at the cost of veracity." "The Boards," he said, "as a group, had lost their balance, particularly over the Nationalist movement . . . the missionaries who appealed for American friendship for the Nationalist cause, making

* Rodney Gilbert, Peking Correspondent of the *North China Daily News*, subsequently "proscribed" by the Nanking Government and compelled to leave China.

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light of the part which the Bolsheviks were playing in the organisation, influenced our Government's attitude." Another American observer, writing in the *North China Herald*, declared that "in America, the deliberate misleading of the public had been nothing short of iniquitous. Efforts made by reputable bodies of Americans, to get the truth over to the people of America, have been suppressed." The Reverend Edgar Strother, General Secretary of the China Christian Endeavour Union, brought upon himself severe criticism and rebukes from several Mission Boards in America, and a demand for his deportation from a number of Kuomintang politicians, for exposing some of the methods by which the Soviet Government was making use of the political activities of the National Christian Council (of which body more anon) to promote its ends and those of the Nationalist leaders.

"It is amazing," wrote Mr. Strother, "to those of us who are familiar with the situation in China, to see how thoroughly the American public has been deceived as to the real facts. It is certainly evident that the Bolsheviks, with the effective aid of the so-called National Christian Council have very nearly succeeded in pulling the wool over the eyes of the Americans. Evidence of this Red propaganda in the United States is now abundant. For example, in an interview on his way from America, in Tokyo, the Editor of the *Peking Leader*, Mr. Grover Clark, tells of his strenuous campaign of lectures in the principal cities of the United States for the Foreign Policy Association and of his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in Washington, in which he urged the revision of the unequal Treaties, etc. Mr. Clark asserts that no political party will dare to put a plank for a strong China policy in its platform for the 1928 campaign, because the public is almost unanimously against such a plank. It is very interesting to learn that in the raid of the Soviet premises in Peking, receipts for several hundred dollars a month were discovered, signed by Grover Clark."

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In an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1927, when the political objectives of the Cantonese Kuomintang and the moral effect of its successful northern expedition were beginning to be realised, I drew attention to this aspect of the situation, and especially to the result of the sympathy displayed by public opinion in America for the political activities of a faction, largely financed by Moscow and openly identified with Bolshevik propaganda. I pointed out that "encouraged by this sympathy and by the peace-at-any-price attitude of the British Government (as manifested in the Hankow Concession agreement) the Cantonese wing of the Kuomintang now makes no secret of its intention to go much farther than the abolition of the foreigners' extra-territorial rights. (An outline of the party's programme, embodying Bolshevik principles and advice, had been set forth in resolutions drafted for the People's Conference.)* It required some courage for an American editor to print an article running counter to the strong current of public opinion then prevailing, but its publication revealed the fact that a considerable section of the missionary opinion on the spot, though precluded by the policy of the Home Boards from expressing itself publicly, was distinctly opposed to that policy and fearful of its consequences. One missionary, recently returned to the States after five years' residence in the interior of China, gave forcible utterance to these views in a letter to the Editor of the *Atlantic*.

"Since my return home," he wrote, "I have been astonished and dismayed at the amount of misleading, vicious

* *Vide China and the Nations*. By Wang Ching-wei, Chairman of the Kuomintang Executive Committee.

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propaganda that has been and still is being broadcasted throughout the country by Chinese students, and others, on behalf of the so-called 'Nationalist' party in China. As Mr. Bland points out, the political activities of the Cantonese faction *do not* represent a real awakening of national consciousness and genuine patriotic ideals. What the Cantonese faction does represent, is a skilfully imposed and wholly artificial state of mind among millions of lovable, friendly Chinese who, bewildered by the delusion of the Republic, ground down by rapacious officials, overrun, looted, raped and impressed by armed coolie mercenaries, at last in desperation, are led to believe by lying tongues that, somehow, the foreigner is at the bottom of all the trouble."

At the end of 1925, when Chiang K'ai-shek, with the help of Moscow, was preparing his Nationalist army for the military expedition against the North, there was unmistakable evidence of a concerted policy on the part of a number of religious and educational societies to bring their powerful influence to bear upon the negotiations then proceeding between China and the Treaty Powers, with a view to supporting the Nationalist politicians in their demand for the abolition of the unequal Treaties. At a conference on American relations with China, held at Baltimore on September 20th, a report of the International Missionary Council was adopted by a majority of the delegates present. Opinion was divided as to whether the abolition of extra-territoriality should be by one stroke, or by progressive steps, but the general sense of the meeting was definitely in favour of America assuming a position of vigorous leadership in these international negotiations, and if necessary, an independent line in support of China's political aspirations. Every effort was accordingly made to bring moral pressure to bear upon the representatives of the Powers in Conference and on the Governments behind them, for the benefit of the westernised class of students,

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politicians and aspirants to office, the class which owes its origin, and most of its influence abroad, to missionary activities, and which, as represented by astute diplomats, such as Mr. Alfred Sze or Dr. Wellington Koo, has succeeded in creating abroad a fantastically misleading impression of modern China.

It is difficult to account for the attitude and actions of these Missionary Boards at this period without imputing to them a bias of class or of profession, in other words, without incurring the charge of cynicism. It is indeed difficult to avoid an inclination to cynicism, when one contemplates the spectacle presented by the great religious and educational organisations of the United States, fervently commending and comforting the cause of Chinese Nationalism, at a time when the class of students turned out by American Universities had already given unmistakable proof of its anti-Christian sentiments and complete lack of discipline. Making every allowance for the sincerity of the sentimental idealism and "uplifting" energy of the general membership of these religious and educational societies, it is impossible to overlook the fact that those who directed their political activities persistently misrepresented the nature of the Nationalist movement together with its Bolshevik associations, and the attitude of the western-educated student class. Because of those activities, the missionary societies were (and are) undeniably responsible for the predominance of a class of politicians which had by then proved, not only its complete indifference to the bitter sufferings of the Chinese people, but its incapacity for rulership and its unwillingness to be ruled. Granted that it was not to be expected that the evangelists and educationalists on the spot, or their repre-

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sentatives at home, should acknowledge and confess that the millions spent on Americanising Chinese students had proved to be as the sowing of fierce dragons' teeth. Granted that, perceiving the nature of their intellectual offspring, they were bound by the nature of their faith (like parents who have given life to a malformed child) to lavish the more effusive solicitude upon it, ever hoping against hope that, by some miracle of grace, it might attain to a fair shape and seemly deportment. There remains, when all is said and done, the fact that the missionary profession depends for its existence on the enthusiasm of its supporters, and that, having pinned their faith to the Nationalist cause, the men who inspired the political sympathies and directed the policies of the missionary organisations, were likely to turn a Nelsonian blind eye on any unpleasant facts which conflicted with their propaganda. They were certainly responsible for suppressing those voices in their midst which endeavoured to draw public attention to the unwisdom of the Boards' policy and its dangerous consequences, already becoming apparent.

But neither the economic nor the sentimental aspects of the case can sufficiently explain the persistence with which the missionary societies, like the British Labour Party, continued to uphold the cause of Kuomintang Nationalism, even after its paramount instincts and purposes had been revealed in a series of outrages which drove the great majority of missionary workers in Southern China to seek safety in their native lands or in the refuge of the Shanghai Settlements. We are compelled to seek a further explanation, and possibly the most important, in that domain of politics and propaganda, where benevolent sentiments and altruistic ideal-

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ism become, consciously or unconsciously, subservient to the ends of Bolshevism.

In an article published in the *English Review* in January, 1928, I endeavoured to indicate this explanation, in the light of recent events.

"Amongst the many curiosities and contradictions of present-day world politics," I wrote, "there are few more remarkable than the evidence of fellowship and co-operation which has been manifested of recent years between Bolshevism and the exponents of sentimental idealism and 'uplift' in the United States. It would seem at first sight an inexplicable paradox that any important section of the only great nation which has stood firm, on moral grounds, in its refusal to recognise the Government of the Soviets, should extend a large measure of sympathy and support to Bolshevik intrigues and propaganda in other parts of the world. Yet, as I propose to show, it is a demonstrable fact, worthy of much more attention than it has hitherto received, that a highly influential body of public opinion in America, represented by a large number of church societies and organisations for the promotion of peace and social reform, is inspired, formed, and guided to the base uses of Bolshevism, by a closely-interlocked system of directorates, through which Communist propaganda is continually spread by agents of Red proclivities, many of whom act in regular communication with, and even under the direct orders of, Moscow. The machinery of this highly-organised and indefatigable propaganda is so ingenious and audacious that, while deploring its results, one is compelled to admire the intelligence which directs it.

"The Bolshevik's method of procedure, like the

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wasp's, is to make a way to the heart of his objective by attacking it at the weakest spot. Thus, in England, his activities have been chiefly directed towards fomenting disorder and creating discontent by boring within through the trade unions and the revolutionary elements in the body politic. But recognising the fact that the Federation of Labour in the United States represents an industrial population definitely opposed to the doctrines of Marxian Communism, the directing minds of the Third International have concentrated their energies on the creation of a body of public opinion favourable to their purposes amongst the religious, educational, and 'uplifting' societies throughout the country. Their insidious approach has been steadily made upon the common ground of pacifism; by this means, and by a system of interlocking directorates they have succeeded in establishing their influence (often, no doubt, unsuspected) in the inner counsels of such bodies as the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the International Society of Christian Endeavour, the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., the American Civil Liberties Union, the League for Industrial Democracy, the Council for the Protection of Foreign-born Workers, and other similar organisations. The Federal Council of Churches alone claims to influence a membership of 20,000,000 citizens. The League for Industrial Democracy reports that last year it organised meetings all over the States, and boasts that 'it has fought American Imperialism in China and elsewhere.' Several of this League's directors are also members of the National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union, an organisation which manifests distinct Communist tendencies and which has co-operated closely with the Federal Council of

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Churches of Christ in the 'hands off China' campaign, and in sympathising with the anti-foreign policy of the Cantonese-Bolshevik faction. The result of the interlocking system of directorates and close co-operation between these various religious and semi-political uplift societies is, that a comparatively small number of persons (a few hundreds at most) have it in their power to control and shape a vast body of public opinion which, in its turn, exercises an enormous influence on the nation's domestic and foreign politics.

"Nowhere have the results of this influence been more conspicuously demonstrated than in China.

"Turning now from the Mission Boards and their affiliated societies in God's Own Country, let us glance briefly at the pro-Bolshevik activities of a semi-political, semi-missionary society which has become notorious in China—the National Christian Council. The membership of this Council consists of English and American missionaries, either self-elected or appointed by their Home Boards, and of an equal number of Chinese, all alike distinguished rather for their chauvinistic political activities than for earnest labour in the missionary field. The opinions and proceedings of the Council have been repeatedly challenged and repudiated by English and American missionaries on the spot, but without effect. A fair idea of the spirit which moved it, at this period of dangerous agitation, may be gathered from the following passages of a letter addressed to the *North China Herald* by an American missionary on October 8th, 1927:

I have just received, he writes, the September Bulletin of the National Christian Council. You will remember, sir, that this is the same sheet that, in the summer of 1925, published an article by one of the Council, in which Lenin

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and Sun Yat-sen were favourably compared with Christ in the most craven fashion.

The present number has something in it that will rouse the wrath of all honest men. It begins on page 11 and is headed "Greetings! World Alliance Resolution on China agreed to by the Management Committee of the Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches at its meeting in Constance on July 29th, 1927." Then this "Greetings" goes on to say in part: "We desire to thank the Council for sending Dr. Lew as their representative to the meeting. We desire to express to the Chinese Council our deep and sincere sympathy for their present struggle for . . . freedom from external interference and domination. . . . We confess with shame and sorrow that the intercourse of Western nations with China has been so frequently and so largely characterised by violence and disregard of right and justice, that many in China have not unnaturally come to associate the name of Christianity with foreign aggression, exploitation, and injustice."

"One need hardly look further for the main cause of the violently anti-foreign spirit displayed by the student class in China and for the unloosing of the hostile forces which, simultaneously with the advance of the Nationalist army northwards, threatened to destroy, amongst other good and beneficial things, the whole structure of missionary work in that unfortunate country.

"Another interesting organisation which is greatly to blame for the extravagant demands and irreconcilable attitude of the student body in China is the 'Institute of Pacific Relations,' of Honolulu, a society of self-elected busybodies in Far Eastern politics, originally founded by Mr. Fletcher Brockman of the Central Committee of the American Y.M.C.A. A conference of this 'Institute,' held in July, 1927, in Honolulu, was attended by Mr. Henry Hodgkin, secretary of the National Christian Council of China, and by his two Chinese co-secretaries, all of whom have displayed a very mischievous activity in support of the Bolshevik-

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Nationalist campaign for the immediate abolition of the Treaties. It would appear that Mr. Hodgkin and his British co-delegate, Sir Frederick Whyte, were selected for this mission by another self-constituted organisation, the Institute of International Affairs,* a society whose membership seems to be dominated by political high-brows of the peculiar type which delights in asserting its moral superiority by assuming that its own country is invariably in the wrong and by giving encouragement to its enemies and detractors. Some indication of the nature of the Honolulu symposium's attitude and objects may be surmised from the fact that Sir Frederick Whyte went out of his way at Shanghai to deliver an address to a large audience of Chinese at the Union Club, in which he waxed eloquent in a glowing eulogy of Ghandi and his ideals of Indian nationalism, and, incidentally, testified to his admiration for the patriotic aspirations and energy which had enabled the Cantonese nationalist movement to make its way from Canton to the Yangtze—a noteworthy instance of misguided sentiment and untimely indiscretion.”

Nearly five years have elapsed since the article was written from which the above passages are taken, and during these years a certain diminution has been observable in the fervour of enthusiasm formerly displayed in support of the National cause and the political aspirations of its leaders, and the benevolent attitude of the Mission Boards and National Christian Council shows symptoms of caution. But the harm has been done. For a quarter of a century the seeds of indiscipline and unrest have been unwittingly sown in thousands of schools and colleges by missionaries intent on building the New

* Now the Royal Institute.

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Jerusalem on American lines. The great majority of the young men connected with the political and propagandist activities of the Nationalist movement under Sun Yat-sen, and later under Chiang K'ai-shek, were the fruit of the tree of knowledge planted by American educationalists. How ungrateful was that soil, and how bitter its fruits, missionaries in the South had begun to realise even before Sun's death (March, 1925). The resolution adopted by a convention of the National Students' Union held on July 25th, 1925, foreshadowed the wrath to come and gave evidence of the truth, to be fully demonstrated as the movement grew with the advance of the Cantonese army, that, relieved of the moral discipline of the Confucian code, the mind of Young China was material more compatible with the doctrines of Bolshevism than with those of Christianity. The attitude of the student class, as a whole, revealed an unmistakable hostility; it proved yet once again,* that China rejects Christianity, not because it is Christian, but because it is associated in the Chinese mind with foreigners, with that European civilisation which the Oriental instinctively despises and rejects.

"We, the National Students' Union," said the first resolution adopted by this Convention, "being one of the most powerful organisations opposed to Christianity and to Christian education, have adopted the following concrete methods: we have decided that Christmas Day,

* In *Les Missions Catholiques*, June, 1891, the Rev. Father Louvet, of the Missions Etrangères, a far-seeing missionary, wrote: "It is of no use to hide the fact: China obstinately rejects Christianity. The haughty men of letters are more rancorous than ever. . . . It is not religious fanaticism; it is only against the Christian religion that it seeks to defend itself. It sees all Europe following on the heels of the Apostles of Christ, Europe with her ideas, her civilisation, and with that it will have absolutely nothing to do, being, rightly or wrongly, satisfied with the ways of its fathers."

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and the week, December 22-28, should be observed as anti-Christian week. During this week, when the Christians are trying to recruit followers, every Student Union should stir up the masses of the people to carry on all sorts of activities against Christianity. We must make the anti-Christian movement, everywhere, work toward anti-imperialism. . . .”

And again: “We students should clearly explain that Christianity is the weapon of our oppressors, that the Industrial Department of the Y.M.C.A. is an instrument used by Imperialists and Capitalists to cheat labourers, so that they will be content and will regard Capitalists as their benefactors. . . .

“We should inform the public that the missionaries, the officers and workers of the missions are foreign slaves and the ‘running dogs’ employed by Imperialists and Capitalists.”

Professor Monroe, to whom I have already referred, discussing this identification of the missionary’s educational labours with Imperialism, and the Chinese Government’s prohibition of compulsory instruction in religion at their schools, explains it on the simple ground that “any action on the part of the foreigner which forces the Chinese to do or to think as the foreigner wishes, no matter to what subject it may relate, becomes Imperialism. So the mission schools, by their very nature, are imperialistic.”

Whatever the explanation of the phenomenon—and missionary literature offers a wide choice—there is no denying that the hostility to Christianity displayed by Young China’s Intellectuals, exceeds in intensity and determination that displayed at any previous crisis in the mission’s history, even that of the Boxer period.

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In the bitter enmity of the students turned out by American educators, there is something ironically suggestive of the malignity of China's indignant tutelary god; equally so in the spectacle presented by Missions which have spent millions of dollars* and years of labour in educating Young China to the blessings of democracy and republican ideals, and now find themselves denounced as agents of imperialism. All these deplorable results the future historian will undoubtedly ascribe to a very general lack of psychological and sociological knowledge in the educators, as a class, and to their failure to appreciate at their right value those social and economic conditions, which rigidly determine the structural character of the Chinese people.

From the date of the Washington Conference until 1926, the cause of Chinese Nationalism had been fervently supported by the majority of Protestant Missionary Societies. Indeed, as Young China's hostility grew in intensity, in response to the foreigners' self-imposed policy of patient conciliation, the benevolent sympathy of the National Christian Council and other representative bodies, frequently savoured of servility. Even when, in the wake of the Nationalist army's northward advance, almost every missionary institution between Canton and Hankow had been either confiscated, desecrated or destroyed, most of the Mission Boards in the home countries still continued to profess belief in the ultimate wisdom of their policy and to support the Nationalists' patriotic aspirations. In spite of the abundant evidence of Bolshevik inspiration in the Kuomintang's official propaganda, they refused to believe

* The capital invested in American Protestant missions in China was estimated in 1925 at eighty million dollars; the amount annually invested is between three and five millions.

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that anti-Christian influences were giving definite form and direction to the whole ideology of the Nationalist movement.

After the triumphant Nationalists had established their authority in the Yangtze valley in the autumn of 1926, the real nature of the Cantonese policy, and the character of the men who directed it, were rapidly demonstrated in a series of "regrettable incidents," culminating in the Nanking atrocity of March 24th, 1927. The following brief account of this outrage is taken from Morse and MacNair's admirably concise and impartial history of *Far Eastern International Relations*.*

"The conciliatory attitude of the Powers generally, and of Great Britain in particular, in surrendering her Hankow and Kiukiang concessions was followed by an unparalleled outrage,† the background factors of which were not understood for some time. When the Nationalist armies entered Nanking on March 24th, a premeditated, organised and controlled attack upon all foreigners was carried out, without distinction as to nationality, sex, or occupation of those attacked. American, British, French, Italian and Japanese nationals were murdered or wounded; many others, women as well as men, were assaulted, robbed and treated with the utmost indignities. The American, British and Japanese Consulates were violated and the houses and institutions of all foreigners resident at Nanking were looted and, in many cases, burned."

As the result of this outrage, following upon the destruction of the missions in Southern China, most of the missionary workers were compelled to abandon the field; out of a total of over 8,000, only

* *Far Eastern International Relations*. By H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair. (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931.)

† As an example of the attitude of the Kuomintang's foreign apologists and propagandists it is interesting to note that Professor Holcombe, in *The Chinese Revolution*, calls it the "Nanking Incident," whereas the action of the police in firing on a mob at Shanghai is described as the "Shanghai Massacre."

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about 500 remained at their posts. Over 5,000 left the country, 1,500 found refuge at Shanghai and about a thousand at other Treaty Ports. In the thirteen provinces affected, three Protestant mission colleges and fifty hospitals were closed.* Protestant missions suffered more, on the whole, than those of the Roman Catholics; the most conspicuous sufferer was the Y.M.C.A., whose directorate had been particularly active in supporting the political programme of the Kuomintang.

In spite of the evidence thus supplied of the anti-Christian animosity of the Nationalists, many Mission Boards persisted in the policy which made them apologists and propagandists for the Nationalist cause. Attempts were made to prove that the Kuomintang forces were not responsible for these outrages, and that they had been committed by Communists or Northerners, in order to bring discredit on the Nationalists. These attempts failed, for the evidence of complicity on the part of Chiang K'ai-shek's officials was overwhelming,† and for the same reason, the efforts made by Nationalist Government diplomats abroad, to reassure public opinion as to its ability to give effective protection to life and property, proved equally unconvincing. On April 29th there appeared in *The Times*, telegraphed from Shanghai, extracts from a manifesto signed by twelve American missionaries, refugees from Nanking. All of these, be it observed, were representatives of the religious bodies which, all unwittingly, had

* See K. S. Latourette, *A History of the Christian Missions in China*, p. 820.

† For a graphic account by an eye-witness of what actually happened, see Mrs. A. T. Hobart's *Within the Walls of Nanking*. (Cape, London, 1928.)

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been engaged in sowing the seeds of unrest, whose harvest was now in the reaping. All had supported the patriotic aspirations of the Nationalists and their agitation for the annulment of the "unequal Treaties" and extra-territoriality, and all now confessed their error and disillusion. After observing that the Nationalists had broken all their promises, the manifesto concluded with these words:—

"We have favoured the return of the Concessions to China, but to-day the Foreign Settlements at Shanghai are our only place of refuge. We have assured our people abroad that the Nationalist movement was not anti-foreign or anti-Christian, but now we are driven from our homes and dispossessed of our property. We who remained at Nanking on March 24th were not personally dependent upon extra-territorial privileges, nor on any form of foreign protection, but were putting our trust in the assurances of the Nationalists; events show that our faith was not justified. In all these matters, the facts of the situation flatly contradict our words. Everything that we have said in favour of the National movement is made to appear false."

Most of the Home Boards and their publicists persisted, nevertheless, in the belief that the Nationalist movement represented elements and ideals deserving of sympathy and support; faith in the regenerating virtue of western education proved stronger, at the headquarters of 'uplift' in America and England, than all the flagrant evidence of its pernicious results, as supplied by the student class militant, from Peking to Canton. In the United States it proved strong enough to induce the administration at Washington to abandon the policy of the United Front, rather than to join in any coercion of the Nationalist Government after the Nanking outrages. In England it proved strong enough to enable the earnest idealists, who had successfully

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agitated for the allocation of the Boxer indemnity to educational purposes in China, to make provision for adding to the numbers and influence of the westernised student class, admittedly the most violently hostile element in the Nationalist movement. It proved strong enough to induce the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Austen Chamberlain) to 'overlook the unpleasant exigencies of the movement,' including the Nanking outrages, in order "not to embarrass this or any other new Government in their task of introducing order in the territory under their control."

The Chinese have a proverbial phrase about jumping on the weak and deferring to the strong, which has always been a guiding principle of their foreign policy. The conciliatory attitude displayed by the missionary societies and by their Governments, in the face of the high-handed hostility of the Kuomintang, was bound to aggravate their position. The regulations eventually adopted by the Nanking Government, for the regulation of missionary educational enterprise, were framed in such a manner that henceforward mission schools, if permitted to exist, would do so at their own risk, on sufferance, and as purely secular institutions. They became, in fact, places in which religious education was either barred or severely limited, and where foreign influence as a directing force was eliminated and its sphere practically confined to the provision of funds and academic advice. The ban thus placed on religious education has compelled many conscientious missionaries to feel that they were no longer justified in appealing for funds in their home lands in support of work which had ceased to fulfil the purposes for which it was endowed. But, judging by the activities of the National

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Christian Council, which claims to represent a majority of the missionary societies, this attitude has not been generally adopted, and most of the 5,000 odd missionaries, whose names are given in the Directory for 1930 as having returned to their posts, may be assumed to have accepted the situation laid down by the Ministry of Education at Nanking. In July, 1930, a deputation approached that Ministry, on behalf of fifteen religious societies, appealing for mitigation of the rigorous restrictions imposed on religious instruction in the elementary schools; but the appeal was magisterially dismissed. The attitude of the Kuomintang leaders and of the Students' Unions has become more markedly anti-Christian since the Nanking outrages showed them that the Foreign Powers concerned were no longer disposed to hold the Chinese government responsible for the security of life and property, and that mission property might be seized with impunity.

In order to provide its propagandists at Washington and Geneva with material suitable for the beguiling of public opinion, an article was included in the new Criminal Code (September, 1928) which provides for punishment by imprisonment or fine of anyone desecrating any place of worship or interfering with any religious service; but it was never meant to be, and never was, taken seriously by anyone in China. It was merely eyewash, for foreign consumption, on a par with the regulations prohibiting the opium traffic or those which proclaim the abolition of all inland taxation, and its fatuity has been amply demonstrated, since its enactment, by the fact that scores of missionary churches and schools have been attacked, looted or confiscated, by order of local Kuomintang leaders, none of whom have

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ever been punished, fined or even rebuked. The list of missionaries killed or kidnapped from 1928 to 1930 is a long one; much mission property has been destroyed during this period and the number of native Christians has greatly diminished. Meanwhile, the anti-Christian campaign continues in many provinces, notably in Hunan and Shantung, with the connivance, if not with the full approval, of the Kuomintang headquarters. The Nationalist Propaganda Bureau, under the direct authority of Nanking, has issued a number of anti-Christian slogans, which have frequently been found posted on the ruins of churches and schools looted by Nationalist mobs during the past year. Many might be quoted, but the following will suffice to show Young China's real sentiments towards the Christian missions:

“ ‘Open the knife and slay all those who profess the foreign teachings.’ ‘Those who sympathise with Christianity are undesirable members of the Chinese race and traitors to their country.’ ‘The anti-Christian campaign should be conducted from the standpoint of Nationalism’; in other words, the anti-Christian movement is part of the Chinese Revolution. If it succeeds the first line of Imperialism will have been pierced.”

These, broadly speaking, are the conspicuous results of half a century of efforts by the great religious societies to prepare the way for Christianity by giving Young China the benefits of education on western lines. As matters stand, the educational authorities who control what is left of the organisation of the Mission Schools, registered under Nanking's education law, are prepared to welcome the flow of English and American money into China for educational purposes, but only on condition that foreigners surrender all rights to control the spending of this money and that religious education and

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exercises are either barred, or made voluntary for the pupil.

Undeterred by these results, the Protestant Mission Boards are apparently determined to pursue the policy, based on faith in the Nationalist cause, to which they and the American Government have been committed since 1921. According to the publicists of the National Christian Council, Chinese leadership in the diminished church has greatly developed in efficiency under the pressure of necessity. The anonymous compiler of the report on Missions work in the *China Year Book for 1931*, evidently in the confidence of the N.C.C., expresses the view that:

"There is a new self-consciousness within the Church and less dependence upon outside initiative and support—there is a feeling that the Church is more truly indigenous and Chinese than at any previous time in its history. On the other hand, the first glow of elation at the opportunity to manage Church affairs, without outside suggestion or direction, has passed, and there is a new appreciation of the unselfish service unstintedly given by western associates. . . . The conviction is deeper than ever that, in spite of her enemies, the Christian Church is in China to stay and to become a permanent element in the regeneration of national life. Chinese Protestantism will differ in some of its manifestations and expressions from Western Protestantism, but it will continue to display the same qualities of heroic faith. . . . A considerable proportion of the Christian schools have decided to accept the Governmental regulations as regards religious education and exercises. Ten colleges and professional schools have now put both upon a voluntary basis."

From which it would appear that the political activities of the Mission Boards, which have produced results so disastrous to all concerned, may be expected to continue. At the same time, there is evidence that these results, and the present position of the missionary

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societies, as contributors to the secular education of the Chinese, have led to much heart-searching concerning future policies. Many hold, as one of their writers says,* that "education without Christianity is an impoverished and hopeless incomplete preparation for life." Others feel strongly that missions, endowed with funds contributed for evangelical purposes, cannot properly continue educational work from which those purpose are excluded. They feel, as Professor Monroe† puts it, that in recent years Protestant mission work has become a cultural, rather than a religious, mission, and that, "in respect to its social aspect, this cultural mission may be said to have accomplished its purpose." The same writer observes that, if a marked decline in Mission interest and support now follows relinquishment of control of Mission institutions, this should not be attributed to change in Mission methods alone. A far greater influence, in his opinion, contributing to this decline, is the enlightenment of public opinion "through the movie news reel, which has portrayed the hostile incidents in China, such as that at Nanking. Anyone who has witnessed the reaction of an American assembly to any such photographic reproductions, can readily see that the new method of visual evidence can undo in a few minutes a prolonged education through missionary efforts extending over years." In other words, by means of the cinema, the American public has been assisted to grasp the real nature and sentiments of the Nationalist movement, in the same way that the missionaries grasped them, who were compelled to fly for their lives to the safety of the Treaty Ports. Such being the case,

* *Chinese Realities*. By John Foster. (Edinburgh House Press, 1928.)

† *A Nation in Evolution*, p. 330.

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the Mission problem of the immediate future would appear to centre in the question whether the Kuomintang Propaganda Bureau will continue to enjoy the sympathy and support of the powerful "Church Vote" in America and England, or whether that vote (and the flow of funds that goes with it) will hereafter be guided, by the cinema and other enlightening agencies, to abstain from subsidising the education of the Chinese on lines which have conclusively demonstrated the wisdom of the warning uttered on this subject by the Directors of the East India Company, a hundred and twenty-five years ago.

CHAPTER VI

CHINA'S MODERN STUDENTS

"Just as injurious as it would be to an amphibian to cut off its branchiæ before its lungs were well developed; so injurious must it be to a society to destroy its old institutions before the new have become organised enough to take their places."—*Herbert Spencer*.

THE activities of the western world, as manifested by missionary and educational enterprise, which are in great measure responsible for the evolution of the modern (as distinct from the classical) Chinese student, are all based on the tacit assumption that the westernisation of the Orient is a process preordained of Providence, inevitable, and of a nature to benefit all concerned. They are, in fact, manifestations of the instinctive impulse of Europe's active self-helping races to impose themselves, morally as well as physically, upon the passive, self-sufficient East—the same impulse as that which launched the Crusades, and inspired by a similar conviction of moral justification. Since the end of the nineteenth century, this conviction of inevitability has become so universal and so axiomatic, that to challenge its validity would appear to be almost a forlorn hope. Nevertheless, amongst a small minority of competent observers, the opinion has been steadily gaining ground during this period, that the West's prospects of achieving moral and intellectual ascendancy in China are probably less promising to-day than they were in the days of Ghenghiz Khan. In another chapter I propose

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to consider briefly this aspect of the Far Eastern problem and to examine the validity of the assumption that the westernisation of China is a consummation devoutly to be wished and actually in process of rapid accomplishment. Meanwhile, it must, I think, be generally conceded, that the prospect and nature of this process of westernisation may fairly be judged by such evidence as we possess, with regard to the dominant morality, mentality and cultural tendencies of the class of Intellectuals which western learning has produced in China during the last fifty years. Let us then consider the present-day student class, from which the officials and politicians of the future will be drawn, and judging by their general dominant characteristics, ask ourselves whether, from their point of view or ours, the experiment of their western education can fairly be regarded as justified by its results, and whether there is good reason for the belief that, with it, these Chinese Intellectuals are assimilating western conceptions of political morality.

The demand for western learning, in substitution for the Chinese classics, first became widespread and insistent in China as the result of Russia's defeat by Japan in 1904-5; that which had been a little stream of experiment since 1872 became a flowing tide between 1905 and 1908. Prior to 1904, public opinion had been to some extent impressed by the fact that, under the auspices of the Viceroy Yuan Shih-Kai, foreign-educated officials, such as Tang Shao-yi and Liang T'un-yen, had risen to the highest offices at Peking, while many others, of the comparatively small number available, were employed in important posts. After Russia's defeat, Court and Governmental circles began to reflect the enthu-

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siasm of the educated class for the idea that what Japan had done, China, by adopting the same methods, might also do. The latent strength of the East had been triumphantly vindicated; no longer need it submit to the insolent encroachment of the West. China, in her turn, would study the secret sources of western power and learn to defeat the outer barbarian with his own weapons. For the old Empress Dowager, humiliated by her bitter experiences in 1900, the prospect of educational reform was rendered easier and more attractive by the fact that it enabled her to conciliate the Western Powers by a course of action which at the same time satisfied the progressive and restless elements in Chinese politics. But when, in 1904, she finally decided to abolish the ancient classical examinations in favour of western learning, it was undoubtedly her intention, and that of her chief advisers, to reform the national system of education gradually, in accordance with the plans originally submitted to H.M. Kuang Hsü by K'ang Yu-wei and his fellow reformers in 1898, retaining the basic elements of China's political economy and culture and adding to them the necessary superstructure of western scientific knowledge. Had she lived to direct the course of events, had the restraining influence of the Throne not disappeared, this prudent course might have been followed and China might have been spared many of the calamitous conditions which have become endemic since the Revolution; for it is beyond all question true that the present chaotic state of the country's affairs is largely due to the indiscipline and unrest which a defective system of education has produced in the student class since the passing of the dynasty.

Three years after the system of Classical examina-

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tions had been abolished by Imperial Edict, many thoughtful observers on the spot already foresaw the possibility of disastrous consequences, as the result of the collapsing Manchu Government's failure to provide in the place of the classics an effective system of education, adapted to the needs and characters of the Chinese people. It was already beginning to be perceived that little good, and much harm, was likely to result from the violent uprooting of the old system which, whatever its defects from the western point of view, had proved throughout the centuries a permanent factor of national cohesion and stability. In an article published by *The Times* at this date (February 6th, 1908) I had occasion to express some of the misgivings which were then beginning to be felt, as follows:—

“That China is awakening, and the old order passing away, is certain; whether, in passing, it leaves the awakened nation to convulsions and partition or to the dignity of a sovereign State, its immemorial traditions and Statecraft enriched by wise adaptations from Western knowledge, must depend upon the nature of the education supplied and on the effect—by no means a foregone conclusion—which it produces upon the mass of the people. . . .

“It is impossible to ignore the mighty forces at work, the eager interest shown by the people in the new schools, the immediate effect upon native thought. It is certain that, before long, these forces must come into conflict with the policy and privileges of the Classical literati and conservatism, and it is therefore a matter of no small moment to humanity to ascertain whether the moving principles of the new system are likely to be constructive or destructive in their effect, whether the wine of the new learning, rapidly absorbed by Young China, will act as stimulant or intoxicant; whether, in fact, the patriotism and patience of the Chinese will enable them to follow the example of Japan.

“If one were to judge of the prospects in China only by the views of students, as expressed in their writings and political speeches, it would be safe to predict for the nation grave crises of unreason and unrest. . . . It would seem that, in

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learning and professing the democratic principles of the West, the celestial mind acquires an accentuated sense of superiority, that its instinctive racial prejudices are increased, rather than diminished, by residence abroad; for it is a matter of common observation that wherever public opinion in China assumes the form of unreasonable hostility to foreigners, the movement is usually inspired and led by men who have received their education from abroad."

Already at that date there had been ominous manifestations of the intoxicating effect of the new wine, evidence to show that, released from the discipline of the Confucian philosophy of national life, and fed straightway upon the strong meat of advanced European thought, the student class was assimilating little more than discontent with the ancient faith of its own civilisation, expressed in indiscriminating appreciation of western ideas of personal liberty, democracy, racial equality, etc. It certainly showed no signs of a capacity to assimilate, or even to understand, the moral principles and ideals underlying western civilisation. The rejection by the Throne of the Confucian Canon, as the basis of public and private morality, speedily resulted in a widespread relaxation of parental authority which, even before the elimination of the Throne itself—rallying point for all authority—had found ominous expression in the unruly proceedings of the students at Tokyo. Their repeated attempts to terrorise the Chinese Minister at the Japanese capital in 1905 afforded an indication of the dangers which the State was incurring by permitting thousands of youths to go abroad, released from all parental discipline. The impunity with which these attempts were committed afforded an equally significant indication of the extraordinary timidity of the officials, of their readiness, even in the highest

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quarters, to submit tamely to intimidation, and even to personal assaults, by students. After the collapse of the dynasty, and the introduction of the new era of civil war and general lawlessness, the students were bound to become an increasingly important factor in the politics of the Republic, for the reason that, in the absence of a hereditary ruling caste (such as Japan possessed in the *Samurai*) the leaders of public opinion in China can only be drawn from the educated class, and the old Confucian scholars having been discredited, their prestige in the eyes of the people passed, *faute de mieux*, to the new Intelligentsia. It was, therefore, not long before the audacity of its activities increased in proportion to their impunity. But the whips wielded by students in the early years of the Republic were mild scourges in comparison with the scorpions of the present generation. The latter's complete demoralisation undoubtedly reflects the tone and temper of the education which has been imparted in the primary and secondary schools under the direction of the Kuomintang. To these text-books I shall have occasion to refer in due course.

During the critical period immediately following the Russo-Japanese war, when the mind of Young China was raised to a high pitch of excitement and that of Old China sunk in depths of apprehension, the timidity displayed by high officials in the face of demonstrations by the students, was inspired partly by their natural anxiety, as rich men, to incur no avoidable risks. But where foreign politics were involved, it was equally inspired by the fact that Young China's professed belief in the regenerative virtue of democratic institutions was backed by an important section of European and

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American opinion, identified with, and chiefly responsible for, the new political faith. Like their fathers before them, the mandarins greatly disliked and feared missionary influence, but they were compelled by force of circumstances to pay lip service to the belief that the undisciplined activities of the student movement indicated a genuine awakening of the Chinese people to a world made free for democracy.

Writing on the subject of student mob psychology at the time of the Washington Conference,* I observed that "even before the Revolution, the overweening conceit, indiscipline and nervous excitability of the foreign-educated student had led many competent observers to wonder whether the younger generation would have patriotism and patience enough to build up on the old foundations a new system of government acceptable and intelligible to the masses of their countrymen. After the passing of the Manchus and the inauguration of parliamentary procedure at Peking, it soon became apparent that Young China had changed its old lamps for new, but that neither the wick of wisdom nor the oil of honesty were forthcoming." These and other criticisms of the western-educated students were indignantly challenged at the time, by the publicists of the Kuomintang, in letters to the Foreign Press and in the columns of the *Chinese Students' Monthly*, but the arguments employed were usually *ad hominem*. Neither then nor since have any of these publicists set down anything in the nature of a definite constructive programme, commonly accepted by the Intellectuals of Young China and based on clear recognition of the imperative need for efficiency and honesty in the administration of the public

* *China, Japan and Korea*. (Heinemann, 1921.)

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services. In all the voluminous works published by these Intellectuals, and by their foreign advisers and supporters, since the inauguration of the Republic, the reader will find the same stereotyped formulæ and vague professions of faith in the healing virtue of democracy à *l'américaine* and 'free institutions.' But in none of them will he discover any indication of either capacity or determination to create and maintain a genuinely representative system of government.

Such being the case, and these professions of faith having been proved sterile during a period of twenty years' observation, it is pertinent to seek, in the education of this semi-alien intelligentsia, an explanation of the increasing violence of the excesses habitually committed by the students in public matters, and of the attitude of subservience towards these excesses, displayed not only by the government but by the individual officials against whom they are directed. The audacity and impunity with which the student class has asserted its right to intervene in government affairs, and to impose its opinions upon the executive by acts of violence, have steadily increased during the past decade. In 1919, for example, roused to wrath by the decision of the Council of Three at Versailles to recognise Japan's claim to the reversion of German Rights in Shantung, the students enrolled themselves into Unions and organised parades of protest at the chief centres of education throughout the country. In Peking they attacked and burned the residences of two members of the government, denounced as traitors on account of their pro-Japanese tendencies. Again, in 1925, the Minister of Education having issued an order prohibiting any anti-Japanese demonstrations on Humiliation Day (the

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anniversary of the "Twenty-one Demands" of 1915) a mob of students proceeded to wreck his house: his resignation followed. These two instances are cited as typical; many others like them occurred during the period which preceded general recognition of the authority of the Kuomintang, under Chiang K'ai-shek as the ruling power, and the establishment of the new capital at Nanking in 1927. Their significance lay chiefly in the fact that on no occasion did the government or its local officials take any steps to check them or to insist upon stricter discipline being enforced upon students by the educational authorities. On the contrary, the attitude of the men in power, at Peking as well as at Canton, continually revealed a desire to conciliate the student class and to find excuses, if not justification, for its turbulent proceedings. Under these conditions, the complete contempt for authority which distinguishes the student movement to-day, was inevitable; for 'western learning' can never modify that instinctive disposition of the Oriental mind, which attributes a conciliatory attitude to fear and treats it accordingly. Since the achievement of political ascendancy by the Cantonese party (a group of sectarians always identified in the public mind with opposition to constituted authority), the student movement has thrown off all semblance of restraint. Its contagious example of dictatorial methods and organised ruffianism has moreover affected the primary and secondary schools, whose pupils now frequently assert their right to criticise, if not to dictate, the government's policy. Finally, throughout the whole movement (and most notably in the case of the anti-Japanese boycott) there is evidence of an increasing tendency on the part of its leaders to make their political

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activities serve those practical ends of family enrichment which, say what we will, are born and bred in the Chinese and, broadly speaking, become the paramount motive of their daily lives. Thus it has come to pass that the government's decision on any question of State policy is now liable to be violently challenged, and its highest officials ignominiously expelled from office, by riotous mobs of excitable college youths and schoolchildren.

As indicative of the attitude of the student and official classes respectively, one or two recent instances will suffice. One of the most notable occurred last year, when some 30,000 middle-school pupils and 12,000 university scholars went on strike, to protest against the Nanking Government's acceptance of the League of Nations' resolution in regard to Manchuria, and demanded an immediate declaration of war against Japan. Their protests culminated, as usual, in violent assaults upon the officials who had incurred their wrath, viz., the Foreign Minister (C. T. Wang) at Nanking, and the Mayor of the Chinese Municipality at Shanghai, both of whom incontinently resigned. Their activities since the beginning of 1932* have been of a nature to justify their claim to regard themselves as the final authority with regard not only to the policy of the government but to the direction of the educational establishments which they frequent. Thus, in January last, the newly-appointed President of the Central University at Nanking was severely beaten by a group of students, who disapproved of his nomination for the post, and compelled him to flee for his life. A week later

* On May 3rd a deputation of students called on the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kuo Tai-chi, to protest against his conduct of the negotiations with the Japanese in regard to Shanghai; their protests, as usual, took the form of a violent personal assault.

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they decided to nominate their own President, giving the government the choice of appointing one of their three selected candidates. At the same time the students of the Canton University were demanding the removal of their President and the appointment of Madame Sun Yat-sen to fill his place. These southern youths were more than usually self-satisfied and aggressive at this time, because they took credit to themselves for having brought about the downfall of Chiang K'ai-shek's administration; since then, the students whose voices predominate at Nanking, dissatisfied with the Cantonese régime, have demanded the restoration of Chiang K'ai-shek's authority.

In March, 1932, a case occurred at Wei-hai-wei, in connection with the anti-Japanese boycott at that port, which throws an instructive light on more than one aspect of the student movement. The students having requested a meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, to discuss means for preventing the importation of Japanese goods, proceeded to differ from the views of one of the merchants present, by beating him severely. The Vice-President of the Chamber then intervening, was similarly attacked; he, however, defended himself with a stick and felled one of his assailants. The students thereupon called in the police and demanded the Vice-President's arrest; he was accordingly taken under escort to the Yamen. Next day the students assembled in force at the Court, and called upon the magistrate to hand over the Vice-President, their amiable intention being to parade him penitentially at the head of a procession through the town. The Court temporised, endeavouring to placate the mob, but finally declined to hand over the Vice-President; the students thereupon signified

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their displeasure in the usual manner by breaking the Court windows, looting a number of Japanese shops, and holding an enthusiastic meeting on the golf course.

Another instance, ludicrous but instructive, which occurred early in the year at Swatow, reveals something of the sordid financial motives inseparable from Chinese politics, even in the rudimentary stage. In this case, the pupils of the middle and primary schools went on strike, because of the refusal of their claim to representation on the Committee of the local anti-Japanese Association, controlled by the students. This right of representation they demanded, partly as a matter of *amour propre*, but more especially because they had good reason to believe that certain officers of the Association had been using the opportunities of their position to squeeze large sums of money from the local shopkeepers. The juniors' demand for a finger in this lucrative pie having been refused, they marched in force upon the headquarters of the Association and proceeded to smash up the premises. The dispute, and the general strike in the schools, were considered of sufficient importance to call for official intervention; a member of the Kuomintang was therefore dispatched from Canton to investigate the matter. His verdict was that the middle schools, but not the primary schools, should be allowed to join the Association. This decision having been indignantly rejected and his person threatened, the delegate sought safety in flight. The schoolchildren then appointed a Committee to "talk reason" with the student leaders of the Association, but without effect; the strike therefore continued, the educational and other authorities being manifestly incapable of imposing discipline, even on the junior pupils.

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The explanation of this remarkable state of affairs is to be found, partly in the privileged position which the scholar has always occupied in the Chinese social system, and partly in the natural timidity of the average official; to the persistence, in fact, of the traditions and tendencies engrained in the national character by the Confucian code of ethics. Student movements have been recorded in Chinese history as far back as the Han period, but the indiscipline and violence which have marked those of recent years are entirely new features. They are only to be explained by the fact that, whereas patience, perseverance and respect for authority were essential virtues, imposed upon scholars by the Confucian system, the new dispensation having abolished these, has left the younger generation without steady-ing force or moral guidance. The fundamental weakness of the present system—or lack of it—resulting from the substitution of western learning for the Canons of the Sages is, that the average modern student in China (as in India) cannot bring his education into any direct relation with the life of his own people. As Prince Ito said of them in 1909, their intentions may be excellent, “but they have hardly any roots in the country and, therefore, as a class cannot be expected to direct and control any practical course of action.” Furthermore, the growth of indiscipline and unrest in the younger generation and the hold which political agitation obtains upon the raw material of the schools and universities, are phenomena in some measure due to widespread economic distress and to the resultant poverty and discontent prevailing in the classes from which this raw material is drawn. No procession or other demonstration by students would be complete without collec-

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tion boxes and methods not far removed from intimidation on the part of the collectors.

A writer in the Shanghai Press who conceals his identity but reveals considerable light of knowledge in signing himself "a student of Chinese affairs,"* has recently endeavoured to solve the "apparently unanswerable riddle" of the "astounding supineness of China's officials in failing firmly to suppress what would be regarded in other countries as obnoxious schoolboy pranks." In his opinion, the explanation lies chiefly in the domain of psychology; in that the rulers of the country understand the mentality of their own people as no foreigner can hope to understand it. He considers it impossible that the government would allow itself to be reduced to a nonentity and defied by schoolchildren, without good reason, which reason is supplied by the fact that the problem which the government has to face is two-fold. It has to reckon with, and placate, the small but highly vocal modern China of the Treaty Ports and big cities, where western civilisation has made some impression; it has also to reckon with the rest of the nation, "the inside, that conglomerate horde which has never so much as heard of extra-territoriality and would not understand it if it had; which still regards the written word as something almost sacred and has never heard of Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles'." It is confronted by the difficulty that, whereas under the old régime, whenever a student was guilty of serious offence, his teachers and the elders of his village were responsible and liable to punishment, the modern student has cast off parental and local authority. Nevertheless, the dominating prestige of learning remains; the common

* *North China Herald*, Shanghai, December 15th, 1931.

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people's awe of the scholar is undiminished and the psychological effect of his privileged position upon the officers of the law is an incalculable force. When, moreover, an officer of the law reflects that most of the large universities and colleges are under the direct patronage and protection of highly-placed members of the Kuomintang, either in the national or provincial governments, the immunity which the student enjoys, even in his attacks upon Ministers of State, becomes somewhat less mysterious. The government has always to reckon with the remarkable solidarity which the student unions have achieved, by western methods, reinforced by the national genius for class co-operation. Let a police inspector at Shanghai or Canton endeavour to prevent or control a political demonstration by students, let one of their number be slightly injured in the pursuit of his unlawful occasions, and straightway every college and school in the land howls for the wretched officer's blood, and threatens to wreak vengeance on the heads of the government if their demands are not complied with. Finally, when it is remembered that the government itself consists largely of men who owe their successful careers to repudiation of constituted authority and the tradition of collective moral responsibility, it becomes easier to understand why the student movement combines the prestige of a privileged class with complete indifference to the duty of dignity and discipline which that prestige entailed under the Confucian system. The mentality displayed by the modern Chinese student is in great measure ascribable to the sudden and violent uprooting of the culture which gave dignity and restraint to the profession of letters under that system.

But the widespread unanimity of the anti-foreign and

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anti-Christian sentiments, which the students have displayed with increasing virulence in recent years, cannot be attributed to this cause. These must be attributed to the nature of the education which the rising generation has received since 1905. They are the natural first fruits of the tree of false hopes, whose planting and watering by the missionary and educational societies I have already described. It was their intention and their confident belief that, with western learning, Young China would acquire the ideals and moral principles of Christian nations, together with a new conception of citizenship; they had therefore no misgivings in advocating the immediate and complete abolition of the Confucian system of morals and ethics. It was a project foredoomed to failure, conceived without regard to biological or sociological experience, and its results are deplorable to an extent which the world is only beginning to appreciate. Amongst these results, the deliberate cultivation of hatred for all foreigners by the professors and schoolteachers of the new dispensation, and the inculcation of that hatred by the text-books introduced by order of the Kuomintang, are the most sinister symptoms. For the great majority of these professors and teachers and textbook makers are products and exponents of western learning, either acquired abroad or from Mission Schools in China. In other words, they represent the class upon which proselytising enthusiasts in England and America have persistently relied for the last fifty years to reform the country's administration upon western lines and to provide the material for that 'stable and effective government' which Washington's optimists foresaw.

It was natural enough that the missionary and educa-

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tional societies concerned should hopefully overlook such tares as they discovered in their earliest crops and pin their faith on the bursting cornbins to come. It was also natural that, in order to gain the goodwill of their pupils, they should display an active sympathy with the political aspirations of their protégés, the westernised officials who came to the front after the Revolution, especially as these aspirations were usually the fruit of thought-germs implanted in Young China's mind at American educational establishments, sentimentally devoted to the inculcation of 'democratic' ideals. In their proselytising enthusiasm and zeal, they trusted also to the traditional loyalty and devotion of the Chinese pupil to his teacher. But in so doing they overlooked the influences of atavism and environment, far more potent in China than in any other Oriental country, and the fact that hostility to foreigners is a deep-rooted atavistic instinct. They forgot that the student, educate him where or how you will, remains *au fond* a product of the antecedents of the social system which produced him—in other words, that, sooner or later, he reverts to type.

Until the end of the second decade of this century, despite ominous indications of the coming storm, optimism of this kind, clearly reflected in the policies of Great Britain and America, was displayed by practically every missionary and educational organisation in China. Many of them, as I have shown, played a conspicuous part in supporting the movement for the abolition of extra-territoriality and other political objectives of the Nationalist Government's propaganda. But the anti-foreign and anti-Christian character of the Nationalist movement from 1925 onwards, a pheno-

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menon of unmistakable significance, left little ground for further self-delusion. There was no denying the fact that many of the bitterest anti-Christians and chauvinists, who inspired the confiscation or destruction of mission schools, churches and hospitals, were either professing Christians, or men who had received their early education from missionaries. The disillusion which had already been produced in the minds of dispassionate observers by the careers of prominent leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen and the "Christian General" Feng Yu-Hsiang, came to be shared by many missionary workers in the field. The truth gradually emerged, as the result of grievous experience, that the net result of fifty years of Europe's and America's educational activities in China has been in many ways disastrous; with the best intentions, they have unwittingly been engaged in the mass production of dangerous explosives.

Nevertheless, if one may judge by the general tenor of missionary reports, the belief still persists, apparently unshaken, not only at many of the headquarters of the great religious and educational societies, but in political circles, that western learning must eventually fulfil its purpose and produce a new and better type of citizen in China. Considering the nature and extent of the influence which these powerful organisations exercise, especially in America, it is hardly to be expected that they should readily confess either to a forlorn hope in the future, or to misdirected efforts in the past. But if the textbooks at present extensively used in the elementary schools throughout China may be taken as a reliable indication of current trends of thought, the students of the next generation are not likely to be less inclined

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to violent chauvinism than those of to-day. If it be true that 'what you put into the School you get out of the State,' it is impossible that the type of citizen to be produced by the Kuomintang's present system of education should make for the improvement of China's internal affairs or foreign relations. The spirit of militant nationalism which these books inculcate is based, from first to last, on bitter denunciation of the foreigner, and there is no getting away from the fact that, generally speaking, the sentiments which they express are those of the modern school Intellectuals, the class which owes most of its education to western initiative, so praiseworthy in its motives, but so misdirected in its methods.

An English translation of typical passages from these textbooks was published last year by the Japanese Press Union; it includes extracts from the *New Chinese History*, the *New Chinese Geography*, the *New Age Three Principles Textbook*, the *New Chinese Common-Sense Readers*,* and other similar works. Their unmistakable purpose is to inculcate a spirit of nationalism inspired by hatred and contempt of foreigners in general; many of them reveal, moreover, an unmistakable undercurrent of Bolshevist influence, similar to that which found expression in the writings of Sun Yat-sen towards the end of his career. The general tone and tenor of these textbooks afford sufficient explanation of the state of mind which the student class habitually reveals in its excursions into politics, of that attitude of hostility to the world at large which Lord Lytton so justly deplored at Shanghai, as a cause of

* A digest of these textbooks is given in "Nationalism and Education in Modern China," by Cyrus H. Peake (Columbia University Press and Milford's, London), 1932.

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conflict for which Geneva can provide no remedy; they therefore deserve the earnest attention of every friend of China, and especially of the religious and educational societies concerned.*

To enable the reader to appreciate the tendency of these textbooks and the manner in which the Young Chinese idea is being taught to shoot, the following extracts are selected from the several works named.

From *The Songs of the Three People's Principles*, in a higher-grade textbook:

The flags of Imperialism, brutally dyed with innocent blood
are waving;
Their barbarous troops, roaring like wild beasts, deafen my
ears;
They have butchered my dear brethren, murdered my re-
vered uncles—
Hot-blooded and high-souled brothers! Set your goal, clearly
and quickly!

The views expressed on the subject of the League of Nations in *The Higher-Grade Civics* have probably been revised since the Manchurian dispute began. In the edition to which the Japanese publication refers, they read as follows:

"The real power of the League is held by England, France, Italy and Japan; they dominate the weaker nations. This kind of organisation is merely a temporary expedient for the preservation of peace. As for our country, our only course is to solve our own problems by ourselves."

The abrogation of the unequal Treaties is thus discussed in the *New Age Three Principles Textbook*:

"The oppression of China by foreigners is the burning

* An indication of the characteristic attitude of our political idealists towards Young China was afforded in the series of broadcast "talks" delivered in June last by Professor Roxby. His talk on "Teaching Young China" (*vide The Listener*, June 29th) lays great stress on the purely academic programme of the National Education Conference, but contains no reference to the ominous nature of the textbooks actually in use.

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question to-day. . . . Committing a crime clearly within the realm of China, they rely on force to deny Chinese jurisdiction, whereas they should be punished by Chinese law. Moreover, the Maritime Customs are forcibly administered by foreigners. We need say no more to make it clear to you that the country is suffering from the oppression of foreign Imperialists. From the very beginning they compelled us by force of arms to accept the unequal Treaties. Therefore, it is that in the matter of foreign policy, the platform of the Kuo-mintang demands the abolition of these Treaties."

A typical extract from the *Popular Developmental Language Readers* under the heading of "Important Problems of Arithmetic":

"If a house were entered by brigands every year and looted of Mex. Dolls. 1,200,000,000, and nothing could be done to prevent them, the loss would naturally mount up each year and in ten years would increase by two and a half times. How much will the sum thus stolen from this house then amount to?

"There are 400 million people living in this house, but only one in ten is a wage earner, the rest being women, children and old people. If the money stolen by the brigands were all earned by these men, how much must each provide annually?"

The following on "Foreign Banking in China" is from the *New Chinese Common-Sense Readers* for lower-grade schools:

"The foreign banks in China issue banknotes and the Chinese have complete faith in them. They simply print hundreds of thousands of pieces of paper and exchange them for so many coins of ours. Is not this kind of loss great?

"There is also a system of exchange and they get big profit out of this, too. When they receive money on deposit from Chinese, they pay only four or five per cent, at best. Loaning the money thus accumulated to the Chinese petty merchants, they charge at least seven or eight per cent interest. The only thing they undertake is the little labour in the accounting department and they make the profit from the Chinese by the Chinese capital. In one item of banking alone, the money they make in China is about \$100,000,000 per annum.

"Beside this, they annually plunder from us four hundred

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to five hundred million dollars in the names of land tax, land assessment or various other taxes; one hundred million dollars through the special business tax; several dozen of million dollars in the speculative enterprises and other profits.

"Out of these economic oppressions, the loss we thus sustain does not fail to amount to \$1,200,000,000. Because we are suffering from such a big loss, people lack in vitality and no enterprises for social welfare can develop. Our future is in imminent danger, if no immediate measure is taken to combat these oppressions."

In issuing the pamphlet containing these translations, the Japanese Press Union justly observes that, considering the fact that millions of China's rising generation have been brought up in this atmosphere of violent dislike and distrust of foreigners for the past twenty years, there is nothing surprising in the excesses committed by the students of to-day, or in their total lack of balance and foresight with regard to international questions.

One has only to study the slogans which the students blazon on their processional banners and with which they disfigure the walls of Yamêns and public buildings, to realise how inane, how remote from the realities which concern the Chinese masses, are the parrot cries of these hybrid Intellectuals and how pitifully the valour of their ignorance contrasts with the dignity and decorum of the old-time, classical mandarin. The depths of emotional childishness to which sloganism has descended amongst China's modern students are almost unbelievable; their unvarying reiteration of machine-made platitudes constitutes in itself a continual indictment of the grievous error which the west has committed, in assuming that its moral standards and political ideals could be transplanted wholesale and bring forth rare and refreshing fruit, in a soil to which

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they are, by their Oriental nature, unsuited.

The pity 'tis, 'tis true. For these same students, drawn from every class of the Chinese people, are individually as good human material as any civilisation has produced—intelligent, by nature courteous and industrious, respecters of lawful authority. It is the tragedy of the present generation to have been born into an age lacking in that lawful authority which commands respect, and that their alien education, while relaxing that parental authority which is the corner-stone of China's social system, has rendered them unfit to play any useful part in the preservation of China's national civilisation and culture. From the Occidental point of view, the tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that the unmistakable tendency of the whole student movement since the Revolution has grown more and more hostile to foreigners in general and to Christians in particular; in other words, that they have accepted western learning simply as a means to an end, the same end as that which their fathers and their forefathers pursued before them, namely, to preserve themselves and their country from the West.

This aspect of the problem, the inherent, atavistic resistance of the Chinese Intellectual class to western spiritual values and modes of thought, has been recognised by many highly educated and thoughtful missionaries during the last century, notably by scholar priests of the Roman Catholic faith and by Protestants of the type of the late Timothy Richard. Had their counsels prevailed, the western learning supplied to the youth of China would have been of a kind very different from that which has actually been provided since 1900, especially that supplied by the Free Church American

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Missionaries. The admirable elements of Confucianism and the social system founded upon reverence for parents would have been preserved (as Shintoism has been preserved in Japan) in order to supply the requisite steadying influences, during a necessarily long period of administrative reconstruction. But the earnest proselytisers, after the manner of their kind, were in a hurry—and the present-day student is the result. Verily, they have their reward, for no truth about China has emerged more clearly since the first introduction of “western learning,” than that which the modern student now proclaims, namely, that western civilisation carries no more appeal to the Chinese mind to-day—and probably much less—than it did in the reign of Ch’ien Lung. Pausing on this conclusion, I propose to diverge briefly from consideration of the actual course of events, to examine the commonly-accepted postulate, that a process of westernisation is essential to the future well-being of China, as well for the body as the soul, and that this process is actually in course of being carried to a hopeful conclusion.

CHAPTER VII

EAST AND WEST: CAN CHINA BE WESTERNISED?

"Asia is not going to be civilised after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old. She will never attend Sunday School, or learn to vote, save with swords for tickets."—*Kipling*.

EVER since China was compelled, by force of arms, to accept the terms of the unequal Treaty of Tientsin in 1858, the policies of the western Powers towards her have one and all been based upon the assumption that her rulers were henceforth committed, and disposed, to westernise her administrative methods, political institutions and social system; also, that the process of westernisation might be expected to make rapid progress, and that its complete fulfilment must be of indisputable advantage to all concerned. Ten years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Tientsin, this assumption derived new force and world-wide acceptance from the special Mission conducted to America and Europe by Mr. Anson Burlingame, as Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary on behalf of the Chinese Government. Mr. Burlingame, who had relinquished the post of American Minister at Peking to undertake this Mission, was an active politician and a practised orator; his eloquent descriptions of the New China, hungry and thirsty for western knowledge, aroused the keenest enthusiasm all over the United States. At banquets and public meetings, from San Francisco to New York, he announced that the day had come when the Chinese

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people were eager to extend their arms towards 'the shining banners of western civilisation'; that China was prepared to encourage the preaching of Christianity and to give a warm welcome to missionary enterprise; that, in fact, she had quite definitely entered upon the path of reform and progress. The terms of the Treaty which he subsequently signed at Washington, on behalf of China, clearly reflected the deep impression which had been made on public opinion by his oratorical efforts and the fact that the American nation, firmly convinced of China's determination to reorganise her institutions on western lines, was disposed to give her all possible help and encouragement in so doing. The first seeds of the policy of benevolent non-interference, which came to fruition at Washington in 1921-22, were sown broadcast by Anson Burlingame in 1868.

The man who initiated the idea of the Burlingame Mission and persuaded the Chinese Government to adopt it, was Robert Hart, the great "I.G.," ever a loyal friend and prudent counsellor to China. His object, in which he fully succeeded, was by means of this Embassy to convince the outside world of China's good intentions, in order that, relieved of coercion, she might be accorded fair treatment and time to adapt herself to the new order of things. From Dr. Morse's admirable history of this period, we know that Hart was a believer in the westernisation of China, in certain directions and for reasons of expediency; the measures of reform which he continually urged upon the Chinese Government, he regarded as "essential to friendly intercourse and their own safety" . . . he earnestly endeavoured to convince them that their "only salvation lay in forward movement."

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But the man who succeeded Anson Burlingame as American Minister at Peking, Mr. J. Ross Browne, was, curiously enough, a realist in politics, who did his best to expose the fallacies underlying the sentimental idealism of his predecessor and to warn his countrymen of the danger of founding a national policy upon them. In his reply to an address presented to him by the American and English merchants of Shanghai in July, 1869, Mr. Ross Browne severely criticised the prevailing assumption of China's willingness to adopt western ideas, in words which have lost none of their cogency and common sense since they were spoken.*

"Hart's advice," he observed, "was wholesome, and it seemed for a time to be appreciated. But the astute mandarins had no idea of advancing. They were chiefly concerned to know how they could prevent innovations upon their established system and at the same time avoid the troubles that threatened them. . . . China neither sees her way clear at present to an acceptance of the ameliorations proposed, nor has she, so far as facts warrant us in believing, the slightest desire to substitute foreign systems for those which have answered her purposes through so many generations. All that the rulers of this Empire desire is to be left free to work out their own destiny in their own way, and that is simply retrogression and final relapse into barbarism. They make small concessions to avoid greater ones. The whole struggle is against making any at all. I state this, not in the way of depreciation, but as an incontrovertible fact, which we are bound to confront."

Sixty-three years have passed since these words were uttered and during that time, the relations of the western Powers with China, whether friendly or hostile, hopeful or pessimistic, have continually been based on the assumption that the necessity for westernisation was

* As a prophetic utterance, Mr. Ross Browne's whole speech will repay careful study. It is reproduced as an appendix to the second volume of Mr. H. B. Morse's standard work on the *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*.

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recognised in principle by the educated class, the rulers of China, and was in itself a process capable of achievement. Nevertheless, during all these years, there has been unmistakable evidence, for those who sought it, that the professed acceptance of western ideas by China's ruling class has never been inspired by any genuine conviction, or manifested in any definitely constructive purpose, but that it has always been due to motives of political expediency. To-day, thanks in great measure to the Kuomintang's skilful propaganda, to the influence of the missionary societies, and to the "F. O. school of thought," China's determination and capacity to remodel her national life upon western lines has become an almost incontestable axiom of international politics. This is only natural, for all the policies subscribed to by the Powers at Washington in 1922, all the activities of the great missionary and educational organisations since the beginning of the century, are baseless and of no effect, except upon the assumption that China's rulers are really sincere in their avowed intention to reform their judicial system to conform to the principles and practice of western nations; in other words, that they are ready and willing to substitute the western idea of government by law for the Oriental idea of government of human volition. Had there ever been the slightest evidence of a sincere intention of this kind, of any general recognition of the necessity for applying those educational processes by which the Chinese race-mind might gradually be modified to acceptance of the western conception of justice and the institutions based upon it, it might be possible, on grounds of faith and hope, to justify this basic assumption, even for those who realise

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that the modification of any firmly-rooted structural type is not the work of decades, but of centuries. But, in point of fact, there has been no such evidence of sincerity, while the proofs of insincerity are overwhelming.

The political idealists at Geneva and elsewhere, who to-day profess their belief in the capacity of China's westernised Intelligentsia to achieve the evolutionary miracle of "passing at one stride from despotism by divine right to full-blown democracy," take both their sincerity of purpose and their power of achievement for granted. Since Anson Burlingame's day there has probably never been a more widespread acceptance of the vision of "the shining banners of western civilisation" being welcomed by the rulers of China. One has only to study the mass of recent literature dealing with the Far East, to perceive how greatly preponderant is the weight of this kind of sentimental idealism in intellectual and political circles, on both sides of the Atlantic, and how powerful (one might almost say hypnotic) has been the influence of China's modern Intelligentsia, as political propagandists, upon cultured western minds, especially those of professors and "liberal-thinking" politicians. The great majority of the works published since the Washington Conference continually endeavour to interpret the East, as depicted by Young China, in terms of the West, and in so doing they invariably attribute to the Chinese people purposes and qualities that are wholly foreign to the deep-rooted instincts and traditions of the race. All alike subscribe to the orthodox belief, that the impending and inevitable westernisation of China will eventually provide a sovereign remedy—indeed,

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the only remedy—for all the ills which afflict her people, and all are therefore naturally disposed to give every encouragement to the westernised Intellectuals who claim to govern the country and to support them in their political aspirations, no matter how extravagant.

Yet once again, as in Burlingame's day, an American Daniel has come to judgment. With the indisputable authority of a thoroughly qualified observer, Mr. Owen Lattimore challenges the validity of this almost universally accepted assumption, and declares the very different truth of the matter, in a work which deserves the attention of every student of Far Eastern affairs. Comparing the westernisation of China with that of Japan, in his chapter on "the Living Force of Chinese Culture,"* he observes that China of old never felt any interest in western civilisation, such curiosity as her rulers occasionally displayed being merely that of fashionable diversion. The interest which was awakened by the unpleasant discovery that China was vulnerable to western methods of attack, was primarily defensive and has remained essentially defensive ever since. The Mandarinate, humiliated and perplexed by new forces, for which its experience provided no remedy, resorted to 'western learning' in the same spirit as that in which it had adopted foreign military training and other western inventions, that is to say, in the hope of discovering the secret of western power, of finding the magic formula which contains the secret of that power, but which, when applied, *need not entail the price of westernisation.*

* From *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*. By Owen Lattimore. By permission of the publishers, Macmillan and Co., Ltd.

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Says Mr. Lattimore:

"While the power of many western inventions has been recognised and the profit to be realised from many western methods, no single quality of the West, no subjective conviction, has truly appealed to the Chinese. The western style, for the Chinese, reveals no new dispensation nor any opening up of first and desirable, or morally superior, worlds of inspiring possibilities. There is nothing in it that, from the standard of Chinese spiritual values, it would be disgraceful to have to go without.

"While Japan manoeuvred for time to adopt western characteristics and catch up with the West, the whole history of Chinese relations with the West implies an underlying instinctive playing for time, in the hope that the West would exhaust itself and China be able to assert once more the superiority of which the Chinese are morally convinced. The normal type of the Chinese 'employment of western methods to defeat the West' has consistently been, not the adoption of western methods in order to attain western standards, but the interposition of western methods between China and the West, in order to stave off the West; and this type of manoeuvre can only be explained, viewing the conflict from the standpoint of China, by postulating as ideal some such eventual solution as the sloughing off of the West, and the survival of the Chinese tradition in its full integrity."

Finally, it is his considered opinion—an opinion fully confirmed by study of the writings and utterances of most modern Chinese writers—that intellectual circles all over China are as much concerned with the possibilities of decay and collapse in the civilisation of the West, as they are with the suitability of western standards for adoption in China.

"The very circles which are most progressive in clearing away medievalism, in improving administration and westernising economic affairs, are fitted with a strong and conscious pride in the Chinese point of view, the Chinese way of life, and the superiority of the basic values of Chinese civilisation over those of the West."

Those who have followed the course of China's

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foreign relations, from the time of the first European Embassies to the Court of Peking down to the present day, must admit the validity of these conclusions. They are confirmed, at every stage and period, by the policy of the country's rulers and by the unmistakable reservations of moral superiority implied, even in crises of humiliation and defeat, in the attitude of its most "progressive" viceroys, envoys and scholars; as witness the writings of statesmen such as Li Hung-chang, Chang Chih-tung, Wu Ting-fang, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, of the pre-revolutionary period, as well as those of Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei, Hu Shih and other publicists, who have achieved distinction under the Republic.

If, as the history of the past fifty years and the actual condition of affairs would appear to indicate, Mr. Lattimore's judgment is well-founded, it must follow that the ideas now generally accepted concerning the westernisation of China will eventually be proved fallacious and that the policies which have been persistently based upon them are policies of delusion, foredoomed to futility. There is certainly nothing in the present situation in China, or in the dominant morality of her rulers, to refute or modify the opinion expressed by Mr. Ross Browne in 1869: China, in her heart, "has not the slightest desire to substitute foreign systems for those which have answered her purposes through so many generations." There are winds of unrest on the surface, but the depths remain inaccessible, unmoved.

In another passage of his most instructive work, Mr. Owen Lattimore observes that, in Manchuria, the native's instinctive 'hope of deliverance from the West' takes the form of a widespread, eager expectation that "China may yet some day, from within the repository

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of her own traditions, produce a latent strength, which can in some manner be triumphantly revived and developed, to the overthrow and consternation of all foreign power and foreign standards, and enable Chinese Manchuria to vindicate its Chinese character." This undoubtedly accurate diagnosis of the Chinese race-mind's attitude towards the West acquires increased significance when we consider that the leaders of Nationalism in Japan have recently revived the slogan of "Back to Asia." "Convinced" (in the words of Mr. Kaku Mori) "that Japan's present plight is due to her surrender to western civilisation," they are determined "to part company with that materialistic civilisation, to return to their own spiritual life and seek to preserve Asia in accordance with their own culture." The racial instincts and feelings which inspire utterances such as these, lie far deeper in China than in Japan, because Chinese unity throughout the ages has always been that of a civilisation of culture, rather than that of an organised State, and because this indigenous culture is of its nature inarticulate. But, if we recognise this resistance, this hostility, to western ideas, as a deep-rooted instinct, a permanent force and a living reality in Asia, we may well ask ourselves how comes it that the great illusion of the impending westernisation of China has established itself so firmly in the public mind of England and America? How account for the fact that the great majority of 'Liberal thinking' politicians, professors and publicists, persistently assert, in the words of one writer, that "there is no longer any question of resistance to western ideas in China, the only question being whether the centre from which they radiate shall be Moscow or Geneva?"

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With regard to this question, it is important to remember that the belief in China's determination to westernise her national life and institutions had come to be widely accepted in England and America, long before the Great War and the Washington Conference had established the present consensus of idealist opinion. Its influence may be traced as far back as the days of the Taiping rebellion; it suffered a temporary relapse during the period immediately preceding the Boxer upheaval, but recovered strength from the Empress Dowager's chastened acceptance of western learning in 1905, and thereafter grew, as has been shown in previous chapters, with the rapid increase in the number of westernised students at home and abroad. Traced to its source, the conviction itself represents, like the Crusades, the proselytising fervour of Europe's active, self-helping races, and of the direct contacts established between their materialistic civilisation and political institutions, with those of passive, philosophic China. But it is a belief which, even when most definitely asserted, has usually been tempered by tacit recognition of the intellectual and moral qualities of Asia's oldest civilisation, and by the instinctive deference which is so frequently paid to the cultured representatives of that civilisation—ancient and modern—by western Intellectuals.

This deferential attitude is a phenomenon not unworthy of note, for it has continually manifested itself, as the result of similar contacts, at every stage of our relations with China, since the pioneer days of the East India Company. In recent times, thanks to the persuasive faculty of Young China's exotic Intellectuals, this deferential attitude has been so marked (notably in the

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Conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the League of Nations) that it would seem in itself, to afford no little justification for the unchanging belief of the Chinese in the inherent superiority of their own type of civilisation.

How comes it, we may ask, at a time when everything in the real condition of China emphasises the indifference of its rulers to western ideas and their unswerving adherence to Chinese lines of thought and standards of conduct, that this illusive belief in the westernisation of the country has held the field so long and still persists? Partial explanations of this phenomenon have been supplied in the chapters which deal with the missionary factor and with Kuomintang propaganda. To these may be added the subsidiary explanation that, for the past thirty years, the two classes of foreigners resident in China, upon which public opinion abroad relies chiefly for information—that is to say, the traders and the missionaries—have been practically compelled, by the very nature of their respective position and callings, to accept and proclaim this great illusion as the only true faith. Ever since the introduction of western learning, they have had practically no choice in the matter; they could not hope to pursue their lawful occasions in peace, unless they were prepared to conciliate the rising generation, the new student class and the ‘progressive’ Intelligentsia, these having become the most vocal and best organised force in Chinese politics. Moreover, the class interests and professed purposes of the ‘progressives’ were naturally regarded by European residents as results arising directly out of the new concerted policy of the Powers, as laid down at Washington, and therefore, with all their faults,

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deserving of loyal support.

Loyalty apart, the reticence generally observed by the foreign communities in China* of late years may fairly be attributed to the unanimity of political opinion with which their Home Governments have supported the policy of non-interference and patient conciliation since the Washington Conference, and by the high moral tone adopted by their diplomatic and consular authorities, in impressing upon them the irrevocable nature of this policy. In the rarefied atmosphere of idealism thus created, the trader was constrained to regard himself as a somewhat sordid anachronism and his interests as comparatively unimportant. He might, in his heart, concur in Mr. Ross Browne's opinion, that things being as they are, the path of self-determination for China must lead, in the end, to "retrogression and final relapse into barbarism"; he might question the wisdom of sacrificing two centuries of commercial enterprise to political ideals of more than doubtful applicability; but he found himself in a position which left him no alternative but to make a virtue of necessity. And those whose knowledge of things Chinese was confined to experience at the Treaty Ports, were, no doubt, impressed by the imposing programmes of reform, promulgated with such indefatigable fervour by the propagandists of the Kuomintang, at home and abroad. The foreign Press of the Far East bears witness, during the past decade, to the readiness of the community to be persuaded that the leaders of the Nationalist party were sincere in their professed determination to carry

* An exception is to be noted in the case of the British Community of Tientsin, whose Committee of Information continually endeavoured to keep public opinion in England advised in regard to the actual condition of China.

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out the pledges which they had given at Washington, especially those referring to the disbandment of armed forces and the reform of the judicial system.

But as time went on, it became more and more evident that the fulfilment of these pledges was limited to the promulgation of grandiloquent programmes at Nan-king and elaborate window dressing at Geneva. Short of attempting to carry out any of the promised reforms, the Kuomintang did everything possible to maintain the illusion of China's progress in westernisation, but, as will be shown when we come to consider the realities of the situation, none of the parties in power during this period, from Canton to Chihli, has ever produced a type of leadership, or committed itself to a policy which gives evidence of any sincere desire to adopt western ideas. There is, in fact, nothing in the attitude and actions of China's rulers to-day which can justify the belief that the political thought and morality of the educated class have been in any appreciable degree modified by contact with the West; while on every hand, and most notably in the administration of justice and finance, there is indisputable evidence to prove that the western innovations serenely accepted in principle, are in practice fundamentally alien to the spirit of Chinese culture. The rulers of China to-day, from Chiang K'ai-shek down to the small chieftains of the farthest frontiers, are men who despotically control their own armed forces, command the sources and output of industry, use the railways for their exclusive benefit, and levy taxes as they see fit. The ambitions of these leaders are the only vital realities; the rôle of the Intellectuals is confined, in practical politics, to furthering these ambitions. Foreign mechanical inven-

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tions, for purposes of war and peace, are sought and employed for purely material ends, either to dominate a rival at home, or to create abroad the impression of enlightened progress and latent power.

But when all is said and done, the innate conservatism which marks even the most progressive intellectual circles all over China and, beneath a thin veneer of western culture, inspires all the policies of her rulers, fittingly represents the true spirit of the Chinese people. Even if, as in Afghanistan, a dominant political party or an autocratic ruler should arise, determined to make westernisation a reality, and, in so doing, endeavour to apply the new Law Codes, with their rules of evidence and western conception of justice, to the everyday life of the Chinese, the experiment must inevitably end in failure. For while the great mass of the illiterate regard with tolerance the strange foreign ways and ideas of the new type of semi-westernised mandarin—confined in great measure to the vicinity of the Treaty Ports—they would assuredly resist with all the weight of their massive inertia, any innovations which threaten to disturb the unbroken continuity of tradition in regard to the things which matter in their eyes, the ancient customs and ways of the Middle Kingdom, as prescribed from time immemorial. They would gladly welcome the strong hand of any authority which might put an end to the evils which have come upon them for the past twenty years, gladly see the bandit return to peaceful paths of labour and the taxgatherer's exactions restrained within lawful limits. But, come what may, the race has often endured similar cycles of calamity in the past and, in spite of them, has preserved its belief in the Celestial scheme of things and its philosophic accept-

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ance of the problems of life and death.

Here we touch the very root of this question of the westernisation of China, for, thus regarded, it becomes the question of a people losing its own soul. Those fervent Internationalists who envisage the evolution of a world State, in which there shall be no more "kindred and tongue, people or nation," a cosmopolitan world made free for a completely standardised democracy, naturally regard the westernisation of China, and of all Asia, as a consummation devoutly to be wished. But even assuming, for purposes of argument, that the desired process might conceivably be concluded this side of the millennium, there still remains, for philosophic minds, the question whether the present type of western civilisation represents the last word in human wisdom and whether, indeed, it is demonstrably superior to that of China? What is there, we may ask, so undeniably enviable or permanent in the recent life history and present institutions of Europe and America, that entitles us to impose them upon the Chinese? What is there in them to justify the desire, or the attempt, to uproot and destroy the whole Chinese system of ethics, morals and culture, a system which had proved its enduring worth long before the light of letters dawned upon Greece and Rome? Would it not be far wiser to help China to add the necessary structure of western science and economics, as K'ang Yu-wei and Chang Chih-tung advised, upon the solid rock of her own civilisation?

Regarding the matter in this light, we may well consider what are the forces which have built up and preserved China's venerable civilisation, like a safe harbour of refuge upon the wreck-strewn shores of Time?

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What are the forces which have enabled her people, times without number, to lead captivity captive and, secure in their deep-rooted strength, to hear the legions thunder by and heed them not at all? Surely, the answer must be that the longevity of China's civilisation is due to its instinctive reliance upon moral, as distinct from material, forces and to the wisdom which has harmonised the nation's social and political institutions with the essential realities of existence and human nature? The essence of China's culture and polity proceeds from universal acceptance of the family system and all that it entails, codified by Confucianism and tempered by the gentle teachings of Gautama. Destroy this system, and with it you destroy the very soul of China.

If we scan the future destinies of mankind by the dim light of history, it would seem that, pending evidence to show that internationalism is a living reality and a guiding force amongst western nations, we should do what in us lies to preserve inviolate this soul of the East, the tranquil philosophy which is the birthright, not of its intellectual *élite*, but of its 'stupid people'; also that, as citizens of a troubled world, we should be eternally grateful for it, even as wayfarers are grateful for the shadow of a spreading tree in a dry land. For who shall say, looking to the signs and portents of our vexed modernity, that this machine-driven, time-killing civilisation of ours may not weary of its congested, pipelined cities and be led once more to learn from the East something of the secret of its serenity and time-tested wisdom?

If so, what is to be said for the activities of those whose proselytising or vocational zeal leads them to

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proclaim the belief that China can be made happier or better by virtue of social and political institutions which, by their very nature, are manifestly irreconcilable with the ingrained habits and beliefs of the Chinese people? Is it not, in truth, a pitiful thing, and an unwarranted encroachment upon China's "Great Inheritance," that we should seek to lead the minds of so many of her ruling class into paths remote from the thoughts and ways of their own people, by the false lures of 'western learning.' Even though, as we know, they tread these paths unconvinced, and without thought of following them to the end, the actual result has been to bring grievous confusion and much suffering to the common people, uncertain of their leaders in a world invaded by new and strange gods.

CHAPTER VIII

CHINA IN RECENT LITERATURE

FROM his masterly survey of the relations between Europe and China up to the end of the eighteenth century, Mr. G. F. Hudson* concludes that, in spite of the advance in sinological scholarship achieved during the nineteenth century, educated public opinion in Europe was better informed about China at the end of the eighteenth; the explanation being that the eighteenth century derived most of its knowledge from the writings of Jesuit missionaries, whose profound knowledge of the language, literature and customs of the country enabled them to grasp the meaning of things Chinese, and who had no political or other motive for misrepresenting them. After the establishment of regular direct intercourse and the first contacts of armed forces of the nineteenth century, the opinions about China which came to be held in Europe and America lost this quality of scientific and philosophic detachment; they necessarily reflected, in rapidly increasing measure, the conflicting opinions of men who approached the subject from the various points of their vocational or professional interests and prejudices, the opinions of merchant adventurers, of Protestant missionary pioneers, special ambassadors and sea captains, each and all naturally predisposed to find in Far Cathay that which he set forth to seek. One has but to study the records of the super-cargoes of the East India

* *Europe and China*. (Arnold, 1931.)

Company* at Canton after the death of Lord Napier in 1834, and to compare their conception of China with that which inspired their Board of Directors in London, to realise how difficult it was becoming, even at that early date, for the 'man in the street' to form a clear opinion upon any phase or aspect of Chinese affairs; and as, with the development of the opium question, these became increasingly involved in the welter of party politics, the comparatively definite and truthful picture which the Jesuit Fathers had given to the world, became more and more blurred and distorted. Thus, during the long-drawn slaughter of the Taiping Rebellion, educated opinion was greatly confused and divided as to the nature and origin of the movement, because of the widely-proclaimed missionary belief in the Christianity of its leaders; and it may be said, without fear of contradiction by any serious student of history, that from that time, until the siege of the Legations by the Boxers in 1900, the vacillating and ineffective policies of the Foreign Powers in China continually reflected, not only their failure to preserve any continuity of principle, but their increasing lack of definite knowledge, based on correlated facts.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, such knowledge as the eighteenth and nineteenth possessed, has gradually been rendered more obscure, and educated opinion increasingly confused, by reason of the propaganda, skilfully devised and widely distributed abroad by the agents of the Kuomintang, whereby a completely misleading idea of Chinese affairs has been created and successfully maintained. And side by side with this in-

* *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading in China.* By H. B. Morse. (Clarendon Press, 1926.)

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tensive *suggestio falsi*, there has been developed, since the southern "Nationalists" overcame their northern rivals and removed the capital to Nanking, a deliberate policy of *suppressio veri*, which has not only deprived the vernacular Press of the last vestiges of freedom but, emboldened by impunity, has established an effectively coercive censorship over the writings of foreign authors and journalists resident in China. With the rare exceptions, therefore, of works from time to time published by the few writers who combine accurate knowledge and sound judgment with personal independence, most of the materials which have gone to the making of opinion abroad have been either inspired or approved by the Kuomintang authorities. The foreign Press, at the Treaty Ports in particular, has in recent years been so forcibly convinced of the pains and penalties of plain speaking, that its utterances have become acquiescent to the point of deference and its attitude towards the powers that be is pathetically eloquent of the insistence with which the policy of patient conciliation has been enjoined upon them from Westminster and Washington. No newspaper, conducted as a business enterprise, can afford serious criticism of an oligarchy which does not hesitate to withdraw postal, telegraphic and transport facilities from those who venture to hold it up to censure.

The methods employed by the Kuomintang authorities to prevent the publication of any criticism of its actions, or opinions opposed to its policies, are many and various, but all display the quality of drastic, autocratic ruthlessness characteristic of Oriental despotism. In the case of journalists of repute, such as Hallett Abend, of the *New York Times*, and Rodney Gilbert of the *North*

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China Daily News, who knew their facts and were not afraid to state them, measures were adopted, including an official demand for their deportation, which eventually compelled them to leave the country. The reader will find the facts recorded in the books* subsequently published, more in sorrow than in anger, by these competent witnesses. Especially informative is Mr. Abend's description of the official Propaganda Bureau, created by the Nanking Government in January, 1930, to work in conjunction with international publicity offices in London, New York and Shanghai, for the purpose of misleading public opinion abroad, while rigorously suppressing the freedom of the Press at home.

But it is not only in the field of journalism that the Kuomintang executive have displayed their autocratic unwillingness to permit the circulation of any opinions which do not meet with their approval. They have shown themselves equally prepared to prevent the publication of serious historical works by authors whose account of events contains anything which does not coincide with the official view. Thus Professor Shryock, of Pennsylvania University, in the preface to his erudite study of *The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius*, is at pains to explain that he has not made use of the Ch'ing Shih Kao, or dynastic history of the Manchu period, "because it does not seem wise to quote as an authority a work which the present Chinese Government considers so objectionable that it has been suppressed." In the same spirit Chin Shih Huang burned the books of the Con-

* *Tortured China*. By Hallett Abend. (Allen and Unwin, 1931.)
What's Wrong with China; The Unequal Treaties. By Rodney Gilbert. (John Murray, 1926, 1929.)

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fucians, 200 years before Christ.

An equally interesting example of the Kuomintang official attitude towards historians is the case of the well-known textbook on *Far Eastern International Relations*, by Dr. H. B. Morse and Professor H. F. MacNair. The first edition of this work was published at Shanghai in 1928, but was withdrawn from sale and circulation within a month of its appearance, as the result of pressure brought to bear upon its Chinese publishers by members of the Nanking Government, who took exception to its description of events in China during the years 1925-27. In his foreword to the subsequently published American edition* Professor MacNair observes that the book had achieved the unique distinction of being the first work by a foreigner to come under the official ban and sentence of burning. It is a curious fact, indicative of the true nature of China's present discontents, that such a fate should have been reserved for the work of two writers whose names are honourably known throughout the East for loyal services rendered to China in all sympathy and goodwill.

Under these circumstances, it will be readily understood that the sources of accurate and impartially presented information concerning actual conditions in China, are few and far between, and that public opinion needs to be increasingly cautious and discriminating in accepting many of the conclusions which have become the common currency of contemporary publicists, especially those that are set before it with the magisterial assurance of learned professors. It may fairly be said that, during the decade which has elapsed since the

* Houghton Mifflin Co. (New York, 1931.)

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Washington Conference, most of the books (fiction apart) that have been written around and about things Chinese, have been the work of authors who are prepared to subscribe to the fashionable belief in the impending westernisation of China, and in the capacity of its modern Intelligentsia to provide, in due time, the 'stable and effective' government, for which the nations wait. The books produced during this period have been, in fact, with a few notable exceptions, of a nature to render more persistent and widespread those facile but dangerous delusions, which first made themselves felt in Far Eastern politics at the time of the Burlingame Mission, and which constituted the dominant influence at the Washington Conference, fifty years later. Roughly speaking, they may be divided into two classes, those which come under the heading of political propaganda, direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious; and those which do not. Unfortunately, the latter class is much the smaller of the two.

It would serve no good purpose to compile a detailed list and analysis of all the works included under these two categories, but it may serve the cause of educated opinion to refer to some of the most important and interesting of them.

Amongst those which have played a notable part in influencing public opinion, before and during the Washington Conference, must be mentioned the large number of works which at that period reflected the rapidly-increasing influence of American-educated students in the politics of the far East. Writing in 1921 in the *Atlantic Monthly*, on the future of the Pacific Problem, I observed that those who had occasion to study the signs of the times by the light of recent American litera-

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ture dealing with that problem, could hardly fail to

"have been impressed by the unvarying similarity of opinions expressed, and policies advocated by, the semi-official propagandists of Young China—such as Dr. M. T. Z. Tyau, Mr. S. G. Cheng and Mr. Joshua Bau* and those set forth in such widely-read works as Mr. Mark Sullivan's *Great Adventure at Washington*, Mr. Sydney Greenbie's *Pacific Triangle*, and Mr. Alex Powell's *Asia at the Cross Roads*. These last may not represent the official mind of America, but they do most undeniably represent the views of those from whom great numbers of well-meaning but uninstructed readers take their opinions, and ultimately a dead weight of prejudice, which in its turn is bound to affect American policy.

"The tone and temper of these books and others published during and since the Washington Conference, are generally speaking, such that no impartial observer, alive to the stern realities underlying the Pacific problem, can easily persuade himself that it is likely to be permanently and peacefully settled; for there is little or no evidence here of any broad-minded sympathetic recognition of the real issues involved, nor any definite attempt to solve the problem in a spirit of 'harmonious co-operation' and reasonable compromise."

Seven years later, discussing the great and increasing output, by the professors and *alumni* of American universities, of books dealing with the history, economics and social conditions of China, I pointed out that the quantity and quality of these works were natural results of the large numbers of Chinese students frequenting these centres of learning, and of the close relations existing between these centres and the great missionary societies. Five separate histories of China in two years would appear to indicate competitive over-production by a highly protected industry, but the explanation of this feverish output lies undoubtedly, to a great extent,

* *China Awakened*. By M. T. Z. Tyau. (Macmillan, 1922.) *Modern China*. By S. G. Cheng. (Clarendon Press, 1919.) *The Foreign Relations of China*. By M. J. Bau. (New York, 1922.)

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in the enthusiasm engendered in the professorial mind by contact with young China's "Intellectuals." Most of these books belong naturally to the textbook class; as such, they compel the melancholy reflection that the ideas of the rising generation in America, on the subject of China's domestic affairs and foreign relations, are bound to be largely based on fallacies and delusions, and therefore in the long run harmful to all concerned. For these books are essentially academic in their outlook and their authors, generally without direct knowledge of the Orient, bring to bear upon the problem which is China, a purely subjective philosophy and a sentimental idealism, similar to those with which President Wilson confronted the realities of world politics at Versailles. Here and there works emerge (*e.g.*, Professor Young's historical study of *The International Relations of Manchuria* or Professor Thomas's *Chinese Political Thought*) which give evidence of serious research work and philosophic detachment; but the spirit which usually characterises these academic excursions to the East is one of vague and misdirected idealism. There is evidence, in the institutions of higher learning, of a laudable desire to adopt a 'world point of view,' but in dealing with China, this point of view frequently suffers from too close association with the prevalent type of sentimental opinion, which persists in endeavouring to interpret the East in terms of the West. As expressed in many of these works, it is a point of view which represents, no doubt, the great middle mass of American opinion, complacently benevolent and optimistic, which has always been taught to believe in the possibility of reconciling economic laws with altruistic ideals, and incidentally of Americanising the soul of the East by

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means of religious and educational activities. Only a working knowledge of the realities of Eastern life, based on direct observation, can correct the misapprehensions thus created. Even scholarly works, such as those of Professor Vinacke and Professor Treat,* when they come to deal with the post-revolutionary period of China's recent history, are manifestly influenced by the belief prevalent in educational circles, that the political activities of the westernised (especially the Americanised) section of young China, represent the conscious aspirations of the newly-awakened Chinese masses—a belief impossible to be held by anyone with direct knowledge of the physical and spiritual condition of those masses. Nor do they wholly escape from the contagion of the popular fallacy which sees in democratic institutions, the sovereign remedy for “Imperialism”, militarism and all the other ills which afflict the body politic in China. Professors, after all, are human; and in this case, like the human society of which they are a product, they contrive to live and to write quite contentedly under a logically-indefensible compromise, between the exotic ideal of altruistic internationalism and an everyday domestic environment of robust nationalism.

Setting aside purely propagandist works such as those of Mr. Thomas Millard (one of several American advisers at Nanking), Colonel Malone (one time emissary to China of the British Independent Labour Party) or “Upton Close” (lecturer on Pacific Asian life and politics at the University of Washington), the reader will find this compromise very frequently expressed in

* *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*. By Professor Vinacke, University of Cincinnati. (1928.) *The Far East*. By Professor Treat. (Stamford University Press, 1928.)

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an attitude which is generally content to ignore the essential realities of the situation; and this despite the fact that these realities have been most carefully studied and accurately stated by a small group of thoroughly competent American authorities, including Dr. H. B. Morse, W. H. Mallory, John Earl Baker and Owen Lattimore.* In certain cases, this attitude is manifestly the result of a *parti pris*, resulting either from the vocational enthusiasm of the educationalist, or from a political bias; in others, it is due to lack of real knowledge of the subject and generally expresses conclusions which have been hastily arrived at in personally-conducted tours of the East, magisterial joy-rides in which the professorial or magisterial eye discovers only that which it went out for to see. Even in the case of learned sinologues, such as Mr. Williams (Professor of Oriental languages at California University), vocational enthusiasm is apt to outweigh the teachings of direct experience and to produce results of a nature to mislead the uninitiated. Like Mr. Holcombe† (Professor of Government at Harvard) or Professor Willoughby‡ (recently official adviser to the Chinese delegates at Geneva) he looks to the intellectual offspring of American missionary and educational work in China to 'build there a Republic that shall be worthy to stand alongside of America.' A very natural wish is father to

* *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading in China*. By H. B. Morse. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926.) *China: Land of Famine*. By Walter H. Mallory. (American Geographical Society, New York, 1926.) *Explaining China*. By John Earl Baker. (Philpot, 1927.) *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*. By Owen Lattimore. (Macmillan, 1932.) *A Short History of China*. By Professor Williams. (Harpers, 1929.)

† *The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution*. By Professor Holcombe.

‡ *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*. By Professor Willoughby. (Probstein, 1927.) *Constitutional Government in China, Present Conditions and Prospects*. By Professor Willoughby. (1922.)

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this comfortable and widespread belief; but to share it, one must disregard the fact that no such uplifting determination has ever been manifested by these westernised students, in any permanently effective form during the three generations that have elapsed since the first batch went forth under Yung Wing, to be educated at American Universities, although several of them subsequently rose to high office. One must also overlook the whole record and character of the western-educated leaders of the nationalist movement since the Revolution, and especially those of the Cantonese 'Parliamentary' group. But the academic mind, as reflected in these and many similar books, persists in believing that to-morrow must be entirely different from yesterday or to-day, and looks for the salvation of China to the modern mandarin of its own dreams—a disinterested patriot of enlightened ideas, with a Harvard education, horn-rimmed spectacles, a single wife and a fixed salary.

The writings of men like Professor Holcombe and Professor Paul Monroe* have reached a large audience and exercised considerable weight, because their authors speak with the authority of men who have studied Chinese affairs on the spot. But their interest in years to come will lie chiefly in the fact that, each in his way, they represent instructive examples of the forces which have largely contributed to create and perpetuate the present conditions of political and social unrest in China. Mr. Holcombe's book (reproducing a series of lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute of Boston) affords a particularly edifying manifestation of the

* *China, a Nation in Evolution*. By Professor Paul Monroe. (Macmillan, 1928.

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manner in which these forces work. In it he analyses, under six headings, the spirit of the Chinese Revolution and "the factors which seemed to him most important in the present phase of the revolutionary process." All the things which he saw, and the men whom he met, during his tour of the Far East, were of a character to confirm his ardent faith in the future of China, wisely and orderly governed by graduates from American Colleges. "All the principal bureau chiefs in the Ministry of Finance were Harvard Graduates," he writes, "and I could not help but feel that the prestige of Harvard was at stake in their conduct of the national finances." From this gratifying fact and others like it, Professor Holcombe concludes that East and West have now finally met and that all is henceforth well with the Chinese world. He sees no reason why Chiang K'ai-shek and his colleagues should not proceed forthwith to train the Chinese masses in the duties of democratic citizenship, in accordance with the enlightened principles of Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy, or why the nation, under the guidance of the Three Principles, should not be able to develop the *morale* requisite for state capitalism and the evolution of a modern capitalist class. Opinions such as these evidently derive their chief importance from the fact that they represent the views of a large and very influential body of educationalists, and that their professorial bias undoubtedly appeals to a very large body of public opinion.

Mention has already been made of Professor MacNair's expansion of Dr. H. B. Morse's standard work on China's international relations under the title of *Far Eastern International Relations*. This comprehensive historical study combines scrupulous accuracy

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of detail with conciseness of style, and the unbiassed attitude, which distinguished Dr. Morse's original work, is well maintained by his collaborator, though tempered, in respect of the post-revolutionary period, by his natural sympathy for Young China's political aspirations. As a textbook for students it is invaluable, covering in its 840 pages all that is important in the history of the Far East, from the first contacts of the West down to the present triangular struggle in Manchuria; its selected bibliography and Index cover 66 pages. Equally valuable, as sources of accurate information, are Mr. John Earl Baker's *Explaining China* and Mr. Mallory's *China, Land of Famine*. Both these books are the work of trained observers, whose scientific conclusions are based on carefully collected facts. Mr. Baker has spent many years serving China in various capacities; like Mr. Mallory, he has dealt with famine, and other grim realities of Chinese life, at close quarters. He makes no claim to the magisterial finality of the political perambulators who, after spending six weeks at highbrow conferences, proceed to enlighten the world with their preconceived and firmly-fixed ideas. The reader will find in his work little or no reference to the individual war-lords and politicians who emerge from time to time from the welter of civil strife; but he will find in it much solid material, wherewith to form a generally accurate idea of the fundamental factors of the Chinese problem. Similarly, Mr. Mallory's study of the causes and results of chronic famine conditions in China conveys more essential information, and carries more conviction, than all the academic essays of the politicians, so strangely indifferent, as a rule, to human suffering in the mass. In

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simple language, Mr. Mallory sets forth the true explanation of the all-important, tragic fact that, as an inevitable result of its patriarchal social system, the Chinese race has dwelt for ages, under the imminent menace of famine; and he makes it plain that, so long as this social system based on ancestor worship persists, the paramount motive underlying all political movements must continue to be "the old spirit of family enrichment at the expense of other families."

These last two books differ from the great majority of those that have been written around and about China since the Revolution, in that they are chiefly concerned with the effect of the political upheaval and civil strife upon the inarticulate, long-suffering masses, and upon the slow-moving mind of the "stupid people." On this subject the world has learned but little from the great majority of foreign observers, and practically nothing from any Chinese writer; only from occasional missionary reports can the seeker after truth gather some idea of the dark shadow of fear under which the urban population of most provinces now spend their lives, hoping against hope for peace in their time. A short book* written by the wife of an American business man, for 19 years resident in the interior, supplies an eye-witness account of the day-to-day growth of this shadow of fear, during the 1927 advance of the Nationalist troops, first in Hunan and then in Nanking. Mrs. Hobart sees the country and its pitiful plight "through the eyes of her merchants, whose shop doors so often in the last years have been close-barred for fear of looting by advancing and retreating troops; through the eyes of its lowly common people, whose junks and

* *Within the Walls of Nanking.* By Mrs. A. T. Hobart. (Cape, 1928.)

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sampans I have seen so often looted and commandeered under rifle fire; of farmer folk, whom I have seen devastated by floods, bandits and soldiers." In her mind, ever insistent, is the vision of the defenceless people, living continually under this dark shadow of fear—fear for their lives, for the honour of their women, for the loss of all they possess, even to the rice-bowls from which they eat. Hers is an unvarnished tale, but the unmistakable sincerity of her affection for these poor people invests it with dramatic force and deep significance. Particularly impressive is her description of the effect of the growing shadow upon the servants of her own household—those pathetically patient, industrious and loyal souls "who deserve so much, ask so little, and get so much less"—and of the gradual disillusion of the respectable middle-class, concerning the purposes and proceedings of Nationalism.

As regards works written in English by Chinese authors during the past decade, these may be lightly dismissed, for, generally speaking, they add but little to our learning and merely serve to make confusion worse confounded. 'Of those which were written in the years immediately following the Washington Conference, most were intended to promote the political purposes of the Kuomintang; but since the breach between the Cantonese and the Nanking factions, those which have had the widest circulation are the work of publicists belonging to the Cantonese Left Wing—T'ang Liang-li, T. C. Woo, and Wang Ching-wei*—and may be classed as propaganda of the controversial domestic type. Two

* *China in Revolt*. By T'ang Liang-li. (Douglas, 1927. Routledge, 1930.) *Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*. By T'ang Liang-li. (China United Press, 1932.) *Wang Ching-wei*. By T'ang Liang-li. *The Kuomintang and the Chinese Revolution*. By T. C. Woo. (Allen

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interesting works by scholars faithful to the old tradition may, however, be cited—viz., Professor Leonard Hsü's *Political Philosophy of Confucianism* (Routledge, 1932) and Mr. L. T. Chen's translation of Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao's *History of Chinese Political Thought* (Kegan Paul, 1930). It was a timely coincidence that the publication of the latter coincided with that of Mr. T'ang Liang-li's *Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, for together they illustrate, in a most instructive manner, the results which "Western learning" is apt to produce on the Oriental mind, beneficial or harmful, according to the manner of its application. A dispassionate study of these two books will, I think, lead most readers to the conclusion that it would have been far better for the state of China, if the present generation of her ruling class had been educated, like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, in the intellectual faith of their fathers, rather than encouraged, like T'ang Liang-li and his *confrères*, to follow after new and strange gods overseas. Comparison of Liang's erudite and convincing study of the history of Chinese political thought, with Mr. T'ang's *Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* compels the reflection that the modern Chinese who have studied "Western learning" in their own country are usually better men and better citizens than those who have acquired it abroad; at the same time it raises serious doubts as to the moral superiority of our social and political systems, as compared with those prescribed by the Confucian formulæ of national life. As a general rule, books published in English by westernised Chinese

and Unwin, 1928.) *China and the Nations*. By Wang Ching-wei. (Hopkinson, 1927.) *The Chinese National Revolution*. By Wang Ching-wei. (China United Press, 1932.)

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writers, are of a nature to warrant the conclusion that, in the process of acquiring abroad the democratic principles of the West, Young China habitually sheds many of its native virtues, while in the same process its instinctive racial prejudices are manifestly increased. With the notable exception of Dr. Hu Shih, none of the younger generation of China's publicists display any sign of that scientific objective attitude of mind, upon which the pioneer scholar-reformers of Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao's school insist, as essential to the study of political ideals.

In addition to Morse and MacNair's textbook of recent history, two valuable works of reference have been compiled during the past decade—namely, Mr. G. W. Keeton's judicially impartial exposition of the nature and implications of extra-territoriality in China* and Mr. K. S. Latourette's *History of Christian Missions in China* (New York, 1929). The annual volumes of the *Survey of International Affairs*, issued by Professor Arnold Toynbee, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, provide a useful, continuous record of events; even if their appreciation of those events is apt at times to suggest the influence of the pale cast of thought which usually distinguishes the symposia of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. C. W. Young's *International Relations of Manchuria*† has already been mentioned; this excellent digest and analysis of treaties, agreements and negotiations concerning Manchuria, from 1905 to the present day, was originally compiled by Professor Young at the

* *The Development of Extra-territoriality in China*. By G. W. Keeton. (Longmans, 1928.)

† *The International Relations of Manchuria*. By C. W. Young. (Cambridge University Press, 1929.)

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request of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to serve as a work of reference for the Institute Biennial Conference at Tokyo in 1929. It supplies a succinct and connected account of events in and about China's loosely-held northern dependencies, and explains the nature of the conflict between the assertion by Japan of her special rights and interests, and the maintenance of the policy of the "Open Door" in this region, to which all concerned pledged themselves by the Washington Treaties. Each of Professor Young's four periods of Manchurian history brings into clear relief the elemental cause of the present-day international problem—namely, that a nation which cannot defend its territories by force of arms, and which can be induced, from motives either of expediency or of fear, to sign away its sovereign rights, can only hope to enjoy the position of a sovereign State in perpetuity by relying upon the altruism, or playing upon the rivalries of other, more powerful, nations. Finally, in the category of books of reference, should be mentioned Mr. F. W. Price's translation of L. T. Chen's edition of Sun Yat-sen's *San Min Chu I* or *Three Principles of the People*, published by the China Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Things being as they are, the translation of this code for the information of the outside world was useful—indeed, necessary. But they deceive themselves, who, like Professor Holcombe, take the Modern sage's incomprehensible formulae seriously, and declare that the new Government of China is founded upon the principles of his political philosophy. For it is safe to assert, as Mr. Lattimore does, that his weirdly irrational analyses of political, social and economic forces have "never affected the

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political thought of China by any power of reason," and that since his death, "his name and his formulae have been invoked only for tactical purposes. . . . Elevated to the authority of dogma, they have served chiefly to stultify original thought in the generation that is now maturing."*

Of books written by other than English and American authors, during the past decade, the number of those that have been considered of importance sufficient to justify translation, is comparatively small. One of the most notable is Mr. M. M. Lowes's translation of Sheng Cheng's *Ma Mère et Moi* from the original French, under the title of *A Son of China*.† The chief interest of this autobiographical work lies in the light which it throws upon the evolution and character of the modern Chinese student, of the class from which, in their thousands, come aspirants to office, fore-doomed from the nature of things to unemployment, and therefore to unrest. Apart from the interest of the narrative, the author's astonishing command of the French language and understanding of the nation to whom his work is primarily addressed, afford a most instructive example of the rapidity with which the Oriental mind can adapt itself to the use of new materials and a new technique. Another book, similar to this in quality and atmosphere, but of a deeper human interest, is the *Grass Roof*,‡ by Younghill Kang, a Korean scholar (Scribners, 1931).

Amongst other foreign works possessing literary interest or distinction may be mentioned Abel Bonnard's

* From *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*. By Owen Lattimore. (Quoted by permission of the publishers, the Macmillan Co.)

† *A Son of China*. By Sheng Cheng. (Allen and Unwin, 1930.)

‡ *Grass Roof*. By Younghill Kang. (Scribners, 1931.)

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In China, translated by Veronica Lucas (Routledge, 1926); originally written in 1921, this is the work of a clear-thinking and cultivated mind. Also, in a different category, *The Soul of China*, by Herr Richard Wilhelm, translated by J. H. Reece, with poems by Arthur Waley (Cape, 1928). Herr Wilhelm's reverence for the profundity of China's ancient culture is so intense that he has nothing but contempt for the West's civilisation of machinery; but his description of his association with the "small circle of the élite of China's Intellectuals" of the old régime is instructive. Mrs. Whale's translation of André Malraux's *The Conquerors* (Cape, 1929) supplies an extremely vivid account of the character and methods of the handful of Moscovite agents who, in 1925, acquired sufficient ascendancy over the Cantonese leaders of the Kuomintang to make the Nationalist movement subservient for a time to the purposes of the Third International. Dr. Legendre's *Modern Chinese Civilisation*, translated by Elsie Martin Jones (Cape, 1929), presents a categorical indictment of China's Westernised Intelligentsia, and incidentally of the foreign opinion which regards it as capable of producing an efficient type of government. Dr. Legendre, one-time director of the Imperial School of Medicine at Chengtu, writes primarily as an anthropologist, after twenty years devoted to study of the physical and mental characteristics of the Chinese race. Mr. George E. Sokolsky's recently published book, *The Tinder-box of Asia* (Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York), is the work of a journalist who has an extensive, first-hand knowledge of Chinese affairs. Dealing chiefly with Manchuria, his book contains a great deal of interesting and reliable information on con-

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temporary events in the Far East. Finally, Professor Dennergy's *Foules d'Asie*, rendered into English by Mr. J. Peile, under the title of *Asia's Teeming Millions* (Cape, 1931), sets forth the conclusions and impressions formed by its author during a tour of the Far East, with especial regard to the problems of over-population.

Two commendable works of reminiscences are *Through the Dragon's Eyes*, by L. C. Arlington (Constable, 1931), and Captain W. F. Tyler's *Pulling Strings in China* (Constable, 1929); both these authors saw active service with the Chinese navy under the Monarchy, and have to their credit many years of interesting experience in various parts of the country. Finally, a book which everyone should read, who desires to form an accurate idea of the present-day life of the Chinese peasantry, is *The Good Earth*, by Pearl S. Buck (Methuen, 1931). Nothing better in its way has been done than this simple and convincing study of the conditions under which a Chinese farmer lives, moves, and has his being, in a land continually devastated by flood and famine and oppressed by tyrannous misrule.

I have reserved for separate consideration two works which, for different reasons, deserve detailed and careful consideration—namely, those published during the present year over the signatures of Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Lionel Curtis.* No exercise could be more useful to the student of Far Eastern affairs than a comparison of these two works, inasmuch as they represent respectively, and most typically, the objective and subjective methods of approaching the Chinese question and the fundamental conflict between realism and

* *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*. By Owen Lattimore. (Macmillan, 1932.) *The Capital Question of China*. By Lionel Curtis. (Macmillan, 1932.)

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idealism in dealing with it. Mr. Curtis's book, in particular, may fairly be said to present the whole case for the school of political thought which found expression in the Washington Treaties and which has since clung desperately to its faith in the policy of patient conciliation and the dogmas of racial equality and self-determination. And since the crux of the Far Eastern question still lies in the continued ascendancy of the mis-directed idealism of this school of thought, on both sides of the Atlantic, it seems desirable to devote to this book a scrutiny somewhat more close and critical than one might otherwise be disposed to accord to it. I propose, therefore, to make it and Mr. Curtis's views on China the subject of a separate chapter.

CHAPTER IX

THE "F.O. SCHOOL OF THOUGHT"*

"The F.O. School saw quite clearly that the Old China was dead, that old traditions no longer counted, that all privileges which we enjoyed had to be given up, and that further, China had now become aware that the Nationalist movement in China had become so active and so powerful, that we must candidly and frankly recognise that China must have all the powers of an independent and self-governing nation."—(*Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in the House of Commons, 8th February, 1927.*)

IN the preface to his recently-published work *The Capital Question of China*, Mr. Lionel Curtis explains that, as the result of his studies and activities as an honorary secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a definite change took place some years ago in his outlook on international affairs. "A sense of comparative values began to develop in his mind." Ireland, South Africa, India, faded into comparative insignificance and he found that "he had come to believe that China, a country in which he had heretofore taken no particular interest, presented a problem second in importance to no other." The conviction having entered his mind "that the next serious threat to the peace of the world would come from the state of the Far East," he was led to concentrate on the study of this region. This study, having no doubt been satisfactorily completed in the process of three visits to the Far East, as a Chatham House delegate to the biennial Conferences

* The first part of this Chapter was published as an article in the *National Review* for August, 1932.

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of the Institute of Pacific Relations, he has now been moved to write a book, in order that his fellow countrymen may be led to share his newly-found knowledge, and with it his opinion that the state of China is "a question of major importance, which cannot be further neglected without risk to the whole structure of human society." True, he makes no claim to expert knowledge; his book is "merely the result of studies made late in life by one seized with a strong conviction that he, in common with the mass of his countrymen, had been too long in ignoring the state of China." And because he foresaw that the opinions expounded in this book were bound to be contentious, he thought it advisable, before writing it, to vacate his position as an officer of Chatham House, "the Institute being precluded by its charter from expressing opinions on questions of policy."

The publication of this 'contentious' matter comes opportunely at the present juncture, when the breathing space afforded by the Lytton Commission of Enquiry has for a while relieved the Western Powers and the League from the dilemmas of the Manchuria Dispute and other thorny problems of the Far East. For although it is not of a nature to contribute to the average citizen's better understanding of Chinese affairs (being indeed calculated to increase his bewilderment) it should yet serve a useful purpose; for it throws no little light on the mental processes of the 'F.O. School of Thought' with which Mr. Curtis, and through him, Chatham House, have been so closely associated; on the opinions of that coterie of political idealists, whose influence has been so frequently reflected in Great Britain's China policy since the Washington Conference. Mr. Curtis, like most dealers in pacifism, is never lacking in

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the courage of his convictions, and on the present occasion he expounds them, *ex cathedra*, with unhesitating assurance. Indeed, his book is not so much an exposition of the capital question of China, as a passionate vindication of the 'liberalising' policy of patient conciliation, which first found definite expression in the Washington Treaties of 1922, and was most significantly reiterated in Sir Austen Chamberlain's 'unilateral' memorandum of 18th December, 1926. Bearing in mind the fact that in recent years the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has habitually confined his attention to the affairs of Europe and America and allowed our China policy to be formulated and expressed by the permanent officials of the Foreign Office; bearing in mind also the influential part which members of the Chatham House coterie have admittedly played in inspiring and formulating the official opinions, for which first Sir Austen Chamberlain and later Mr. Henderson assumed responsibility, Mr. Curtis's reiterated defence of the famous 1896 Memorandum, "as the genuine and permanent expression of British policy towards China," having behind it "the support of all three parties in the Parliament of Great Britain," becomes a matter deserving of attention. For at the present stage of the Far Eastern problem, when thoughtful men on both sides of the Atlantic are becoming more and more conscious of the futility of the Washington policy; when a growing sense of realities and humanities is gradually leading public opinion to perception of the necessity for some form of helpful intervention in China, we should welcome anything which helps to explain the peculiar mentality of the doctrinaires to whom the inspiration of the Washington policy was due, and with whom rests most of the respon-

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sibility for the errors to which British policy has ever since been committed.

The idealism of Mr. Lionel Curtis, as revealed in this book, presents a curious resemblance to that of two other pedants in politics, the late Mr. President Wilson and Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It has the same quality of pontifical assurance; the same autocratic finality of opinion, the same sublime indifference to unpleasant facts, whensoever they conflict with his *obiter dicta*; and withal a whole-souled belief, like theirs, in the solidity of his sand-castles, which verges at times on the naïve. Mr. Curtis, moreover, makes no secret of his poor opinion of the men on the spot—be they traders, consular officials or journalists—and of his contempt for their several opinions. Towards the sordid mercantile community of the Treaty Ports, he displays the superior attitude of the highbrow which Professor Toynbee (Director of Studies at Chatham House) has fittingly expressed in these lines:—

"You Smyrna weeping London's tears
You London racked by Smyrna's fears,
Busy detestable Shanghai,
Our anchor's up, thank God. Good-bye,"

Coming from the high priests of an Institute, whose funds are ultimately dependent to some extent on the largesse of financiers and traders, this attitude towards the merchant and "the Man in the Club" seems at first sight illogical and possibly ill-advised. On the other hand, it is intelligible, because Mr. Curtis never allows himself to forget that "opinion, as crystallised in the Clubs of the Treaty Ports, was openly hostile to the policy of their own country" (in other words, to the policy inspired by Mr. Curtis and his fellow-visionaries)

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and that the "unilateral Note of December, 1926, reaffirming this policy, was issued as much for the benefit of the Man in the Club as for the Foreign Powers, and rightly so." In like manner, he scorns the views of officials on the spot "whose whole training has been in the East" and who, by the nature of this training, are incapable of conceiving "that the people of China will ever be able to govern themselves on the lines of a commonwealth." Finally, he ascribes the lack of an effective public opinion in England and the absence of interest on the subject of China, partly to the fact that in the field of journalism, "Morrison left no successor," so that "public opinion, with no foundations in genuine knowledge is, in the present crisis, blown this way and that, by Press correspondents, ignorant" (as Dr. Morrison was) "of the language of the country, whose messages too often reflect little more than conversation in Clubs."

Mr. Curtis is prepared to admit that in the opinion of the men on the spot, and notably of the Consular service, the present disorders are likely to continue indefinitely; also he admits that if, as these experienced officials think, China is not capable of emerging from anarchy within any period worth considering for practical purposes, it must follow that "the policy officially accepted at Washington is a house founded on sand." Moreover, he recognises many of the unpleasant facts of the existing situation, *e.g.*, the Chinese Government's inability to control its own officials, to maintain order or observe Treaty engagements; the difficulty of introducing any remedial measures in the absence of any government which can govern; the incapacity to subordinate private interests to those of any group larger

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than the family; and so on. But when it comes to dealing with the fact that the Nationalist movement has rendered the Washington policy abortive, by its failure to establish a government competent to execute as well as to negotiate Treaties, it was not to be expected that any leader of the 'F.O. School of Thought' should attribute the existing chaos to its own 'adventures in Liberalism' and blind devotion to the dogmas of racial equality and self-determination. It is in the nature of things that Mr. Curtis should prove to his own satisfaction that, as usual, it is not China, but England, that is to blame. Firstly, with that naïvety to which I have already referred, he observes that "we are apt to forget that her present condition is directly due to our own insistence on trading with her." Secondly, he avers that if Chiang K'ai-shek and T. V. Soong, 'unquestionably the ablest leaders in China,' failed to establish a competent administration when 'there was real hope of it,' after the Powers had recognised the Nationalist Government in 1928, the blame for their failure must rest with these Powers, inasmuch as they refused to transfer their Legations from Peking to Nanking.

Like Sir Frederick Whyte (another prominent member of the Chatham House coterie, who, under its auspices, was sent out to introduce the 'personal factor' at Nanking, and who now holds the position of political adviser to the Nationalist Government) Mr. Curtis clings firmly to the faith, that the strength of the Nationalist Government in Canton "lay in the feeling created by its founder that it stood for the people of China," and furthermore, that the real issue at stake between it and the northern 'adventurers,' was "whether China should revert to the old dynastic system or de-

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velop on European and American lines." Immovable in this faith, blinded by this hypothesis, he persists in the belief that "in the Nationalist Government recognised by the Powers in 1928, there was real promise" and continually asserts that the fulfilment of this promise was chiefly frustrated by the failure of the Powers to move their Legations to Nanking. Herein the mentality of the doctrinaire idealist asserts itself most characteristically. It is difficult to understand how anyone with even a slight knowledge of Chinese history can persuade himself that "the mere presence of the Foreign Powers in the persons of their Foreign Ministers at Nanking, would have gone far to strengthen the Nationalist Government's prestige and discouraged the Tuchuns from attacking it," or that "the constant presence in Nanking of specially selected Ministers (of the type of Lord Elgin or Mr. Dwight Morrow) would have changed the atmosphere of Nanking and have helped it to pass from medieval to modern ideas." But to the true believer in self-determination, such miracles are wholly credible and Mr. Curtis has no difficulty in declaring them to be not only possible but probable. In arriving at these and similar conclusions, he is compelled to ignore facts of capital importance, which no serious student could overlook; for example, the fact that the centre of gravity of the most truly Chinese policies has always lain in the North, and that the idea of the northern and central provinces uniting in acceptance of a government controlled by the Cantonese, is manifestly and utterly impossible, as a matter of practical politics. Similarly, he ignores the fact that the 'promising' Southern Nationalist leaders of 1928 (in whom Sir Frederick Whyte also discerned 'a cause

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greater than themselves' and 'the only hope' for China), have actually achieved amongst their own countrymen, a reputation for cynical self-seeking, more conspicuous than that of any of the groups of adventurers that have risen to power since the overthrow of the Monarchy.

One delusion, originally a fundamental article of faith with the 'F.O. School of Thought,' Mr. Curtis now seems disposed to abandon, namely, that the political aspirations of the Southern Nationalists reflect a definite awakening of the Chinese masses to a rigorous national consciousness. He still believes implicitly in the inevitable 'westernisation' of China and in the capacity of the nation to achieve 'self-government under free institutions'; at the same time, curiously enough, he now holds that, in countries like Russia, India and China, it is not the masses that matter; "the mere handful of educated people who are breaking away from the past, are the vital and dominating factor." When one remembers that opinions such as these, have held the field and dominated Anglo-American policy in China for the past decade, and when one compares Mr. Curtis's book with the works of serious and scientific students of Chinese affairs, such as Mr. H. B. Morse or Mr. Owen Lattimore, one is compelled to the melancholy reflection that sentiment still counts for more than science in human affairs. Mr. Curtis has hitched his wagon to the star of semi-westernised Canton and looks to its handful of youthful iconoclasts for the salvation of China, apparently unconscious of the simple truth, that even the most progressive and modern of China's Intellectuals retain, undiminished, their distrust and deep dislike of the foreigner and their pride in the superiority of China's civilisation. Mr. Lattimore is undoubtedly

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right when he says that China's modern Intellectuals are as much concerned with the possibilities of decay and collapse in the western civilisation, as they are with the advisability of adopting western standards in China.

It is, however, in his conclusion of the whole matter, in the panacea which he finally proposes for the healing of China, that Mr. Curtis displays the fine flower of the closet-philosopher mind, fixed with childlike intensity on its own ideas. Starting from the question as to what can be done by Great Britain to help China, and with the characteristic premiss, that "we shall fail in all our dealings with her until we recognise that our interests are misconceived whenever they seem to conflict with hers," he observes that the people of England cannot know how they "should act in respect of China, until they have recognised the magnitude of the issues at stake and adopted the course successfully followed in other fields of similar importance." Following this course, they must send to the capital of China, as their Minister, a public man of wide political experience, one of the stamp of Durham, Cromer, Milner or Irwin, "whose estimates of the facts, and whose methods of handling these facts will, when explained by himself in reports and despatches, convince not merely the Secretary of State and the Cabinet, but Parliament also and the public opinion it represents." Mr. Curtis is also quite convinced, that "if England once adopted the practice of sending to China Ministers drawn from the first rank of public life, the Americans and Japanese would follow suit."

Thus, under the guidance of these diplomatic supermen (carefully selected, no doubt, to represent the "F.O. School of Thought") public opinion all over the world would soon be led to see the China problem with com-

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plete unanimity; to see it clearly and to see it whole. As to what should be done with and about China herself, during the unspecified period of this educative process, or during such lapses of unanimity as might occur in spite of it, Mr. Curtis is silent, nor does he explain the nature of the process by which the conflicting elements in China itself are to be made to accept the solutions vouchsafed by the 'men of sufficient authority' on the spot.

In conclusion, since Mr. Curtis has invoked the names of Cromer and Milner, as typical of the supermen required, I (being only human) cannot refrain from quoting the following passage from an article written by Lord Cromer for the *Nineteenth Century*, in May 1913, when reviewing a book which I had published the year before. "We English," he wrote, "are largely responsible for creating the frame of mind, which is even now luring Young Turks, Chinamen and other Easterns into the political wilderness by the display of false signals. We have, indeed, our Blands in China, our Milners in Egypt, our Miss Durhams in the Balkan Peninsula, and our Miss Bells in Mesopotamia, who wander far afield, gleaning valuable facts and laying before their countrymen conclusions based on acquired knowledge and wide experience. But their efforts are only partially successful. They are often shivered on the solid rock of preconceived prejudice and genuine but ill-formed sentimentalism."

It is fairly safe to assert that if Lord Cromer were alive to-day, and in a position of authority at Nanking, his general policy would follow the lines prescribed long ago by Sir George Staunton, a profoundly wise observer, who, at the outset of England's direct relations with

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China recognised the essential differences between their type of civilisation and that of Western nations, and declared that the only hope of gaining the confidence of the Chinese lay in "the firm adherence to principle which distinguishes the British character." Certain it is that Lord Cromer would have definitely eschewed a line of policy which begins by assuming that British interests must be misconceived, if they seem to conflict with those of this or that group of predatory adventurers.

As already observed, Mr. Curtis's study of China on the spot was carried out during his tours in the Far East, as a delegate of Chatham House to three biennial conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The first of these was held at Honolulu in 1927, the second at Kyoto in 1929, and the last at Shanghai in October, 1931. In theory, the chartered activities of the Royal Institute of International Affairs are restricted to those of a strictly non-political body, organised for the scientific study of international questions, and their impartial discussion by means of lectures, books, reports, etc. Its membership, Presidents and Council are representative of every shade of political opinion; its honorary Presidents include the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and the Dominions. But, in practice, the manner in which this study of international questions is pursued, the selection of subjects for discussion and of speakers to present them, and the nature of its relations with other irresponsible but influential bodies, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, are matters dependent on, and determined by, the dominant mentality and initiative of the Institute's secretarial and executive officials. It is not my present purpose to discuss its activi-

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ties in any field of international affairs other than those of China; as regards these, however, it is, I think, uncontestedly and demonstrably true that, from 1926 onwards, they have continually reflected the influence of those political ideas, with which the 'F.O. school of thought' is identified, and that they have been conducted in an atmosphere sickli'ed o'er with the pale cast of highbrow internationalism. The fact, indeed, scarcely requires demonstration; an Institute whose initiative of organisation and media of expression are primarily in the hands of Mr. Lionel Curtis, Professor Arnold Toynbee and Commander Stephen King-Hall, may be trusted to approach and treat most international questions in a spirit of 'forward-looking Liberalism.' As regards China, Chatham House has undoubtedly provided a spiritual home and rallying ground for the group of political visionaries who have inspired and upheld the unfortunate policy of patient conciliation and graceful surrenders, who have encouraged Young China's denunciation of the unequal Treaties, and other similar manifestations of vigorous nationalism, while sternly deprecating any insistence on national interests by their countrymen at the Treaty Ports. The active interest displayed in Far Eastern affairs by deputations of Chatham House delegates, at the Conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was undeniably mischievous, in so far as it helped to create in the minds of the party leaders in China false ideas with regard to the active sympathy and support which they might expect to receive from England and America in their differences with Japan.

In theory, of course, these Chatham House excursions to the Far East were purely intellectual joy-rides, de-

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void of all political significance; on the other hand, it was manifestly impossible to prevent political consequences arising out of Conferences, conducted in the full glare of publicity, at which delegates, ostensibly representing all phases of British public opinion, met to discuss, with American and other delegates, vexed questions such as the abolition of extra-territoriality and the unequal Treaties, or the position of Japan's legal rights in Manchuria. The general tendency of the views which these delegates might be expected to express, as representative of British opinion, may be gathered by the initiated from the following lists of their members.

<i>Honolulu Conference, 1927.</i>	<i>Kyoto Conference, 1929.</i>	<i>Shanghai Conference, 1931.</i>
Sir Frederick Whyte, Leader.	Lord Hailsham, Leader.	Professor Adams.
Mr Malcolm Macdonald	Hon. Mrs. Alfred	Dr. C. H. Chatley.
Hon. W. W. Astor,	Lyttelton.	Mr. C. I. Cooks.
Joint Secretaries.	Mr. Lionel Curtis.	Mr. W. C. Costin.
Viscount Castlereagh.	Professor Toynbee.	Dame Rachel Crowdy.
Mr. Lionel Curtis.	Hon. H. A. Wyndham.	Mr. and Mrs. Lionel
Professor Hinton.	Canon Streeter.	Curtis.
Mr. Henry T. Hodgkin.	Professor Webster.	Mr. F. A. Frith.
Mrs. Henry T. Hodg-	Miss Eileen Power.	Mr. E. W. Grey.
kin.	Mr. S. K. Datta.	Mr. G. E. Hubbard.
Miss M. T. Hunter.	Mr. G. F. Hudson.	Sir Reginald Johnston
Mr. W. P. Ker, C.M.G.	Mr. Malcolm Mac-	Mr. John Keswick.
Mrs. Macgregor Mills.	donald.	Mr. Archibald Rose.
Professor Webster.	Mr. George Sale.	Professor Roxby.
Mrs. Webster.	Mr. Archibald Rose.	Mr. Colin Scott.
Hon. H. A. Wyndham.	Mr. W. Turner.	The Hon. W. E.
	Mr. Hardy Jowett.	Shenton.
		Mr. N. L. Sparke.

With the best of intentions it was impossible, in practice (as the Press of the Far East bore witness at the time) to prevent the Institute becoming to some extent identified in the public mind with the very decided opinions, voiced by individual delegates on highly controversial subjects, and with policies that were often diametrically opposed to those 'men on the spot,' whose views Mr. Curtis has dismissed with such

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undisguised contempt. The great majority of the Institute's delegates were exponents of the 'F.O. school of thought,' of its ideals of internationalism and self-determination. The effect, upon their impressionable minds, of contacts established, in an unfamiliar Eastern atmosphere, with some of the most astute members of Young China's Intelligentsia, was not conducive to sound judgment upon questions requiring accurate knowledge and judicial detachment. Finally, the publicity given to their deliberations and the opinions freely expressed by the delegates as to the far-reaching importance of these Conferences, as factors in the ultimate adjustment of the problems discussed, were results which cannot well be reconcilable with the theory of an organisation devoted to purely academic and educative research.

One of the most conspicuous instances, illustrative of the manner in which the ill-informed sentimentalism of a coterie of doctrinaires has influenced the British Government's China policy since the Washington Conference, was that which occurred when Sir Austen Chamberlain was called upon to explain and defend the surrender of the Hankow Concession to mob violence. It will be remembered that in the House of Commons he then voiced the pious hope that "our friendly policy will presently evoke an equally friendly response from a Chinese Government, freed from foreign domination and thus enabled to devote itself to the single-minded service of the Chinese." There spoke the very soul of self-determination, fortified by self-delusion. But public opinion, trusting in its oracles, was fain to hope for the best, and to accept at their face value assurances which were manifestly absurd.

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Another instance, which throws an even more instructive light upon the mentality of your *sang-pur* internationalists, occurred in October, 1930, when Mr. Arthur Henderson, speaking as Foreign Secretary on the occasion of the first annual dinner at Chatham House, commented at some length upon the relations between Great Britain and "the great peoples of the Eastern Hemisphere." In the course of his remarks on the subject of China, he declared himself an ardent believer in the determination of the Chinese to westernise their country, and in the progress which they have made towards this end. After the Boxer rebellion, he said, "the current of nationalism was diverted from reaction into the path of progress. China proceeded to transform herself. . . . The new era was marked in 1911 by the overthrow of the old monarchy, and its replacement by a modern and up-to-date republic, at any rate in theory. There is ample evidence to prove that this change was not a change of name but a change in fact"—and so on. Needless to say opinions of this kind, when expressed by Secretaries of State on public occasions, are purely political in their origin. No one would suggest, either in Mr. Henderson's case or that of Sir Austen Chamberlain, that their views about China represent personal conviction based on serious study. To use a motoring simile, the F.O. machine may toot with the horn of Henderson, but the motive spirit, in this case, is Pratt's.

Conforming to that spirit, Mr. Henderson, after thus testifying to present-day China's progressive tendencies, was prompted to assert that when she responded to the call of the Allies in 1917 and declared war against Germany and Austria, she received in return a promise

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"that on the termination of the war, she would be accorded in international relations the position and the consideration due to a great country. The promise was given unhesitatingly, etc., etc."

Being in a position to know that no undertaking in these terms was authorised at the time by H.M. Government and considering the matter to be one of considerable importance, I applied to the Secretary of State, enquiring as to the conditions under which the alleged promise had been made. The following correspondence then passed:

"Foreign Office, S.W. 1.
"20th October, 1930.

"Dear Sir,

"In reply to your letter of the 14th October on the subject of the promise made to China on her entry into the war, the correspondence of 14th August, 1917, between the Chinese Government and the Ministers of the Allied Powers, which contains the information you are seeking, is published in MacMurray's *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China* Vol. II, page 1,362. This is a well-known work of reference which you will doubtless have no difficulty in consulting.

"Yours very truly,
"N. B. RONALD."

"J. O. P. Bland, Esq.

"Foreign Office, S.W. 1.
"23rd October, 1930.

"Dear Sir,

"With reference to our conversation on the telephone this morning, I find that, through a regrettable slip in copying, the reference to the page in MacMurray's *Treaties* was given as 1,362, whereas it ought to have been 1,363. In the second official document quoted on the latter page you will find the passage: 'It' (*i.e.*, the Government on whose behalf the Legation were writing) 'will do all that depends upon it in order that China may have the benefit in her international relations of the situation and the regards due to a great country.'

"If you are still in any doubt, perhaps the simplest thing

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to do would be for you to telephone to Sir John Pratt the next time you happen to be in London.

"Yours very truly,
"N. B. RONALD."

"J. O. P. Bland, Esq."

"Brudenell House,
"Aldeburgh.
"2nd November, 1930.

"Dear Sir,

"I have to acknowledge with thanks your letter of 23rd October, in which, replying to mine of the 14th, you quote from MacMurray's *Treaties*, the correspondence of 14th August, 1917, between the Chinese Government and the Ministers of the Allied Powers at Peking, with reference to the promise made to China by the Powers on her entry into the war.

"At the interview which you were good enough to give me on Thursday last, and in my subsequent conversation with Sir John Pratt, I suggested that the terms of the identic Note addressed by the Ministers of the Allied Powers to the Chinese Government on the date in question, were not such as to justify the wider interpretation placed upon them by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the first annual dinner at Chatham House; furthermore, that when this identic Note was written, no such promise as that described by Mr. Henderson had ever been suggested or discussed in the protracted negotiations which took place from April to August, 1917, between the Chinese Government and the Allied Ministers at Peking.

"As regards the assurance contained in the identic Note, that H.M. Government would 'do all that depends upon it in order that China may have the benefit in her international relations of *the situation* and the regards due to a great country,' I ventured to observe that this assurance referred solely to the economic and financial advantages, which were all that the Allied Powers had proposed, and all that Tuan Chi-jui's government had asked, as inducements for China to throw in her lot with the Allies. At no time during the negotiations to this end was there any mention on either side of a 'promise' that, '*on the termination of the war*, China would be accorded in her international relations the position and the consideration due to a great country.' The specific advantages offered to China by the Powers in May and June, 1917, in return for her declaring war against Germany, contain no reference to any such promise and it is, I think,

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reasonable to assume that, had it been made, the Chinese Government's representatives at Versailles, would not have failed to place it in the forefront of their objections to the settlement of the Shantung question agreed to by the Powers.

"In conclusion, and with all due respect, may I observe that, no matter what opinions may now be held as to the intention and scope of the assurance conveyed by the identic Note in question, recognition of China's claim to the position and consideration due to a great country must eventually depend, not upon such qualified assurances, but upon the proved ability and intention of her present rulers to administer her national affairs and international relations as befits a great country, and that, so long as her Government fails to afford security for life and property and to fulfil her recent Treaty obligations, it would appear to be inexpedient to widen the scope of the assurance in question beyond anything which has hitherto been ascribed to it, and thus afford ground for further claims on the part of the Nationalist Government of China at a time of serious difficulty and danger to British interests in the Far East.

"Yours very truly,

"J. O. P. BLAND."

"N. B. Ronald, Esq."

"Foreign Office, S.W. 1.

7th November, 1930.

"Dear Sir,

"I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 2nd November, in which you refer again to the speech of the Secretary of State at the first annual dinner of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

"I am not aware of your authority for the statement that at no time during the negotiations leading up to China's declaration of war upon Germany was there any mention of a promise that China would have the benefit of the position and the consideration due to a great country. The statement is, however, contrary to fact. The question of China's standing in the family of nations was one to which the Chinese Government attached considerable importance. Discussions on the subject took place at an early stage of the negotiations and the promise which was eventually agreed should be made to China was embodied in the last paragraph of the Note of the Ministers of the Allied Powers of 14th August, 1917. This paragraph is not capable of any other interpretation than that put upon it by the Secretary of State in the passage

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of his speech to which you draw attention in your former letter on this subject. Any attempt to argue that it referred solely to economic and financial advantages, the negotiations in regard to which were only carried to a successful conclusion some considerable time after China's declaration of war upon Germany and Austria (see, for example, MacMurray, page 1,375), could only expose His Majesty's Government to the charge of denying the existence of a promise which it was found inconvenient to fulfil.

"The actual text of the Note from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs of 14th August, 1917, will be found at page 19 of *Official Documents relating to the War (for the Year 1917)*, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, China. The last paragraph of the Note is as follows:—

"I have the honour to state, for the information of the Chinese Government, that His Britannic Majesty's Government have pleasure in assuring them of the solidarity of their friendship, and of their support. His Majesty's Government will do all that rests with them to ensure that China shall enjoy in her international relations the position and the regard due to a great country."

"The text of this paragraph was agreed upon by the Ministers of the Allied Powers who all embodied it in their replies. The slightly different version of the paragraph that is published in MacMurray, page 1,363, would appear to be a translation back into English from some foreign language—probably French. The sense of the two versions is, however, obviously the same and is not open to dispute.

"In these circumstances the considerations put forward in the last paragraph of your letter under reply do not appear to arise. They are, in any case, incompatible with the carrying out of the policy of His Majesty's Government towards China which, as the Secretary of State indicated in a subsequent passage in his speech, is the policy set out in the Memorandum of 18th December, 1926.

"Yours very truly.

"N. B. RONALD."

"J. O. P. Bland, Esq."

"Brudenell House,

"Aldeburgh.

"11th November, 1930.

"Dear Sir,

"I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 7th

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inst., in reply to mine of the 2nd, having reference to the speech of the Secretary of State at the first annual dinner of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

"It was not my intention to question the fact that an identic Note was sent by the Ministers of the Allied Powers to the Chinese Government at the date of the latter's declaration of war upon Germany, and that it contained an assurance in the terms quoted in your letter of the 23rd October. My purpose was to draw attention to the fact that the nature of this assurance and the conditions under which it was given, were not such as to justify the much wider significance given to it by the Secretary of State (particularly by the addition of the words 'after the war') as a formal promise and a declaration of high policy on the part of H.M. Government and the Allied Powers.

"As regards the statement contained in your letter under reply, that discussions on the subject of this 'promise' took place at an early stage of the negotiations, I may observe that, during the whole period of these negotiations, I was serving as a member of the secretarial staff of the War Cabinet, my duty being to make a weekly digest of all diplomatic telegrams received and despatched. I was therefore in a position to observe very closely the course of these negotiations with China and I have no hesitation in saying that no such promise as that described by the Secretary of State was ever asked for by the Chinese Government amongst the advantages and benefits claimed in return for declaring war upon Germany, nor was it included amongst the specific terms offered during the negotiations by H.M. Government. I may add, from personal knowledge of the policy pursued by Tuan Chi-jui and his colleagues, that 'China's standing in the family of nations' was at no time in evidence as a question which greatly concerned them during the whole course of these negotiations. In support of this aspect of the case, I submit for your consideration the fact that no reference to this categorical promise is to be found in any Blue Book or official history of the war; and furthermore, that the fact that the authority now found for it, would appear to be based solely upon the unverifiable text of an inaccessible Chinese document, affords in itself good ground for the contention that, whatever may have been the origin and intention of the assurance conveyed in the Allied Ministers' Note of the 14th August, 1917, it cannot, without further evidence, be held to cover the extended sense attached to it by the Secretary of State. Nor can it afford retrospective justification for the policy set out

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in the Memorandum of 18th December, 1926, the wisdom of which remains open to serious question.

"Yours very truly,
"J. O. P. BLAND."

"N. B. Ronald, Esq."

"Foreign Office, S.W. 1.
"18th November, 1930.

"Dear Sir,

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 11th November in regard to the interpretation of the identic Note addressed by the Ministers of the Allied Powers to the Chinese Government of 14th August, 1917, and expressing doubts as to the wisdom of the policy of 18th December, 1926.

"The correspondence has been submitted to the Secretary of State who has nothing to add to the information which has been furnished to you in earlier letters from this Department, although he takes note of your view, both as regards the interpretation of the Note and the policy embodied in the Memorandum communicated to the Chinese Government in December, 1926.

"Yours very truly,
"N. B. RONALD."

"J. O. P. Bland, Esq."

The reader will observe how in this correspondence, as in Mr. Curtis's book, stress is laid upon the immutable finality of the sacrosanct Memorandum of 18th December, 1926, that high water-mark of the tide of misguided idealism which began to flow in 1921. Six months before these letters passed, there being good reason for anticipating disastrous adventures in Liberalism as the result of Mr. Curtis's suddenly developed interest in Chinese affairs, I took occasion in the *English Review* to trace the origin and nature of the influences which, under three administrations, had determined the course of British policy in the Far East. The following extract from the article in question deals particularly with the part played by the Chatham House coterie in

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the inspiration and guidance of the 'F.O. school of thought':—

"Those who have studied the causes of the steady deterioration of our position and prestige in China, are aware that the policy of patient conciliation pursued by successive Governments in recent years has been to a great extent inspired, and often initiated by certain political idealists whose opinions have carried far more weight in Downing Street than those of the British communities in the Far East. As matters stand to-day, it is not surprising that the Government, largely composed of men without personal experience of Oriental races, should follow the facile path of graceful concessions, in view of the fact that their line of action, or inaction, is usually based upon the opinions of the 'F.O. school of thought,' whereof the fountain head is Chatham House. To put the matter plainly—with Sir Frederick Whyte as adviser to the Government at Nanking, and Sir John Pratt as the chief authority on China at the F.O.; with that indefatigable and persuasive pacificator, Mr. Lionel Curtis, now directing his attention to Chinese affairs; and all the 'liberalising' influence of inveterate theorists, such as Sir Charles Addis and Professor Toynbee, in the background—a policy of lamentable surrenders was inevitable. The personnel of the delegation selected by Chatham House to represent Great Britain at the Kyoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in itself sufficiently indicates the opinions now fashionable in the highest circles of academic politics. All things considered, therefore, the British merchant in China (whom the 'high-brows' regard as an unfortunate anachronism) should perhaps be grateful that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has not yet seen fit to withdraw all our armed forces from Shanghai. As regards the immediate future, remembering Mr. Curtis's notable contributions to the cause of 'dyarchy' in India and that of Dominion Home Rule in Ireland, it may fairly be predicted that the result of his present activities will be manifested in further concessions or compromises, all theoretically unimpeachable, but all in practice disastrous, for the reason that they will fail, as usual, to take into account the real objectives and the 'dominant morality' of the Oriental politicians with whom he is dealing."

CHAPTER X

KUOMINTANG PROPAGANDA AND GENEVA

"The success of the Kuomintang party may perhaps be attributed to the fact that they, more consistently than any other party in China, have denounced the Western servitude imposed on their country."—(*Mr. Arthur Henderson, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Chatham House annual dinner, September, 1930.*)

IN an earlier chapter I had occasion to refer to the measures adopted by the Southern Nationalist Government at Nanking to prevent the publication or circulation by foreigners of historical works, and even of newspapers, which contained any unfavourable criticism of its methods or proceedings. I did not attempt to describe the crushing restrictions placed upon the liberty of the vernacular Press, or the vindictive and illegal penalties (including summary execution) frequently inflicted upon offending editors; the truth is sufficiently well known, that the liberty which the Press expected to enjoy, after the unification of the country by Chiang K'ai-shek's party in 1928, has been drastically curtailed, if not completely abolished, under the Kuomintang dispensation. In September, 1929, in order to counteract the unfavourable impression created abroad by its declaration of postal bans against four foreign newspapers, and by the "social ban" imposed on certain American journalists of good standing, the Central Executive Committee at Nanking published an official notice stating that "the principle of absolute freedom of the Press will be observed." As, however, it was

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stipulated in the same document that "no newspapers, periodicals or news-agencies will be allowed to carry on reactionary propaganda, or maliciously to attack the Central Government," the native Press found in it no occasion for premature rejoicing. A subsequent order gave notice that all criticisms or comments on political questions must be submitted, before publication, to the central authority at Nanking; and in connection with this order Hu Han-min, one of the chief stalwarts of the Cantonese party, publicly declared that, in his opinion, anyone "who joins the Kuomintang party, voluntarily consents to the limitation of his freedom of speech." There is no information available as to the number of Chinese newspapers which have been denied the use of the mails, suspended, or confiscated since that date, but an account of the methods and results of the rigorous censorship exercised by Nanking has lately been published in the *People's Tribune*, a monthly journal, edited by T'ang Liang-li at Shanghai.* There can be no doubt that the autocratic ruthlessness of the Kuomintang leaders, in restricting public opinion to the expression of their own views, is responsible for many of the discontents and differences within the party, and especially for the indignant outbursts of the Young China element. Some idea of the Government's conception of the functions and freedom of the Press may be gathered from the text of the Publications Law, passed by the Legislative in November, 1930, containing 44 articles; one of these requires that all publications shall register, not only with the Nanking authorities, but with the Kuomintang local party headquarters,

* "The Futility of the Press Censorship," article in *The People's Tribune*. (May, 1931.)

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the penalty for non-registration being very severe. In addition to the local censorships established by these 'Tang Pu,' there is an "Emergency Law governing Treason and Sedition," promulgated in February, 1931, which takes precedence over the ordinary Criminal Code. Amongst other drastic provisions of this law it is ordained that "whosoever engages in seditious propaganda by means of writings, pictures, or word of mouth, with intent to subvert the Republic, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life." And again, "whosoever, with intent to subvert the Republic, organises associations or meetings, or propagates doctrines incompatible with the 'Three People's Principles,' shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of between five and fifteen years."

Having thus successfully contrived an effective *suppressio veri*, at the sources to which the outside world had heretofore looked for information in regard to things Chinese, the Kuomintang Executive proceeded to organise elaborate machinery, *in partibus infidelium*, for purposes of propaganda, in which there figured continually a *suggestio falsi*, calculated to create the impression of a unified and stable government, actively engaged in progressive measures of national reconstruction. At the beginning of 1930, the Central Political Council at Nanking issued instructions for the immediate establishment of an International Propaganda Bureau, to work in conjunction with an international news service, with offices in Shanghai, London and New York. The ostensible object of this Bureau was to counteract 'reactionary' opinions, but its real purpose was speedily manifested in the distribution of propaganda calculated to mislead public opinion abroad

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concerning the real conditions of the country and to maintain the illusion of a new China, triumphantly advancing upon the path of progress and therefore entitled to claim the immediate cancellation of the "Unequal Treaties" and the position of a great Power. Shortly before the establishment of this Bureau, the Minister of Finance had declared that the country was now sufficiently unified and stabilised to justify a large scale investment of foreign capital in Chinese industrial enterprise; the Minister of Railways had issued a railway reconstruction programme involving an expenditure of 500 millions of dollars per annum for 50 years; the Minister of Communications had solemnly announced a "General Plan" of communication services—(telephones, radio stations, air fleets, inland navigation, etc.)—involving enormous expenditure; while the Central Executive proclaimed its intention of proceeding at once with an "enlightened scheme for the housing and relief of the poor." The Chinese themselves (familiar with the face-making tradition, by virtue of which Chinese administrators are wont to assume that a purpose has been achieved when the regulations concerning it have been officially proclaimed) were never under any delusions with regard to these fantastic programmes, but they served their purpose in convincing a large body of sentimental opinion abroad, which was only too ready to be convinced, that the Government of New China, under the direction of its Westernised Intelligentsia, was rapidly reaching a condition of efficient administration and orderly civilisation. The delusions thus created were continually strengthened by China's diplomatic representatives abroad, several of whom did not scruple to describe the condition of affairs

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in China and the course of events in public utterances of unblushing mendacity. Indeed, the general tenor of their public utterances was such as to create the impression that, under Kuomintang rule, China was fast becoming an earthly paradise, to be thrown open to the world so soon as the Powers were prepared to facilitate matters by abolishing the 'Unequal Treaties.' The measure of the Nationalist Government's adroit diplomacy, and of its success in exploiting the ill-informed sentimentalism which has been so prevalent in the United States and Great Britain since the war, may be gauged by the fact that it has gained for the rulers of the bankrupt and hopelessly misgoverned Republic a position of greater consideration in the eyes of the world than the country ever enjoyed under the old Imperial order.

In the organisation and direction of political propaganda, Young China has been remarkably quick to perceive and make skilful use of the new field of opportunity, created by America and England, in the education of Demos by means of knowledge in tabloid form administered by wireless. They have exploited this latest of modern inventions quite as cleverly, and for the same ends, as they had previously used the political theories of the Manchester School, the social ideals of the Labour Party, the pacific enthusiasms of Geneva and the uplifting activities of religious bodies in America. In the British B.B.C. they have found, and made good use of, a steadily sympathetic supporter. Those who direct the policy of that licensed monopoly take their general cue, no doubt, from the Government of the day and are, as a rule, subject to the same influences as those which determine the attitude and utter-

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ances of the Treasury Bench. There may possibly be instances, such as that of Mr. Winston Churchill, where personal factors are involved; it is also conceivable that where Asiatic races are concerned, Sir John Reith and other magnates of the Corporation belong, consciously or unconsciously, to the 'F.O. school of thought.' Be this as it may, the fact remains, incontestable, that whereas the Kuomintang's propagandists, publicists and apologists have enjoyed frequent opportunities of broadcasting matter calculated to create a favourable impression of the Nationalist Government's progressive tendencies, the grim realities of the situation have almost always been omitted from the picture. For example, at the time when, towards the end of 1929, the Nanking Government had seen fit to "proscribe" and boycott the correspondents of several reputable American journals for having supplied their papers with accurate information in regard to these grim realities, Dr. W. Y. Chen was permitted to announce from Savoy Hill that the purpose of the Kuomintang is "to secure economic justice and opportunity for the labouring classes and peasants, under a government of the people, by the people and for the people." Yet, had the B.B.C. authorities sought them, the broad facts of the situation, the facts which since then have wholly stultified these pretensions, were readily accessible. The Peking correspondent of *The Times*, for example, had quite recently shown how the Kuomintang's government of the people, for the people, was working out in practice.

"The dictatorship of the Kuomintang," he wrote, "is something which the Chinese can understand and even admire. But when hundreds of little branches of the

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Kuomintang are composed of self-appointed youths, who spout orthodoxy, but use their opportunities to tyrannise over the poor and to rob the respectable, indignation and dismay are wide-spread and deep."

It is significant that the B.B.C.'s 'talks' on China, by speakers such as Mr. Vernon Bartlett and Professor Roxby, have all borne a distinct family resemblance to the writings of Mr. Lionel Curtis, Professor Arnold Toynbee, Sir Frederick Whyte and other sympathetic supporters of the Kuomintang régime; and that they habitually ignore the humanitarian aspects of the question. The dumb misery of the masses, the wholesale massacres committed by war-lords and bandits, the horrors committed in the name of Communism, the persecution of native Christians and the rapacious money-lust of the Republican mandarins, are subjects seldom or never referred to in the polite circles of the B.B.C. Nevertheless, certain dominant facts of the situation have been so repeatedly demonstrated during the past twenty years of misrule, that public opinion abroad should by now have formed a fairly accurate idea of the actual state of affairs, if these facts had not been continually obscured by the smoke-screen of political propaganda. Consider, for instance, the simple, undeniable truth that, during all these years of civil war and brigandage, while the people have been reduced to the lowest depths of destitution and despair, no sign of any determined effort to relieve their sufferings can be found in all the fervently patriotic manifestos of the rival politicians. One might suppose that, this being the case, even the loftiest of highbrows might be led to ask himself whether the best interests of civilisation, not to say humanity, would not be better served by facing

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these grim realities, than by proceeding with new experiments in liberal theories. But pity 'tis, 'tis true, that the 'F.O. school of thought' is usually so absorbed in these experiments that it creates the impression of being as indifferent to the sufferings of the Chinese masses, as the 'Christian General' himself.

In the course of a series of articles on China, contributed by Sir Frederick Whyte to *The Times* in 1928, recommending a *rapprochement* with the leaders of the Southern Nationalists at Nanking, he expressed the opinion that the Chinese, not being political adults, would require constructive aid for the achievement of their purposes and that, when they had "learnt the lesson of their own disorder," benevolent help from outside would be urgently needed. The constructive aid which he contemplated was presumably in the nature of that enlightened political guidance which Nanking might obtain from suitably selected advisers; apart from this, he expressed the belief that when the Chinese become aware of the significance of Geneva, "they will see a new light on their own problem. They may then possibly apply to the League of Nations for that aid."

Sir Frederick Whyte's appearance on the scene at Nanking, and subsequent acceptance of the position of political adviser to the Nanking Government in 1929, coincides fairly closely with the first definite indications given by the Kuomintang Intelligentsia of their perception of the important part which the League of Nations might be made to play in furtherance of the Chinese Nationalist cause and aspirations, especially in regard to their differences with Japan over the Manchurian question. The results, from the Kuomintang's point of view, must have exceeded its highest expectations. From

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the first, Nanking's representatives at Geneva found themselves dealing with groups of idealists and doctrinaires who, in regard to Chinese affairs, have continually displayed a simplicity and credulity which invest their benevolent activities with something very like fatuity. Under these conditions, the League speedily became a regular sounding board for Kuomintang propaganda, which, with the sympathetic assistance of the B.B.C., has been generously broadcast throughout the United Kingdom. In developing to the utmost the welcome opportunity thus provided, China's representatives displayed all their characteristic acumen, the intelligent anticipation and *flair* which they habitually bring to bear upon international politics. They speedily realised that, by proclaiming Geneva to be their long-sought spiritual home, and by flattering the self-esteem of the League's Directorates, they would greatly strengthen the hands of the international idealists, who had already done so much to popularise the doctrine of racial equality for their benefit. In pursuance of their own unchanging purposes, they exploited to the utmost the sympathy of Europe's collective intelligence, with the result that, within a very brief space of time, the League of Nations was producing and distributing propaganda unmistakably identified with that of the Nanking group of politicians.

One typical instance may be cited. On March 27th, 1930, Mr. Vernon Bartlett, London representative of the League of Nations, was permitted to broadcast his optimistic belief in the good intentions of the Nationalist leaders, in phraseology undistinguishable from that of the Kuomintang, the purpose of his address being to lend colour to the delusion that, in supporting the Nan-

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king faction, England would be serving the best interests of the Chinese people. After disparaging the northern war-lords, he proceeded to draw a picture of the Southern Nationalist leaders, curiously similar to that drawn by Sir Frederick Whyte in *The Times*. He described them as a body of men, mostly of Western education, who were "determined to turn China into a country run on the lines of Western civilisation." He went on to credit them with the organisation of "an efficient civil service," and concluded with the astounding statement that "the collection of taxes had become much more reasonable and systematic." Mr. Bartlett further expressed his belief that civil war in China would come to an end when the "social and economic benefits" of the Nanking Government's progressive activities had made themselves felt throughout the country.

The simplicity displayed by Geneva in regard to everything connected with China has been so ingenuous that some of its manifestations incline one to doubt whether all concerned can really be so unsophisticated as they appear. For example, on April 1st, 1930, it was announced in the Press that the Health Section of the League had recommended to the Council a programme, presented by the Chinese Government, for the organisation, in collaboration with the League, of a modern Public Health Service. In this case the Council of the League cannot have been completely ignorant of the real condition of affairs in regard to the public health in China, for it had sent out a Medical Mission six months before, to undertake a preliminary survey. It must have been aware that the Nanking Government was not in a position to allocate the funds required to

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finance a scheme of this magnitude, and that its effective authority was not established over a sufficient area to permit of the serious discussion of anything in the nature of a national service; in other words, that the scheme was neither feasible nor seriously intended. It was, in fact (like the proposed reform of the national finances by American experts, or the reorganisation of the Chinese Navy by British advisers), a political window-dressing gesture, and nothing more. Instead of accepting the Nanking Ministry's programme and commending its "courage and vision," the Geneva Mission might more suitably have suggested that, as a proof of good-will and good faith, the Chinese Government should first proceed with the restoration and protection of the numerous hospitals and medical schools, established in various parts of the country by British and American missionary and benevolent societies, which had been expropriated and looted by the Chinese Government's own military forces. For those who understand the mentality of Chinese officialdom, there is nothing new or strange in a political gesture of this kind, nor any doubt as to its underlying motives; the remarkable feature of the situation is that the League of Nations should display such activity in the culture and distribution of this 'eyewash,' and that the B.B.C. should think fit to advertise it freely to the British public.

The beginning of 1931 witnessed a new act in the comedy, from which it was reasonable to infer that, with an eye to impending developments of the Manchurian dispute, the Nanking Government had determined to cultivate the League of Nations as the most promising, and least expensive, field in which to sow the seeds of propaganda. Early in the year it had

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issued invitations to no less than three directors of the League (those of the Departments of Public Health, Financial Reorganisation and Communications) to visit Nanking, for the purpose of advising the Government on the very same problems which were to have been solved in 1928 by the Kemmerer Commission and later by Sir Frederick Whyte and a host of other counsellors. In the light of all experience, and considering the known facts of the situation, the advice to be tendered by these gentlemen from Geneva could not possibly produce any results more practical than those of their many predecessors. Like theirs, it was condemned in advance to polite futility—but the gesture which invited it was undoubtedly good propaganda.

A complete list of similar window-dressing gestures, covering the whole range of the Nanking Government's activities, would require a chapter to itself, but a brief list may usefully be given. First of all, there are the Constitution, the Civil and Criminal Codes, and the 'Three Principles,' which may be said to constitute the ornamental stucco façade to the lath-and-plaster of the Republic, useful for the beguiling of the foreigner, but with no more bearing on the realities of Chinese politics than the signs of the zodiac. Next come the solemnly-staged farces of military disbandment, economic conferences, hypothetical budgets, together with machine-made official slogans against militarism, official corruption, communism, and what not; all calculated to divert the attention of Europe and America from the simple truth that the struggle for place and power which began in 1911, remains wholly and solely a matter of money and armed men. Then there is the evergreen comedy of opium abolition, played by China's

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diplomatic agents abroad with all the old earnestness of conviction, though the whole world knows that the development of the opium traffic, as a chief source of revenue, by the civil and military chiefs at Nanking, has been a public scandal of the first magnitude for the past ten years. Finally, there are a number of minor gestures, such as the engagement of experts to advise (without executive authority) on every subject under the sun; the fantastic project of a new Chinese fleet, to be bought and trained under the direction of British naval officers; the application of humanitarian labour laws for the benefit of Chinese manual workers, and the construction of a national system of railways and roads. But the most notable example of Europe's collective gullibility is that furnished by the attitude and proceedings of the League with regard to China's production and traffic of opium. Those who are familiar with the history of this question will recollect that when, with the sympathetic support of the missionary societies, the Chinese Government first began to agitate, on moral grounds, for the abolition of the Indian opium trade, many competent observers pointed out that its ultimate purpose was to secure a mandarin monopoly of traffic in the native-grown drug, free from foreign competition. The Indian trade having been suppressed, China's propagandists, native and foreign, proceeded to explain that she could not hope to abolish the native trade unless the Powers first conceded tariff autonomy. This end having been achieved, all further pretence of sacrificing the vastly lucrative opium revenues was abandoned, except in official documents intended for foreign consumption. The Opium Suppression Bureau became, without concealment, the Government's chief agency

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for the control and promotion of the traffic. "All up and down the Yangtze," wrote a reliable observer two years ago, "the movement of opium is quite open. Foreign shipping-masters know that it is being carried in their vessels; so do the Customs outdoor men, but neither dare interfere, literally for the sake of their lives." Nor are the mandarins' drug-dealing activities confined to opium. In 1928, there occurred a case (to which the attention of the advisory Committee of the League was subsequently drawn), in which the Chinese Minister of the Interior had issued a permit to an individual chemist for the importation of *four tons* of heroin; and other equally instructive instances might be cited. At the same time, the business of deluding public opinion abroad has been conducted as energetically as the opium trade itself. At the end of 1930, the Nanking Suppression Bureau issued a list of drastic regulations, purporting to prevent the importation of the drug into China by foreign ships and aeroplanes. On the eve of the meeting of the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations in January, 1931, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs at Nanking issued a statement on the subject of opium, in the course of which he observed:

"During the past two years China has exerted great efforts for the suppression of the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. Up to date, many new regulations have been promulgated, such as those relating to the inspection of poppy cultivation by District Magistrates; to the disposal of the fines imposed in opium cases; to the rewarding and reprimanding of Government officials in connection with the discharge of their duties, etc., etc. . . . The effect of these regulations is most encouraging."

Five months later, the correspondent of the *North*

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China Daily News at Luchowfu, in the province of Anhui, reporting on the conditions of the opium traffic in his district, wrote as follows:

"Harvest time has come for the tens of thousands of gay poppy fields in this section. We are now only a few hours by rail and car from Nanking. While the big political meetings are being held there, tons of opium are being started on their way to fill the opium pipes of the nation, from this district alone. . . .

"We can hardly tell how it looks from the outside, but looked at from the inside, here, it looks as if the opium trade were about the country's chief business."

On 2nd February, 1931, in a speech referring to the importation of foreign drugs into China, Mr. L. A. Lyall, Chairman of the Permanent Opium Board at Geneva, observed that "it was scandalous that the prosperity of a great country should be sacrificed to the interests of a few manufacturers." The League's indignation might perhaps have been less widely endorsed, had public opinion been placed in possession of certain facts of the case which were, or should have been, easily available. The *China Year Book* for 1931 contains a summary of the state of the opium traffic in every province, compiled from the reports of resident missionaries. The whole document proves conclusively—if proof be needed—that so long as China is responsible for about ninety per cent of the world's poppy cultivation, and so long as the League is prepared to acquiesce in the refusal of the Nanking Government to permit its Opium Commissions to conduct any enquiries in China, the pronouncements of its Permanent Opium Board must continue to be purely academic. The same observation applies, though in a less degree, to the traffic in narcotic drugs, as is shown by the following extract

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from the Szechuan section of the Year Book summary:

"At Chungking it is estimated that twenty million ounces of opium were exported in 1930 . . .

"Chungking reports that during 1929 and 1930, a large quantity of morphia was prepared locally and shipped down river. At Chungking and its environs there are about 100 morphia factories, besides many more in the country."

To sum up. The general attitude and proceedings of the League of Nations in matters relating to China, and the peculiar susceptibility which it has displayed to Kuomintang propaganda, reflect the collective opinion of a body of individuals who have no direct knowledge or experience of the Oriental races to whom their sympathies and antipathies go out, and whose collective judgment on Asiatic problems is therefore inherently unsound. Also they reflect the remarkable influence which China's westernised Intellectuals habitually exercise on the type of mind which figures so prominently in the personnel of the League's Directorates, the type for which, as Lord Bryce says, the idea of racial equality is "a dogma, almost a faith." The whole record of the League's proceedings in the matter of the Manchurian dispute bears testimony to a very definite bias on the Chinese side. Even after the Lytton Commission of Enquiry had set forth on its appointed mission, the League's official representative in London, Mr. Vernon Bartlett, was permitted to broadcast opinions on the Far Eastern question, that were unmistakably hostile to Japan and frequently of a nature to prejudice public opinion in matters which, pending the Commission's report, should have been regarded as *sub judice*. Similarly, the political activities at Shanghai of Dr. Louis Rajchmann, one of the League's Public Health emissaries, at the be-

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ginning of the Manchurian dispute, were strongly partisan. They were severely criticised, as such, by the Shanghai Press, and formed the subject of formal protests by the Japanese authorities.

The League of Nations Union, inspired and guided by such eminent internationalists as Viscount Cecil and Professor Gilbert Murray, has been even more emphatic than the League itself in championing the cause of China against Japanese "Imperialism." The speech in which Viscount Cecil drew attention to "certain aspects of the Sino-Japanese situation" at the Albert Hall on 27th February, 1932, made it abundantly clear, to every impartial observer, that many of the causes antecedent to the Manchurian crisis were due to a complete misunderstanding, on the part of the League and its kindred associations, of the real condition of affairs in China and the ultimate purposes of the political groups which claim to govern the country. In a letter addressed to Viscount Cecil, after the delivery of this Albert Hall address, I ventured to observe that, for lack of the necessary understanding, the League of Nations had added to the dangerous complications of a problem, in which, things being as they are, its intervention could not hope to achieve good results.

"Granted," I wrote, "that China, a member of the League, having applied for intervention, the Council had no option in the matter—but the manner of its intervention, which ignored the real nature and causes of the trouble, stultified the League position from the outset. Had the League requested Japan to withdraw her armed forces from Chinese territory outside the leased railway zone, on the sole ground that their presence there constituted a violation of the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg Pact, its position would at least have been unassailable and dignified. But in asking that this evacuation should be made in return for a guarantee by the Chinese Government, that they would effectively pro-

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tect the persons and property of Japanese in Manchuria, the Council ignored the vital fact, that the whole situation in that loosely held Dependency is a direct and inevitable result of the parlous misgovernment of China. To profess to seek a solution of the dispute on the assumption that China has the power or the will to fulfil any such guarantee, was merely to proclaim to the world the League's ignorance of, or its indifference to, uncomfortable facts. Incidentally, it also justified in advance, by implication, Japan's recourse to forcible measures, so soon as China's guarantee should have proved valueless.

"The truth of the whole matter has been succinctly stated by an Englishman with wide knowledge and experience of Chinese officialdom. In a letter to *The Times* of February 8th, he said, 'The intrinsic difficulty arises from the fact that China is a disorganised territory in which responsible government is non-existent, that the mass of the population is inarticulate, and that the public opinion where it exists cannot be uttered if it is in opposition to the authority—particularly the military authority—for the time being in power in any locality.'

"The League's persistent indifference to this truth is, I venture to suggest, a matter of even greater importance than the military operations which have taken place around and about Shanghai. How comes it that in dealing with this problem, the collective intelligence represented at Geneva is so deeply concerned for 'the mint and anise and cummin' of protocols and pacts, and so indifferent to the 'weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and faith,' in other words, to the pitiful sufferings of the Chinese people? The explanation is to be found, I think, in the almost hypnotic influence exercised by Chinese propagandists of the westernised Intellectual type, on the minds of those who inspire and direct the proceedings of the League. The point needs no stressing. The peculiar susceptibility of the League to Kuomintang propaganda has been continually manifested, by well-meant but unfortunate gestures, since M. Albert Thomas first went out of his way at Shanghai to attribute China's economic and political disabilities to the oppression of the 'unequal Treaties.' To-day, while China lies prostrate under ever-increasing burdens of civil war, banditry, famine, flood and misrule, the League continues freely to spend money in sending out Professors, Directors of technical organisations, and members of the Secretariat, for the purpose of reorganising China's non-existent Health services and in order 'to facilitate interchanges between centres of intel-

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lectual activity in China and elsewhere.' The active sympathies displayed by some of these emissaries (notably by Dr. Louis Rajchmann) on the Chinese side of the Manchurian dispute, have been severely criticised on the spot. In a word, the whole attitude of the League, in regard to China, reflects the preponderance of political theories and sympathies, applied without direct knowledge of the country concerned, and a lack of understanding which has enabled Mr. Alfred Sze and Dr. Yen to manœuvre the Council into a dangerously false position.

"Last, but not least, in inviting the United States to become an honorary member for the discussion of the Manchurian problem and to assist in its deliberations, the League has given proof of partiality for the Chinese side of the case. For it is not to be denied that, ever since the Russo-Japanese War, there has been a marked tendency of public opinion in the United States to challenge Japan's position of 'special interests' and influence in Manchuria. Nothing can be gained by shutting our eyes to this fact.

"The Washington Conference was practically an intimation to the world in general, and to Japan in particular, of America's intention to establish a sort of moral guardianship of China and to challenge any extension of Japan's 'special interests' in Manchuria. The instincts and interests which threaten ultimately to conflict in that region are not so much those of China and Japan (for China's chaotic state does not permit of constructive national effort), as those of Japan and America. Such being the case, the position of the League, as an international pacificator, becomes invidious, when it invites America, a non-member, to take part in adjudication in a matter which Japan has repeatedly declared to be vital to her national security and very existence.

"A word, in conclusion, as to Great Britain's position in this quarrel. Great Britain is still an Asiatic Power and if, for the reasons which I have outlined, public opinion in this country should come to the conclusion that the League of Nations cannot deal effectively with the problems of Asia, it would seem to follow that the Covenant of the League cannot be a safe 'corner-stone' of Great Britain's foreign policy.'

"I remain, dear sir,

"Yours very truly,

"J. O. P. BLAND."

CHAPTER XI

THE ANATOMY OF IDEALISM IN POLITICS

“How, in the name of soldiership and sense
Should England prosper, when such things . . .
Who sell their laurel for a myrtle wreath
And love when they should fight . . . when such as these
Presume to lay their hands upon the ark
Of her magnificent and awful cause?”

—*Cowper.*

“An hour’s conversation with Mr. Eugene Chen was worth an army corps in removing risks to men and women.”

—*Mr. Ramsay MacDonald (Albert Hall, 6th Feb., 1927).*

I AM conscious of the possibility that some readers, unaware of certain undercurrents and unseen forces which have contributed to determine the course of twentieth century history in the Far East, may consider that I have unduly stressed the importance of the part which sentimental idealism in politics has played in the tragedy of modern China.

Few will deny that, in the conditions prevailing in present-day Europe, the world is continually confronted with evidence of the lamentable consequences of the loose-thinking ‘liberalism,’ which found expression in the Treaty of Versailles, but the general trend of public opinion in regard to Asiatic affairs, as reflected in contemporary literature and journalism, shows clearly that only a comparatively small number of observers perceive how powerfully the same type of unscientific sentimentality has contributed to evoke and perpetuate conditions of chaotic unrest and lawlessness in India, China and other parts of Asia. Nevertheless, it is becoming increas-

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ingly evident that no improvement in these conditions can ever be achieved until public opinion is better informed as to the true causes of Asia's discontents, until, in dealing with Asiatic peoples, we shall have replaced the now fashionable protean internationalism, by a normal individualism and the encouragement of truly national cultures. There can be no hopeful prospect of internal peace for China, until discipline has been restored, and taken effect, as an essential part of a truly national system of education. Therefore, at the risk of wearying the initiated by insistence on this aspect of the problems which vex and perplex modern China, I propose to analyse somewhat more closely, the doctrinaire attitude of mind which inspires activities such as those which were discussed in Chapter IX. To that end, I propose to invoke the authority of two observers, whose direct experience and close study of Asiatic life entitles them to a consideration at least as serious as that which we have accorded in recent years to the pious opinions of the Manchester school, to "the doctrinaire parrot-cries that passed for serious thought at the close of the nineteenth century."*

Before so doing, however, let us digress to consider briefly the nature of "Die-hards," by which name (as a term of reproach) the authorities to whom I refer, will no doubt be summarily dismissed by many of the "unco guid." It has become the fashion to describe as Die-hards those who, at the risk of being unfashionable, persist in adhering to their belief in such old-world things as the British Empire, the unswerving maintenance of law and order, the sahib's stoic sense of duty and

*Sir Arnold Wilson, "Constitutional Tendencies in Eastern Countries," *English Review*, May, 1932.

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the responsibilities of the Raj. The term, as used by the pundits of the Round Table school and other superior persons, is intended to designate the owner of a mind impervious to enlightenment, a species of clotted Conservative, past praying for. But when one comes to examine closely the attitudes and utterances of these same political highbrows, of the individuals and coteries who claim to mould public opinion and to guide the destinies of a world made free for democracy, one speedily discovers that, in the matter of inflexibility of fixed ideas, the most obdurate of Die-hards cannot hold a candle to them. Their type of mind, so conspicuous in official and philanthropic circles since the war, which deprecates any manifestation of the commercial spirit by a nation of shop-keepers, the type which believes implicitly in universal suffrage, universal arbitration and the world-wide applicability of democratic institutions, continually displays a super-diehard indifference to facts and arguments, whenever they happen to conflict with its own pet theories.

Lord Lloyd is beyond all peradventure a Diehard, but an administrator of the Cromer type, of proved ability and wide experience of Asia and the Asiatics. Addressing the British Empire Union on December 5th, 1929, with especial reference to the situation in Egypt, he was at pains to impress upon his audience the dangerous folly of the school of thought which persists in attributing to semi-civilized Asiatics and African nations the qualities requisite for successful self-government and enlightened internationalism.

"The main cause for the alarm and preoccupation of so many of those who are familiar with Eastern affairs," he said, "is not so much because of any single proposal or declaration, in this treaty or that, regarding this or that area

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of British interest in the East to-day, grave as each may be, but rather the cynicism and levity with which it is proposed to abandon vital strategic positions, to allow our position in great markets, built up by the courage and enterprise of our people, wantonly to be sacrificed, and helpless masses of people, who have always looked to us for their protection, abandoned and thrown back into conditions from which they were gradually being rescued and emancipated, by the protection of British arms on the one hand, and the patient and studied devotion of the great Civil Service on the other.

"It is the fashion of the moment, so it sometimes seems, to make light of these great responsibilities, and to be careless of these grave obligations. It is all the more curious that it should be so, when one recollects that, what some are to-day so willing to yield at the point of a pen, was only recently not to be wrested from us, even at the cost of long-drawn suffering and death. In so far as the public may be apathetic towards these dangers, the explanation is, I think, that many of them are sincerely under the impression that the relaxation of our control in the East is a liberalising policy towards the masses of the peoples in the East. If only they realised that British rule in the East has always been the protection of the under-dog; that it is British rule alone that has stood between him and his old oppressors, and that the premature relaxation of our rule, before he has been sufficiently educated, organised and emancipated to defend himself, is not a liberalising policy, but exactly the contrary; it is a policy whereby we make ourselves privy to the restoration of religious and political oligarchies and tyrannies of an oppressive and evil kind."

These words accurately describe not only the errors and dangers of the Montagu experiment of dyarchy in India, but those of our policy of patient conciliation adopted towards the Kuomintang or Nationalist faction in China. In both countries we have deliberately jeopardized the strategic position and vital interests of the British Empire, as well as the well-being and security of the masses of the peoples concerned, and this in order to conciliate some thousands of self-elected Westernised politicians, lawyers and intellectuals, whose chief

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concern is the advancement of their own class interests, and whose hostility towards us increases with every graceful concession made to them.

Lord Lloyd concluded his address with the following words of warning:—

“If you allow disorder or misgovernment to take the place of order and stable government, the purchasing power of the people will be reduced; if you hand over the direction of affairs to agitators who are avowed enemies of this country, you will lose your markets and imperil still further the already grave position in this country. Already our share of the Eastern markets—Egypt, India, China—has suffered grave and dangerous reduction, a tendency which will be gravely accentuated unless we reconsider our attitude towards those great problems. It is not a little curious that the same government who so carelessly throw away our own real and existing markets in the East, should be willing to sell our country’s soul in order to buy purely problematical Soviet trade in the West. Let no one think that those who lightly press down the accelerator of democratic progress in the East are the true friends of its peoples. It is rather those of us who, in spite of misrepresentation and abuse, urge that it is prudence that will bring real and lasting progress by law and order that you will get liberty, and by firm rule, affection and respect, who are the true friends of the East and its peoples.”

Lord Lloyd, it will be observed, finds the explanation of his countrymen’s apathetic attitude towards Eastern affairs in the prevalence of the belief that the relaxation of our control is a liberalising policy towards the masses of the people in the East. His warning is, in fact, an indictment of that school of Liberal thought which, since the war, and most notably when Sir Austen Chamberlain was at the Foreign Office, has become obsessed with the dogma of racial equality and the universal applicability of democratic institutions, and therefore disposed to apply them, with that cynical levity which Lord Lloyd deplotes, and without direct know-

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ledge of the races with which, in theory, they sympathise.

Another profound observer of Eastern affairs, Meredith Townsend, when discussing the future of India twenty years ago, drew attention to the momentous change which had already taken place in the attitude of Englishmen towards the great Imperial interests which had been "built up by the courage and enterprise of our people in the East." The present-day cynicism and levity had not then become features of the problem. The change, as he saw it, was simply due to the increasing prevalence of sentimental idealism in political circles.

"Whether for good or evil, a great change is passing over Englishmen. They have become uncertain of themselves, afraid of their old opinions, doubtful of the true teaching of their own consciences. They doubt if they have any longer any more right to rule anyone, themselves almost included. An old mental disease, the love of approbation, has suddenly risen among them to the height of a passion. Instead of being content to rule well, to do justice and to love mercy, they are trying themselves by a new standard, and desire to rule so that the governed may applaud, or, as they phrase it with a certain unconscious unctuousness, may 'love' them. That is the real root of the great change which has passed over the management of children, of the whole difficulty in Ireland, of the reluctance to conquer, and of the whole of our new philanthropic and social legislation."

In the twenty years that have elapsed since these words were written, the symptoms of this "old mental disease, the love of approbation," have greatly increased. In India, Ireland, Egypt and the Far East, its effect has been to jeopardize the security of the Empire at vital points, without winning approbation in return. "Adventures in Liberalism" have become the order of the day, with Utopia as their objective, by paths of in-

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ternational pacifism. The fact that such adventures can be continually indulged in, without being seriously challenged by Parliament and Press, would seem to indicate that the body politic has been badly infected by the state of mind which seeks refuge from realities in self-deluding optimism.

British public opinion, in the sphere of world politics, has to a great extent surrendered its critical faculty in recent years to the guidance of the internationalists of the Round Table coterie and the League of Nations Union. One may venture the hope that the surrender is only temporary, inasmuch as persistence on the primrose path of plausible delusions is bound to produce unpleasant results of the kind which Lord Lloyd anticipates, and these, in their turn, must produce a powerful reaction. This also Meredith Townsend foresaw, observing that no democracy other than ours entertains any genuine doubts as to its right to govern. But things have gone so far, and such boundless ambitions now inspire the small class of Westernised Intellectuals which is disturbing the 'pathetic content' of India and China, that it will probably require a serious catastrophe to restore general recognition of the fundamental truths, that democratic institutions are wholly inapplicable to Asia, and that a policy of forbearing conciliation has never yet secured the respect or the good-will of an Asiatic people.

Meanwhile, however, in the general apathy manifested with regard to British policy in Asia by our hugely-swollen electorate, and in the docile surrender of the critical faculty to the guidance of internationalist doctrinaires, many observers perceive evidence of deterioration in the once robust political instincts of

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the British people, symptomatic of the decline of liberty in England. Be this as it may, it cannot be denied that a great change has taken, and is taking, place in these instincts, or at least in the outward and visible signs of those inward and spiritual qualities which, through the long centuries, have built up the British Constitution and inspired the Mother of Parliaments. If the pessimists are right, if this change foreshadows the decline and fall of the Empire, the end of the type of Western civilisation which, more than any other, has blazed new trails of liberty and justice and given peace and security to the weaker nations, the historian of the millennium may be led to discover the initial cause of this decline in the insidious processes which have gradually concentrated political influence in the hands of the type which the late Prebendary Gough has described as that of the "dangerous Feminine Man." The doom of the Raj, like that of Rome, will have come about, not by the strength of hostile tribes on its frontiers, but by the insidious elements of decay, of intellectual dry-rot, at the heart of the Empire.

Preaching at the Guards' Chapel in Wellington Barracks in the summer of 1927, Prebendary Gough deplored the sapping of the masculine element in the religion and politics of the British nation, and commented as follows on the extraordinary influence now exercised by the Feminine Man on the affairs of Church and State:

"Any attempt to energise the nation by appeals to a masculine and Imperial spirit—however gracious and humane the purposes to which it is invited to devote its energies—is becoming increasingly regarded as 'unchristian.' We are to have a special kind of politics, economics and citizenship for

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restraining efficiency and flattering the incapable. . . . The Feminine Man is so full of pity for any spectacle which suggests hard work, and so unfriendly in his attitude towards robust strength or efficiency, especially efficiency which expects to receive any reward for being efficient. Very strangely, he can often applaud vigorous exercises in other races which are not friendly to us, but he holds that it is irreligious to commend these things in the people of England. . . . This sort of person has a settled conviction that his country is wrong, and any foes who rise against her, right. He is for the most part in favour of making friendly agreements with irreconcilable enemies, even with an enemy who throughout the world is striving for the overthrow of our Empire. And he is quite pleased to bribe the old English energy down into home-abiding lethargy by doles and such-like expedients."

I have quoted Prebendary Gough's analysis of the mentality of the Feminine Man because it summarises many of the most conspicuous characteristics and proclivities of the "Round Table" and Fabian schools of thought, of our Norman Angells and Gilbert Murrays, our Wellses and Curtises, our Toynbees and Bertrand Russells. In particular, the foreign and colonial policy of the late Labour Government, dominated by its doctrinaires, reflected this influence with unswerving fidelity and increasingly disastrous results, of which the end is not yet. In India, Ceylon, Egypt, Malaya, China, Ireland, and many other parts of the world, we are to-day confronted with these results and saddled with policies which, born of the peculiar delusions of the Feminine Man, applaud the expression of vigorous nationalism by every race except their own and conceal the lamentable consequences of their misguided sympathies under a smoke-screen of self-deluding optimism. Thus we have seen the Foreign Office endeavouring at all costs to conciliate the contemptuously irreconcilable Soviets and to concede all the impossible demands of

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China's militant Nationalism; we have seen the India Office carrying the Montagu policy to its logical conclusion by parleying with organised law-breaking and sedition; and we have seen the Colonial Office proclaiming a 'native' policy in South Africa which plainly implied, that the white settlers in territories controlled by that office are objects of suspicion (as the Shanghai traders are to the Foreign Office) to be cheerfully sacrificed to the Feminine Man's conception of humanitarianism.

When, more than thirty years ago, Meredith Townsend discussed the question "Will England retain India?" he observed that, starting from the fallacious assumption that all men are equal, the Fabians of that day had initiated a process of disintegration which, if carried to its logical conclusion, must mean the doom of the Raj; that is to say, "that the noblest dream ever dreamed by man (that of tranquilly guiding, controlling and perfecting the Asiatic until the worse qualities of his organisation had gone out of him) was but a dream after all." He foresaw that, in this process of disintegration, the Imperial Service must inevitably pass into the hands of men "who have every temptation to be, and will be, Indian Pashas." Furthermore, since there would not be time to complete the one great work which that Service has begun*—namely, the substitution of the idea of government by law for that of government by human volition—he thought it probable that India must fall to pieces and become once more the victim of incessant wars, invasions and struggles for

* Mr. Lionel Curtis, as befits the chief advocate of dyarchy, believes that this work of civilisation has actually been completed, and that the rule of law *has* now been established in India.—*Vide The Capital Question of China*, p. 263.

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personal ascendancy. That is to say, he foresaw that experiments with liberal theories, and blind devotion to the dogma of self-determination, would produce in India chaos of a kind identical with that which they have actually produced within the last twenty years in China; in other words, that the fixed ideas of the Feminine Man would be applied in Asia at an incalculable cost of human suffering.

Despite his conviction that the disintegration of the Raj had definitely begun, Townsend thought it possible (though he could not persuade himself that it was probable) that English opinion might undergo a healthy reaction and modify the doctrine of racial equality with just recognition of insuperable racial differences. But his outlook—and none was better qualified to judge—was, on the whole, pessimistic, for he perceived that if the Englishman, by virtue of the authoritative *morale* of his race, has not a moral right and duty to govern India (pending Asia's acquisition and application of the idea of government by law), then the Raj becomes manifestly impossible and the White Man can only remain in Asia on sufferance and at his peril. This opinion, be it observed, is practically the same as that which, by a very different process of reasoning, the Pan-Asiatics of Japan's "Black Dragon" Society have reached, and by virtue of which they aspire to proclaim their Monroe doctrine of the Far East.

Amongst the most distinctive characteristics of the Feminine Man are his indifference to logic and the consistent inconsistency which he displays in the enthusiastic pursuit of his ideals. The long-haired men and short-haired women who profess the internationalists' creed of political magnanimity, by assuming that in

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every dispute England must be wrong, are serenely unconscious of anything unreasonable in a faith which, while it looks to the Intelligentsia of India and China to bring about a New Era in those countries, continually proclaims its sympathy for the Russian type of self-determination, which puts its Intelligentsia to the sword; the truth of the matter being that, in each case, their sympathy is instinctive, in that it is extended to those who are opposed to the British type of civilisation. They can find it in their hearts to admire the active, self-helping militant nationalism of Young Germany, as proclaimed by Herr Hitler, and advocate the revision of the Treaty of Versailles in support of its aspirations; but they cannot abide the thought that the youth of England should be permitted to manifest its love of country, or its readiness to defend it, by anything savouring of 'militarism.' The professed ends of their political faith are those of a benevolent humanitarianism, yet in pursuing them, they display a curiously inhuman callousness towards the sufferings which their uplifting processes involve—the barbaric horrors of the Soviet régime, for example, or the pitiful condition to which 'nationalism' has reduced the Chinese people. By acquiescing in the guardianship of mandated territories under the auspices of the League of Nations, they tacitly recognize the truth that, as Amiel says, the foundation of true humanity is justice, and justice for the weak necessitates some form of protection, but they fail with one accord to recognize the obvious fact that the two nations which most urgently need protection, as wards of civilisation, to-day and for many a day to come, are India and China.

But, the enquiring reader may observe, if the phil-

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osophical and moral bases of China's ancient civilisation are as excellent as has been suggested in an earlier chapter, if the products of that civilisation have proved to be enduring beyond all human experience and, in many other respects, admirable, how is it possible consistently to profess sincere respect for this Chinese system of ethics, morals and culture and at the same time to sympathise with regrets, such as Meredith Townsend's, for the doom of the Raj and the failure of its civilising mission in Asia? The apparent inconsistency between the two attitudes thus adopted will, however, be removed, if it be borne in mind that Townsend regarded the "one great work which the Raj had begun in India" (namely, the education of the conglomerate of races to the idea of government by *law*) as "the noblest dream ever dreamed by man"; at the same time, it was his opinion that it would take at least three centuries for this idea to filter down to the masses. Even if we now assume that, in the course of two or three hundred years, this dream can become a living reality, for the present it remains incontestably true that, as regards the essential bases of political morality and thought and of social economy, West is still West and East determinedly East. In the domain of realities, the principles, qualities and defects which characterise the eastern and western types of civilisation respectively, must continue to exist and to represent the essential difference between the active, self-helping, western type of human beings and the passive, non-resisting Asiatic type. For the present, and so long as these inherent differences persist, until, in fact, the dream of the Internationalists has been fulfilled in a world which knows no frontiers, or barriers of language,

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creed or colour, the British type of civilisation will probably continue to be the best type evolved by the nations of the western world; while the Chinese is undoubtedly the highest which Asia has ever produced. The active, self-helping western type is by its nature disposed to dominate and to proselytise; the eastern, to passive resistance; and each has fulfilled, not without dignity, its destiny.

As a purely abstract question, there may be matter for speculation and debate as to whether any western race can be morally justified in assuming the government of non-resisting Asiatics; also, whether the European nations had any moral right to compel Asia, as they did, to abandon its immemorial policy of seclusion. But for practical men, the fact remains that these rights, and others arising out of them, have been assumed for the last two centuries, and that to-day the King of England is Emperor of India. It may be, as the self-determinationists assert, that the tribes and races which inhabit India would rather be badly governed by Indians than well governed by Englishmen; it may be that Asia, as a whole, would have been "earthlier happy" in its own way, if the West had never invaded its borders, to make its people conscious of their military inferiority, and later, of their 'pathetic content.' But these, after all, are speculations with which, until lately, the Raj has not been greatly concerned.

The curious feature, and the tragedy, of the world-policies imposed upon us to-day by our twentieth-century Internationalists is that, in their zeal to shatter the present "sorry scheme of things entire, and then remould it nearer to their heart's desire," they are all busily engaged in sapping the foundations upon

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which these two, the highest forms of civilisation, East and West, are based. In both cases, the immediate result of their indefatigable activities is to undermine the moral authority of the Raj on the one hand, and the Confucian system of philosophy and ethics, on the other. In their earnest pursuance of the shadow of a world-wide cosmopolitan democracy, they ascribe no vital importance to the innate differences that divide race from race; in their zeal for the theory of racial equality, they overlook the truth that these differences connote inequality in practically every direction except that of an abstract morality. Viewed in the light of such knowledge as we possess of the civilisations that have waxed and waned on this planet, the British Empire and the political philosophy of China represent each in its way, high levels of practical wisdom and constructive achievement rarely, if ever, equalled in the history of the human race; yet both, if the theorists of advanced 'liberalism' had their way, would be relegated to the limbo of systems outworn.

CHAPTER XII

THE QUESTION OF MANCHURIA

THE purpose of the present work being to analyse and explain the various forces, influences and tendencies which have contributed to the process of demoralisation in China during the past decade, a discussion of the Manchurian question may seem to be somewhat outside its intended scope. Strictly speaking, the situation which has gradually and inevitably developed in China's loosely-held northern dependencies since the Washington Conference, is in itself only one of the major symptoms of this demoralisation. It might, therefore, be omitted from the purview of this book, on the same principle that the status of the International Settlement at Shanghai and other similar questions are omitted—namely, that all these are merely symptomatic, surface indications of deep-rooted organic disease in China's body politic.

Moreover, since the publication of Mr. Owen Lattimore's erudite and most illuminating work* there is actually no need for further elucidation of the essential factors of the Manchurian problem, for he has brought to bear upon it not only the results of years of competent research, but the analytical discrimination of a trained observer, and the result is a closely-reasoned sociological and historical study, which explains and emphasises several generally neglected aspects of the

* *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*. By Owen Lattimore. (Macmillan, 1932.)

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problem. From the ancient 'tribal' history of Manchuria he has traced the modern relation between it and China and the real significance of the present-day conflict of races and interests, with their invasions of colonists and rivalry of civilisations. With history for his background, he has demonstrated the relation between the living phenomena of society, as developed by the cultural and tribal influences of this region, and the conspicuous facts, political and economic, of the existing situation. This masterly survey of the Manchurian question should enable every student of Far Eastern affairs to see it in correct perspective and with an accurate appreciation of relative values; in the field which it covers, there is little which can usefully be added for the enlightenment of public opinion.

Nevertheless, because of the world-wide importance which this question has assumed, as the result of the action taken, at China's request, by the League of Nations, and of the attitude assumed towards it by the United States Government (as set forth in Mr. Secretary Stimson's letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on February 24th, 1932), it seems advisable, and pertinent to the general purpose of this book, to discuss certain political aspects of the question, which are outside the scope of Mr. Lattimore's survey. As a rule, these have been overlooked, and often confused, at Geneva in the tumult of words which has arisen out of Japan's forcible assertion of her special rights and interests and other developments of the situation, prior to the declaration of Manchuria's independence (March, 1932).

Before proceeding to consider the main facts of the problem with which the League of Nations has now to

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deal, it may be well to recall to the reader's mind certain important circumstances and events which have combined to produce the present situation. *Imprimis*, it must be remembered that, at the beginning of the present century, the future of Manchuria depended, not on anything that China or the friendly Powers could do, but solely on Japan's willingness, or unwillingness, to acquiesce in Russia's unconcealed purpose of forceful expansion in that region. Japan, as we know, declined to acquiesce and eventually succeeded in compelling Russia to abandon, at any rate for the time being, Mouravieff's dream of an Asiatic Empire on the Pacific seaboard. Five years later, making a common front against the American Government's attempt to 'neutralise' the Manchurian railway system, for the preservation of the 'open door' principle, Russia and Japan entered into a formal alliance, which virtually sealed the fate of Manchuria and Mongolia and reduced the Treaty of Portsmouth to a dead letter. Having thus composed their differences, they proceeded, unopposed, to develop their respective spheres of interest by energetic measures of "peaceful penetration" and by processes which steadily undermined what was left of China's effective authority in those regions. The Chinese revolution (October, 1911) greatly accelerated the processes of geographical gravitation, especially in Mongolia. In January, 1912, the Russian Minister at Peking formally insisted, in a note addressed to the Chinese Government, on the "independence" of Northern Mongolia.

Next, it behoves us to remember that, prior to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in July, 1911, Sir Edward Grey had publicly recognised the purport

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of the Russo-Japanese *entente* and its immediate results. On June 11th, 1910, he said in the House of Commons that H.M. Government recognised that "Russia and Japan had special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria." The uncompromising veto pronounced by Japan in the matter of the proposed Anglo-American Chinchou-Aigun railway, and her subsequent refusal to submit the matter to arbitration at the Hague, afforded conclusive proof of her determination to prevent the establishment of any vested interests other than her own in South Manchuria. In this situation Great Britain and the United States tacitly acquiesced.

With the Great War came the cessation of Russia's expansionist activities in the Far East. Her collapse in 1917, and the consequent suspension of the *entente* of 1910 with Japan, produced a new situation in Manchuria and Mongolia, which, because of the uncertainty of the future, created many new problems for Japan. So long as the final issue of the struggle in France remained in doubt, her policy aimed at taking advantage of the disorganised state of China, so as to extend and consolidate her position in South Manchuria and, in the event of Russia's complete *débâcle*, to secure for herself new coigns of vantage in Mongolia and Eastern Siberia. The means adopted to secure these ends, beginning with the "twenty-one demands" imposed upon China in May, 1915, were undeniably high-handed and morally reprehensible; to a certain extent they were also undoubtedly tentative; something, in fact, in the nature of a gambling insurance against the possibility of a German victory. When, after the war, a new alignment of the Powers in the Pacific region and the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came to be envisaged by Japan,

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a modification of her expansionist policy and of her relations with China were obviously indicated and recognised as necessary by her Elder Statesmen. Nevertheless, the attitude and arguments of her representatives at the Versailles Conference afforded conclusive evidence of the nation's unswerving determination to insist upon recognition of their "special interests" in Manchuria, if only as an equitable *quid pro quo* for their tacit acquiescence in the British and American Asiatic Exclusion Acts. There had been evidence of the same determination in Viscount Ishii's Special Mission to the United States in 1917. When visiting Japan on the eve of the Washington Conference, I had occasion to discuss the subject with the leading men of all political parties.* I came away convinced that nothing short of decisive defeat in a life and death struggle would ever induce the nation's rulers to abandon their claims to a privileged position of economic and strategical advantage in Manchuria and Mongolia—a conviction which the passing years have strengthened. During the war (in September, 1916), the American Government had intimated its intention to take up the questions of Shantung and Manchuria, and other matters arising out of the 'twenty-one demands,' with all the world Powers actually or tacitly committed to the "open door" policy. In 1920, in pursuance of this intention and in response to Young China's appeals, the State Department at Washington (supported, *tant mal que bien*, by Lord Curzon) attempted, through the medium of the international financial Consortium, to induce Japan to surrender her "special interests" to "the combined activities of an international Group," on the

* *Vide China, Japan and Korea.* (Heinemann, 1921.)

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plea that "the international position had been profoundly changed by the Peace Conference, and that former claims to spheres of influence were no longer admissible." A new era, it seemed, had dawned, and "a new start was to be made with a clean slate." The Japanese Ambassador's replies to Lord Curzon* concerning these Consortium proposals, indicated a desire to temporise and to avoid all contentious side-issues, while carefully refraining from any admission which might tend to prejudice or diminish Japan's position in the region under discussion. Lord Curzon's despatches were curiously lacking in the quality of conviction which usually characterised his utterances; he found himself indeed in an uncomfortable position between the deep sea of England's desire for friendship with America and the devil of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He could hardly expect the Japanese Government to admit that the proclamation of a "new era" by the exponents of international finance was sufficient to justify Great Britain in asking her ally to consent, either to the revision of the Shantung clauses of the Versailles Treaty, or to abandonment of her privileged position in Manchuria and Mongolia, that position having been repeatedly recognised in the past. Nor could he expect the plea of a "New Era of harmonious co-operation" to be effective in persuading Japan to surrender a position which her rulers have consistently declared to be vital to her economic existence and national security, unless the Powers were prepared to admit the same plea in support of Japan's claim to "racial equality" and to abandon their Asiatic Exclusion Acts.

The statesmen who subsequently represented Japan

* Published in a *Blue Book*, 1921.

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at the Washington Conference were tactfulness itself on the subject of new eras and clean slates, but neither at that Conference nor at those subsequently held (1925) at Peking was anything said or done by them to justify the belief that Japan would ever voluntarily abandon her position in Manchuria—on the contrary, everything in the utterances and attitude of Baron Shidehara at Washington justified the prediction that Japan would continue to develop her “special interests” with all the resources at her disposal, and to accelerate at every point her “peaceful penetration” into that field of economic activity which, as he frankly told the Conference, is vitally necessary to her national existence. Everything in the situation justified the further prediction that Japan would be materially assisted in that process of penetration by the venality of China’s officials, which—as will be shown hereafter—proved to be the case.

Throughout the period 1924 to 1928, the British and American Governments vied with each other in giving effect to the Washington policy of patient conciliation, and the Chinese, thus encouraged, became more and more insistent upon their own unilateral interpretation of the principles of racial equality and self-determination. During this period Japan’s attitude was conciliatory but cautious; although China’s right to tariff autonomy was recognised by all the other Powers during the latter half of 1928, Japan’s treaty on the subject was not concluded until May, 1930. From June, 1924, till April, 1928, Baron Shidehara was Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tokyo and, in spite of the events which finally necessitated the despatch of a Japanese military expedition to Shantung, his relations with the Nationalist Government were generally friendly. From

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May, 1927, to July, 1929, Baron Tanaka, as Premier and Foreign Minister, adopted a less conciliatory and more positive policy, especially with regard to Manchuria. When, in the spring of 1928, a coalition between the northern war-lords, Yen and Feng, threatened the position of the Manchurian chieftain, Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese Government despatched identical notes to Nanking and Peking announcing, in the most emphatic terms, its determination not to permit any waging of China's civil wars within the boundaries of Manchuria. From that date onwards, despite the fall of the Tanaka Government in July, 1929, a gradual consolidation and increased assertion of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria has taken place, coincident with evidence of an equal determination on the part of the Chinese to deny and annul these "interests" by invoking the assistance of the League of Nations and the Government of the United States. The declaration, under Japanese auspices, of an independent Manchurian Republic, in March, 1932, was the predestined culmination of a policy which had never swerved from its declared objectives since the beginning of the century. As a *fait accompli*, it effectively precludes the possibility of any solution of the Manchurian problem such as was contemplated in 1931 by the Council of the League of Nations and its co-opted American advisers.

Japan's recourse to military force in Manchuria has been generally condemned as a breach of the international agreements recorded in the Covenant of the League and in the Kellogg Pact, and the League's intervention has been claimed by the Nanking Government ostensibly for the purpose of asserting and preserving the sanctity of those agreements. It is safe to predict

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that in the logomachy which ensues upon the submission of the Lytton Commission's report to the Council at Geneva, there will be a renewal of the arguments set forth in Professor C. W. Young's monumental works on *Japan's Special Position in Manchuria* and *The International Legal Status of the Kuantung Leased Territory*; all very learned and legal. But in so far as Japan is concerned, the position is bound to remain precisely as it was (though then unchallenged in detail by China) before and during the Washington Conference. If, coming down to the basic realities, we reduce the problem to its simplest expression, it must be apparent that the future of Manchuria depends to-day upon the acquiescence of the United States in Japan's conception of the scope and significance of her "special interests" in Manchuria, just as, in 1904, it depended upon Japan's willingness to allow Russia to control and exploit it.

Meanwhile, however, it is of interest to consider how, and to what extent, Japan's military activities in Manchuria constitute a violation of the principles underlying the Kellogg Peace Pact. On May 19th, 1929, Sir Austen Chamberlain was careful to make it clear on behalf of Great Britain that the terms of this Pact excluded "any action which a State may be forced to take in self-defence"; also he considered it advisable to remind Mr. Kellogg that "there are certain regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with those regions cannot be suffered." By a remarkable coincidence, on the day before this declaration was made, the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria had provided a

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forcible illustration of the far-reaching significance of such reservations, by proclaiming their intention of preventing any Chinese armed forces, whether victorious or defeated, from entering Manchuria. At the same time they announced their unwillingness to permit any interference with this policy.

Seldom has there been a more swift and dramatic exposition of the truth, that activity in the search for formulæ and facts to ensure the preservation of peace, is in itself a symptom and warning of latent causes of conflict. Seldom has there been a clearer demonstration of the futility of the panaceas of pacifism, when confronted with the stern realities which determine the policies of nations struggling for survival and a place in the sun. For here, at the very outset of civilisation's most imposing experiment in peace pacts, the world was confronted with the spectacle of one of its signatory States, constrained by its rulers' conception of 'self-defence' and vital necessity, to adopt measures which violate the *de jure* sovereign rights of a weaker State, and which, in their ultimate consequences, may well constitute a menace to the 'self-defence' programmes of others. We shall probably never know whether those who frame and guide Japan's ever-cautious statecraft, had any foreknowledge of the nature of Sir Austen Chamberlain's reply to Mr. Secretary Kellogg when they decided to close the Manchurian frontier to China's rabble armies. If not, the tenor of that reply must have come as a very grateful surprise, establishing, as it does, the principle of non-interference in any region "whose welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest" for the signatory concerned. At no time since 1905 has the Japanese Government ever made any

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concealment of its conviction that the protection of its special position of economic and strategical advantage in Manchuria is a matter of imperative necessity, also that it regards the validity of its rights and vested interests in that region as defensible, in the same manner and for the same reasons as Great Britain's position in Egypt or Gibraltar, or that of the United States in applying the Monroe doctrine to prevent the establishment of non-American interests in Central and South America.

Prior to the events which culminated in the outbreak of hostilities at Mukden last year, Japan's attitude towards China, even during the Tanaka régime, was generally consistent with the Washington policy of patient conciliation and benevolent neutrality; but (unlike that of Great Britain) it has always been tempered by a resolute refusal to surrender lawfully-established rights and interests to illegal violence. At no time during the last ten years had Japan anything to gain, and there was much to lose, by forcing the pace or by independent action.

The position of comparative isolation in which she found herself after the Washington Conference and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; the post-war wealth and strength of the United States, and the rapidly increasing importance to that nation of the Far Eastern markets; the impossibility of any early renewal of the Russo-Japanese *entente* on satisfactory terms; and finally, the strain imposed upon her financial resources by the disastrous earthquake of 1923—all these were factors which, as a matter of necessity, imposed upon the rulers of Japan a period of watchful waiting and careful preparation, similar to those which had fol-

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lowed upon the fall of the Shogunate in 1868, and the war with China in 1895. Moreover, from the all-important commercial point of view, there was every reason to stretch the policy of conciliation to its farthest limits. At any date between 1925 and 1931, a very strong body of commercial and financial opinion would have brought its weight to bear upon any Cabinet which failed to do its utmost to cultivate the good-will of those elements in modern China's politics, upon which satisfactory trade relations depend. Therefore, in common with the other Treaty Powers, Japan was disposed to overlook and condone, without retaliation, on the Yangtze and elsewhere, the attacks which were made on her subjects and the frequent violation of their Treaty rights, so long as her position in Manchuria was not directly threatened. But on this vital point the Japanese authorities have been persistently frank in their warnings to all concerned. At the beginning of 1928, for example, they announced that, if the Chinese persisted in ignoring their agreements on matters affecting the South Manchurian Railway and other important Japanese interests, the Japanese Government might be compelled to remind Peking that "Manchuria does not form an integral part of China," and deal with it accordingly. Considering the frankness and the frequency of these warnings, it may safely be asserted that the Nationalist Government at Nanking would never have ventured to challenge Japan's position and claim to special interests in Manchuria, had they not been encouraged to do so by the well-meaning but misguided sympathy accorded to their political aspirations in the United States, and on a smaller scale in Great Britain, by the die-hard school of self-determination and

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by the earnest busybodies of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In protesting and appealing to the United States and to the League of Nations against Japan's assertion of her rights in the matter of railway construction in Manchuria, the Chinese Government was manifestly acting upon the classical principle of setting one barbarian against the other, in the hope of retrieving a position which, through sheer lack of honesty or courage or both, has been definitely surrendered in more than one formal agreement. Inasmuch as this important but delicate aspect of the situation has never been seriously discussed at Geneva (although it lies at the very root of the international problems with which the world is confronted, not only in Manchuria, but throughout China), it seems advisable to recall to our short-lived memories, certain facts connected therewith. At the Washington Conference it was laid down, as a self-denying ordinance, binding upon all the nine Powers concerned, that China's sovereign rights and the integrity of her territory must be respected and maintained. But it is a remarkable fact (attributable in great measure to the idealists who dominated the proceedings of that Conference and who now inspire the activities of the League of Nations) that at no time, in all these years of solemn assemblies, has anyone ventured to raise the question, whether as a matter of practical politics any good purpose can be served by the Powers binding themselves to protect the sovereign rights of a nation, when the official class of that nation have repeatedly manifested their readiness to sell or pledge those sovereign rights, regardless of the welfare and dignity of their country. Throughout the many conferences that have been held

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at Geneva since the present Manchurian dispute was referred to the League, there has been continual evidence of a disposition to examine and discuss all the legal aspects of Japan's special position in that region, coincident with her obligations as a member of the League. Many speeches have been made, and many volumes written by distinguished American publicists, all based on the broad assumption that China's relations with Japan are capable of being dealt with on generally accepted principles of international law. But in none of these will the earnest seeker after truth find any specific exposition of the fundamental fact, that the whole position of economic and political ascendancy which Japan has been enabled to build up in Manchuria since the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) is largely due to the venal complicity of China's own officials. This is a hard saying, but it is the simple truth.

The attitude of the highly-cultured diplomats who have advocated China's cause before the Council of the League, and that of the Nanking Government behind them, amounts to a general denial of Japan's position and rights, on the ground that the Treaties and agreements conferring these rights and special interests, were made in the past by high officials or government departments, with whose methods the present-day Kuomintang Intellectuals are not in sympathy. In other words, their attitude reflects, by implication, upon each and every government that has held office in China since the Manchurian question began to take form, except that which they themselves now represent. It is a line of argument for which they can find justification and good precedents in Western politics, but its general applicability has not yet been admitted, even at Geneva. The position there

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adopted by Mr. Alfred Sze and Dr. Yen is, that agreements, such as the supplementary clause to the Peking Treaty of 1905, or the concessions granted in return for the Nishihara loans, should no longer be regarded as binding upon the Chinese Government of to-day, inasmuch as they were either wrongfully obtained by coercion, or corruptly negotiated, and that such things are no longer possible under the completely changed conditions of present-day China. The assumption is one which can be made to apply to almost every Treaty and thus reduce it to a scrap of paper; it has, in fact, been repeatedly invoked by the Kuomintang, in denouncing those Treaties which it chooses to regard as 'unequal,' or in cases where it has good reason to believe that a policy of repudiation will not be unduly discouraged by other interested parties, inside and outside of the League. In the early days of the Republic, it was the fashion for Sun Yat-sen and his adherents to attribute Japan's ascendancy in Manchuria, and many other things derogatory to China's sovereign rights and dignity, to political abuses prevalent under the corrupt tyranny of the Manchus. As time went on, the Manchus having left the scene, it became the fashion for the advanced section of the Kuomintang to attribute all such unpleasant things to the misgovernment of its political antagonists. Since 1921, the Cantonese element has always been particularly eloquent in denouncing the inefficiency and corruption of its northern opponents.

Such being the case, it may be well to set forth in brief outline the steps by which Japan's position of economic and political ascendancy in Manchuria has gradually been consolidated, with the connivance of high Chinese officials, since the beginning of the century.

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The first of these steps, whereby China's sovereignty was curtailed and threatened with complete extinction in the three Eastern provinces, occurred in 1896. Shortly after the Japanese had been compelled to restore the Liaotung Peninsula to China (as the result of *force majeure* brought to bear upon her by France, Russia and Germany), Russia, the villain of the piece, proceeded, first through her Minister at Peking, and later in negotiations between Li Hung-chang and Prince Lobanow in Moscow, to conclude a secret Treaty (3rd June, 1896) of alliance, whereby Russia secured the right to build her own railway through Northern Manchuria to Vladivostock, together with an undertaking that China would finance all future railways construction in that region through Russian banks only. It was said at the time that the Manchu Court (and particularly Li Lien-ying, the chief eunuch) had derived considerable financial advantages from this agreement; but the fact remains that it was carried to its conclusion by the greatest of China's Viceroy's, and that, by common report current at the time throughout all China (subsequently confirmed by the memoirs of de Witte) he received a large *douceur* for his part in the transaction. From that date onward, by China's own voluntary action, a foreign power was empowered to exercise rights in Manchuria which definitely encroached upon the unrestricted exercise of her sovereignty in that region. On 11th November, 1901, a secret agreement was made, again through Li Hung-chang, between Russia and China, which gave the former complete control of Manchuria and the right to connect Port Arthur by railway with the Trans-Siberian line.

Again, after the Russo-Japanese War, when China's

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sovereign rights over the three provinces had been re-established, without cost to herself, by the Treaty of Portsmouth, it was the venality of a high Chinese official which again undermined and gave away these rights in the all-important matter of railway construction. The corruption of Na Tung, Minister of Finance, who negotiated the Treaty which did so, was notorious through all China; but the fact remains that he *was* Minister of Finance and, in that capacity, invested with authority to make such agreements binding upon China.

Again, in 1927, at a time when China could confidently rely upon a large measure of sympathy and support from other nations, because of the high-handed action adopted towards her by Japan in the matter of the "Twenty-one Demands," it was the cupidity and inefficiency of the Chinese Government's representative officials (beginning with the Minister of Finance) which placed Japan in a position still further to dominate and develop the economic resources of Manchuria for her own national advantage. Broadly speaking, it may be said that, since the Revolution, every single one of the political groups which have come into power in China has been willing to permit Japan's encroachments upon China's sovereignty in Manchuria, at a price which Japan has paid in subsidies and loans. In this respect, Sun Yat-sen himself was little better than Tuan Chi-jui and others of the pro-Japanese Anfu party, whom the patriots of Young China now so fervently denounce. It is pertinent to record the fact that in 1922, at the time of the Washington Conference, the leaders of the Cantonese party had made common cause with the pro-Japanese faction in the North, just as, in 1931, the independent Military Government at

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Canton entered into direct negotiations with Tokyo, under circumstances which evoked bitter accusations of treachery from the Nanking Government.

In preserving a magisterial silence in regard to these matters, and by consenting to ignore their contributory effect to the actual situation in Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations tacitly accepts at its face value the assurance of the diplomats and publicists, who now speak for the Nanking Government, when they assert that the methods of that Government are entirely different from those of all its predecessors. It has persistently done so and, as we have shown, has had the support of many powerful religious, educational and cultural societies in England and America.

But, in so doing, the League has deliberately and repeatedly shut its eyes to realities which are generally recognised by the Chinese themselves, except in their face-saving propaganda for foreign consumption. All China agrees that the corruption displayed by officialdom under the Kuomintang régime has been more flagrant and rapacious than anything hitherto known in the history of modern China. Dr. Hu Shih, one of the most notable modernist scholars in China to-day, has quite recently declared, at some personal risk, that the habit of bribery is now universal in every branch of Chinese society and that, in the matter of administrative corruption, China leads the world. Every political party in power is freely denounced by its opponents for acts of maladministration and for wholesale peculation of public funds, in terms more outspoken than anything known to the Board of Censors under the Manchus. Such being the case, the assumption which has hitherto influenced the

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uncritical policy and determined the judicial attitude of the League of Nations is manifestly untenable. If any lasting settlement of the Manchurian problem is to be achieved, this assumption must be abandoned and the realities of the situation, including the consequences of the dominant morality of China's official class, must be squarely faced. In other words, the Chinese Government must be given to understand that it is not in the power of the League of Nations, or any combination of the Powers, permanently to protect the sovereign rights of a country whose officials are prepared to sell, or otherwise sacrifice them. Such an intimation, politely but firmly conveyed to China's delegates at Geneva, would do far more good than any number of reports by committees of inquiry, on matters which, considered in this light, are of comparatively minor importance.

Such being the case, it would seem that the problem of Manchuria—and indeed the problem of all China—is one which can no longer be approached in the spirit of benevolent optimism hitherto displayed at Washington and Geneva. No longer, as the Japanese Government has tersely put it, can the civilised world continue its common consent of treating China as if that geographical expression connoted an organised Nation within the meaning of the League of Nations Covenant. "Fictions cannot last for ever," wrote the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the League Council on 23rd February, 1932, "nor can they be tolerated when they become grave sources of practical danger. The time has inevitably come when realities, rather than fictions, must be reckoned with. The general desire to see China happy, prosperous and

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united, has led the world to treat her as united, in a way in which, in sober fact, she was not." Such being undoubtedly the case, it must be patent to every dispassionate observer that, even if it were possible for the Powers in Council to devise some solution of expediency for the present *impasse*, some formula whereby China and Japan might be persuaded to sink their immediate differences and co-operate on a *modus vivendi* of compromise, the crucial problem would merely be deferred, not solved, and Manchuria would still remain the "Cradle of Conflicts" to come. The Japanese Government's definite announcement to the League commission on 14th July, 1932, of its determination to support the independence of the Manchukuo Republic as an accomplished fact, "which must form the basis of all future arrangements", has confronted the League of Nations with a new situation, but it leaves untouched the central problem which the Washington Treaties professed to solve by their policy of non-interference and their benevolent support for China's experiments in self-determination. The world has still to face the problem of preserving the sovereign rights and integrity of a nation whose rulers have shown no sign of the constructive initiative requisite for removing the causes of its own defenceless weakness. Henceforth, as the result of the decision taken by the Japanese Government, with the whole-hearted support of the Japanese people, the problem is once more international, as it was in 1905, and the issue of the Manchurian question becomes a matter dependent not on China, but on the attitude of the great Powers concerned—beginning with that of the United States.

Amongst observers well qualified to form an opinion,

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there are many who believe that America can afford to remain faithful to the Nine Power Treaty and simply bide her time, for the reason that every extension of Japan's line of communications on the Asiatic mainland, every addition to the number of her vulnerable interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, brings her nearer to the day when her position will once more be challenged by Russia. There are competent observers who believe that this challenge will not be long delayed and that another Russo-Japanese war is likely to test Japan's resources and endurance far more severely than the last one.* The efficiency, and reliability in warfare of the Soviet's Red armies is largely an unknown factor, but its technique is admittedly very different from that of the former Tzarist forces and has become essentially Russian in character. As regards the steadily increasing penetration of Russia into all the region bounded on the south by the Chinese Eastern Railway, there can be no question, nor any doubt as to the talent displayed by her administrators and leaders in bringing all kinds of alien elements peacefully under their rule. "The most significant quality of modern Russia," says Owen Lattimore, "is its extraordinary faculty of incorporating alien populations within its own organism. For this reason the Russian advance into the East is even more important as a migration of ideas than it is as the movement of a people." Slowly and silently, for the last ten years, they have been penetrating into Chinese Turkestan, into Urianghai and Outer Mongolia.† From the Pamirs to the Pacific there is evidence of the age-

* *Vide Manchuria, Past, Present and Future.* By Laurence Impey. *English Review*, July, 1931.

† *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict.* By Owen Lattimore. (Reproduced by permission of the publishers, the Macmillan Co.)

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long imperative instinct of expansion eastwards, 'the old shibboleth with new men to utter it' of establishing Russia's Eastern frontier on the Pacific, the final fulfilment of Mouravieff's dream. The pressure of Russia's penetration, and the steady increase of her influence throughout the Amur-Ussuri region, are undeniable and significant facts which, in the opinion of many reliable observers, must sooner or later assert themselves on the Manchurian frontier and end in a renewal of the struggle with Dai Nippon. Others, having regard rather to the political and economic difficulties of the Soviet's government, incline to the belief that, as in 1907-1910, Russia will conclude an offensive and defensive *entente* with Japan, leaving each nation free to consolidate its influence and interests within its own sphere of influence, and that these spheres will be sufficiently wide to keep both nations busily employed for years to come, China being reduced, as before, to the position of a helpless spectator. If history be a safe guide, the prospect of a Russo-Japanese agreement to divide the spoils would appear to be more probable than another war.

On the other hand, America's growing perception of the potential importance of the Far Eastern markets to her future trade, combined with vague fears that Japanese domination over Manchuria, if not checked, might enable her to challenge American supremacy on the Pacific, constitutes a factor in the Far Eastern problem which has acquired steadily increasing significance since 1905. It constitutes, indeed, the ultimate crux of the problem, regarded internationally, inasmuch as it represents an irreconcilable difference of instincts and interests between two powerful nations; a differ-

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ence not only of political ideals and methods, but of vital realities, created by the economic laws which, in the end, determine the destinies of nations. It is a difference of no new or sudden growth; it was forcibly impressed upon the political consciousness of both nations by the building of the Panamá Canal (1914) and still more emphatically by the proceedings of the Washington Conference. As Mr. Frank Simonds pointed out at an early stage of those proceedings, the policy then adopted by the United States involved not only the assertion of a moral guardianship over China, but a course of action definitely committed to limiting Japanese expansion in the only direction which the modern world has left open to it, "a policy which according to every historical precedent, must inevitably lead to war."

Japan's definite declaration concerning her position and policy in Manchuria, considered in conjunction with Mr. Secretary Stimson's definition of America's position on 24th February, reveals the position of the two Powers as an *impasse* not likely to be solved by any formula which Lord Lytton's commission may propound. Given to the world within a few hours of the publication of the Japanese Government's reply to the League's Committee of Twelve, Mr. Stimson's letter to Mr. Borah (Chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee) placed it on record that the situation which had then been created by Japan's military measures in Manchuria and at Shanghai, was one "which could not under any circumstances be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants" of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg pact, and that "if the Treaties had been faithfully observed, such a situation could not have arisen."

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Furthermore, with reference to his earlier note (7th January), in which China and Japan were warned that the United States would "not recognise any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by those governments in violation of treaties," Mr. Stimson expressed the belief that if a similar course were adopted by the other governments of the world,

"a caveat would be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of the rights and titles of which she may have been deprived." Finally, he observed that "no one of the Washington Treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety." . . . "The willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its position at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortification, was predicated upon among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine-Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of an equal opportunity for their Eastern trade, but also against the military aggrandisement of any other Power at the expense of China."

The Japanese position, as laid down in its note addressed to the League of Nations on 23rd February, amounts to an assertion that, as the Nine-Power Treaty was based on assumptions which have been proved to be false, any present-day appeals to its provisions are mere "formalism and theory." An anomalous state of affairs has actually developed in China, they say, during the past ten years, "which cannot but profoundly modify the application to Chinese affairs of the Covenant of the League." They now deny, in effect, the truth of the postulate on which the Nine-Power Treaty

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was based, and which Mr. Stimson reiterates, viz., that "China is engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing Republic," and assert that, on the contrary, the country being ruled by "various rudimentary *nuclei* of organisation," the time has come to deal with it on a footing of facts and reality, the central fact being that "China does not constitute an organised people."

Impartially considered, there can be, I think, no doubt that, as regards the actual state of China, the Japanese position is nearer than the American to the realities, and that the idea of China attempting to develop "the free institutions of a self-governing Republic" could never have been conceived or seriously maintained by any statesman with direct experience of Asia and the Asiatics. The only government that the Chinese people will ever recognise and respect is that of strong central and provincial authorities, possessed of a firmly-established executive. Elected assemblies and democratic institutions are wholly inapplicable, because unintelligible, to the race-mind of Asia.

Moreover, there can be but little doubt that, regarded as a world problem, the preservation of China's integrity and sovereignty is not to be achieved by international pacts: it must depend, in the long run, upon her own efforts and upon the gradual development of a real force of public opinion, which shall demand, not free institutions, but a systematic reform of the executive's administration. Pending the appearance on the scene of a ruler, or groups of rulers, capable of educating (or compelling) the nation to such a conception of patriotism, China's loosely-held dependencies will continue to be absorbed by the inevitable process of

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economic and geographical gravitation which began in the middle of the nineteenth century, although the process itself may occasionally be checked or suspended, by reason of the rivalries and conflicts of the several claimants to reversion of her defenceless estate.

The reader will have observed that, in reviewing the course of events which has led to the present situation in Manchuria, no attempt has been made to question the validity of the assumption underlying Japan's unchanging policy, namely, that the maintenance of her position of economic and strategic ascendancy in that region is a matter of necessity, to be defended at all costs. We have been concerned only with the realities of the case, and there is no denying that the unconcealed policy of Japan's rulers for the past fifty years has been consistently based upon their belief that the nation's security and economic existence would be jeopardised by abandoning that position. The creation of the thinly-disguised Japanese protectorate, functioning as the independent Republican Government of Manchukuo, is the logical and inevitable result of the critical situation created by the aggressive proceedings of the Kuomintang politicians, supported by the misguided activities of the League of Nations. By these, and by the increasing pressure of public opinion in Japan, visibly perturbed by the evidences of widespread economic distress, the process of geographical gravitation has been greatly accelerated and the Government at Tokyo has been impelled to make drastic and immediate a course of action which might otherwise have been one of peaceful penetration.

In spite of the general unanimity which prevails in Japan on this subject, a small but increasing body of

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public opinion now perceives that, even if Dai Nippon has her way in Manchuria, the nation's fundamental problem of overpopulation cannot be permanently or materially affected by any relief which this solution may afford. Indeed, there are Liberal thinkers, such as Yukio Ozaki, who assert (at no little personal risk) that the new programme of expansion on the Asiatic mainland is likely to aggravate, rather than to diminish, the difficulties and dangers of Japan's economic and financial position. They realise that public opinion, diverted from anxious consideration of the parlous plight of the agrarian population, has been led to hope that a forward policy in Manchuria may in some measure relieve it; and, forced by the growing pressure of that opinion, the government has now taken steps from which it could not, if he would, recede. Nevertheless, amongst the 'Old Heads,' the more thoughtful and far seeing elements of Japan's political world, there are some who perceive grave danger in pursuing the policy of self-determination proclaimed by Mr. Kaku Mori and the Military Staff, and who doubt whether Japan can hope to derive from Manchuria benefits to her trade and industries, sufficient to compensate her for the cost of this great adventure. Also they ask whether Japan's paramount interests of foreign trade, and particularly trade with China, are not likely to suffer to an extent which will outweigh all the advantages to be derived from the Manchurian protectorate. For the moment, however, their voices are almost inaudible, and the ardent spirits of the military clans dominate the situation with their slogan of "Back to Asia" and a Japanese Monroe doctrine for the Far East. But, if history is a safe guide, the cautious wisdom of the "Elder States-

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men" is likely to assert itself, in due course, as it has always done in similar crises of the past.

Politics apart, however, the problem of Manchuria, whether we regard it from the Chinese or the Japanese point of view, is essentially subsidiary, symptomatic of chronic conditions which, in each case, though in very different ways, are the result of the tendency of the race to increase more rapidly than the nation's maximum food supply. If, as the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs declares, the time has to come to reckon with realities, the rulers of Dai Nippon must face the reality that an annual increase of a million in the number of mouths to be fed, constitutes a problem which can neither be solved by a policy of expansion on the Asiatic mainland, nor by the scientific development of Manchuria's resources. Large scale emigration to these regions they know to be impracticable; they cannot hope to compete successfully with the Chinese either as traders or agriculturists. Their superior organisation in the field of modern industry may serve for a time to provide raw materials and food supplies for their industrial population and afford some relief for the desperate condition of their peasantry, but in the long run they will find that the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong. Nothing but Exclusion Acts, forcibly applied, can ever stem the tide of China's surplus millions, steadily, silently flowing into the sparsely inhabited regions of Manchuria, Mongolia and eastern Siberia, and whether it be at farming, manual labour, or trade, the Chinese can produce better work, at a lower cost, than the Japanese. Every colony of the Western Powers east of the Indian Ocean bears witness to the truth that, given anything like equal oppor-

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tunity, the wealth of the region becomes theirs; they can outwork and under-live every race on earth. Japan may be justified in regarding the maintenance of her position of economic and strategic advantage in Manchuria as a matter of vital necessity; she may succeed in consolidating her political and administrative control of these undeveloped regions and, as before, arrive at an understanding with Russia in regard to her sphere of expansion; but in the end, the Chinese will inherit the land, and in the meanwhile Japan's fundamental problem of over-population, the root cause of this instinctive urge towards expansion, remains unsolved. Regarded in its true aspect, as a sociological problem, there would seem to be no prospect of its solution, nor any hope of permanent relief from the economic pressure which arises from it, until the collective intelligence of the race has learned (as Mill puts it) "to bring the increase of its population under the deliberate guidance of judicious foresight."

The Japanese are much more likely than the Chinese to learn in the near future to recognise in their high birth-rate the primary cause of their economic disabilities and political discontents, because their race-mind is not so deeply rooted in the past and because their collective intelligence, more highly organised and better educated, loyally accepts 'deliberate guidance' when it speaks with the voice of Imperial authority. On the other hand, the consequences of the pressure of over population are more serious for Japan, and for the peace of the world, than they are for the self-sufficient Chinese, for the reason that it is in the nature of the Chinese to accept their calamities with passive resignation, whereas the Japanese, not being thus con-

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stituted; are impelled to seek relief at the expense of their neighbours—as Manchuria bears witness to-day. But there are evidently limits to the remedial policy of territorial expansion, and if these limits should be reached before the nation has learned to control its birth-rate, the penalties for its lack of judicious foresight are likely to prove cumulative.

CHAPTER XIII

GENEVA AND THE FAR EAST

"The religion of enmity in its unqualified form is as indefensible as the religion of amity in its unqualified form. Each proves itself to be one of those insane extremes out of which there comes a sane mean by union with its opposite."

—*Herbert Spencer. (Study of Sociology.)*

So many of the League's best chickens are now coming home, in grievous plight, to roost, and their cackling is so perturbed, that the nervous apprehension manifested by the guardians of the Geneva *poulailler* is hardly matter for surprise. What with the possibility of Germany's leaving the League, if thwarted in the matter of her demand for equality of armaments, the severe loss of prestige incurred by reason of several defaults in Geneva's guaranteed loans, and now the hydra-headed dilemma, with which they are now confronted in the impending debate on the Lytton Commission Report on Manchuria, the League's most fervent sponsors and faithful servants may well feel anxious; the difficulties and dangers ahead are undeniable. At the same time, were it not for the parlous condition of the whole world's affairs, a philosophic observer might detect a certain element of grim humour in the turn which the human comedy has lately taken at Geneva. If there were place or scope in present-day politics for the comic muse, the spectacle of Mr. de Valera, solemnly lecturing Dai Nippon on the subject of the sanctity of Treaties, might well have added to the gaiety of nations. But the high priests of internationalism are compelled to take themselves very

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seriously; *on pince sans rire dans le Palais des Nations*. Every delegate in the Assembly, every member of the Secretariat, must therefore applaud the Irish President's appearance on the scene as a staunch upholder of Covenants and pacts; all must concur in his belief that "the League's testing time has come" and that "without progressive disarmament [*pace* the I.R.A.], it was almost impossible that the League should survive." Even that consistently optimistic believer in the benefits of pacific internationalism, Mr. Wickham Steed, has lately been led to perceive that "the severest crisis of the League is at hand, and with it, soon or late, the decision of Peace or War"; in his opinion, however, Germany's claim to equality in armaments is of less importance than the Far Eastern conflict and the problem of Manchuria.

It is interesting at this juncture to compare Mr. Steed's proposed solution of the dispute with that suggested by Mr. de Valera. In the Irish President's opinion, "it is the duty of statesmen to face the present desperate situation, not as representatives of States or parties or special interests, but as men who realise that the primary duty of statesmen is to plan for the well-being and happiness of their fellows." Mr. Steed is more disposed to examine the practical bearings of political formulæ, and more familiar with the whisperings of Geneva's *coullisses*. He proposes to deal with the crisis by telling Japan that:

"we (that is, Great Britain) hold to the League and the Kellogg Pact and that we cannot suffer the Lytton Report to be treated as still-born. We shall concert our policy with the United States and France and welcome the support of all other nations that may be of our mind."

Students of history can hardly fail to observe that this

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suggested 'peace policy,' intended as a remedy for Japan's undeniably forceful measures and expansionist policy in Manchuria, coincides in a remarkable manner with the policy of the State Department at Washington, as set forth in recent *pourparlers* by Senator Reed in Paris; moreover, that the procedure which it proposes—namely, united action by England, the United States and France, to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on Japan, independently of the League—is identical in method and purpose with that which was adopted by Germany, Russia and France, when they compelled Japan to abandon the spoils of war in 1895, and incidentally laid the foundations of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is worthy of note that a solution of the Manchurian question on the lines now proposed by Mr. Steed (involving, in effect, a return to the régime of offensive and defensive alliances) was discreetly discussed at Geneva some time before the publication of the Lytton Report; it is therefore not surprising to find that, in the words of *The Times* correspondent at Washington, the American Government should have derived "very real satisfaction" from the findings of the Commission and that, at the beginning of October, the State Department should have felt convinced, that, with the publication of the Report, there was, at last, a reasonable prospect of united action with France and Great Britain, to "block Japanese aggression."

In their zeal to apply the principles of the League Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact to the affairs of Asia, the exponents of international pacifism at Geneva have cheerfully invoked the aid of the United States, but in so doing they have finally demonstrated the helpless insufficiency of the League as an effec-

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tive observer of the world's peace. For it must be obvious that an alliance, organised, on the strength of the Lytton Report, to include the most powerful non-member of the League, for the purpose of applying minatory pressure to Japan, must inevitably produce, as its first result, the withdrawal of Japan from the League. In that event, none of the three great nations chiefly interested in the question of Manchuria being parties to the Covenant, no valid ground could be adduced for Geneva's further intervention in Far Eastern affairs. Those who direct the political activities of the Council of the League would appear to have been curiously lacking in intelligent anticipation, if they failed to foresee that this must be the immediate result of their latest attempt to apply the principles of the Washington Treaties and the Kellogg Pact to the solution of China's problems, in the present condition of that country. They must also be lacking in perception of the basic facts of the situation if at any time since the Washington Conference (where Japan made her position quite clear), they have seriously believed that Japan can possibly be induced to abandon her position of predominance in Manchuria by any argument other than that of superior force; in other words, by the arbitrament of war.

Here let me digress to observe that the group of pacifist Intellectuals, which has recently launched the *New Commonwealth* as the latest organ of internationalism in this country, has recently come to the significant conclusion that "the Sino-Japanese affair has laid bare the inadequacy of existing machinery for the prevention of war;" they are therefore inclined to revert to the ideas which Viscount Grey expressed on this subject at

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the time of the formation of the League in 1918, and to advocate something like the original programme of the League of Nations' Union. Therein, it will be remembered, it was proposed to create a Supreme Court, which, with the aid of an international Police Force, would "maintain international order and thus finally liberate mankind from the curse of war." "I do not see," said Viscount Grey in October, 1918, "why the League of Nations, once formed, should necessarily be idle, why it should not be arranged for an authoritative and international force to be at its disposal, which should act as police in individual countries." Sir Norman Angell, Professor Gilbert Murray and their associates in the *New Commonwealth* are now convinced that "power to restrain a law-breaker, and a system of Courts to which *all* disputes can be taken," are essential features of the new dispensation which they envisage.

"Any diplomatic *démarche*, such as the withdrawing of Ambassadors, even an economic and financial boycott (premised for just such an emergency as the Manchurian case by Article XVI of the Covenant) was admittedly impracticable, in default of agreement in advance to enforce the collective will of the international society, should force be required."

In other words, the present collective system of Treaties and agreements, abjuring war as an instrument of national policy, is now recognised to be inadequate for the purposes which it was intended to serve, for the reason that it possesses no means of applying the collective coercion implicit in the Covenant.

It is not my present purpose to consider the implications and possible results of an organised attempt, by any group of Powers, to apply coercion to Japan in defence of China's "sovereign rights and administrative integrity" in Manchuria. Nor would it serve any useful

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purpose to discuss the nature, size and cost of the international Police Force which the League would have to provide in order to be able to impose its collective will upon any one of the great Powers—the United States, for example, or Russia)—in the by no means inconceivable event of its refusal to accept a decision of the international Supreme Court, in a matter where the national honour might consider itself involved. Neither of these ideas is likely to become practical politics for some time to come. On the other hand, it is increasingly evident that many of the leading spirits of the international school of thought in this country are now disposed to forsake the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg Pact, as regulators and pacifiers of the world's affairs, and to substitute for them a limited League of the kind which the American Committee on Foreign Relations defined (and rejected) in 1918, as a "limited association between the United States and the British Empire for the policing of the world."* As a solution of the peace-preserving problem, this is hardly calculated to arouse much enthusiasm at Geneva; nor is it likely to commend itself to those European statesmen who realise that America's intervention in the Manchurian dispute, as an upholder of the Kellogg Pact, is wholly consistent with America's traditional policy in the region of the Pacific, and protective of purely

* Professor Alfred Zimmern, in an article dealing with the Lytton Report (*News-Letter*, 15th Oct., 1932), adopts a distinctly bellicose tone, in support of this new pacifist solution. After discussing the possibility that Japan may refuse to abandon her 'accomplished fact' in Manchuria, he observes that her position, in that event, would become intolerable and untenable, at Geneva, "and the association of the British Commonwealth and the United States in the Pacific, implicit in the Washington Treaties which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, would become plainly apparent. The English-speaking peoples dislike discussing sanctions. But face to face with a definite emergency, they have a way of discovering that the resources of civilisation are not exhausted."

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American interests; in France, especially, its value must be diminished by the fact that, despite Mr. Stimson's eloquent contention that the Pact has definitely abolished the 'doctrine of neutrality,' President Hoover can still regard Germany's claim to equality in the matter of armaments as a question "of solely European concern."

Leaving these speculations in high politics, let us now consider briefly the principal results of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry and the nature of the situation with which the Council of the League will have to deal when the Japanese Government's reply is presented at Geneva in November. Generally speaking, the Report may be said to have enjoyed a good Press in this country, at Geneva and in the United States, public opinion being naturally disposed to regard discussion of its findings as *sub judice* in matters of detail, and to be concerned rather with the spirit than with the letter of its conclusions. The Commission has undoubtedly performed a difficult and delicate task with ability, courage, and tact; and the result of its findings, all instinct with the spirit of patient conciliation and reasonable compromise, are manifestly intended to provide a solution of the Manchurian problem which, letting bygones be bygones, shall regularise the new autonomy of the Three Provinces, by means of legislative and administrative measures, designed to give Japan the economic and political security she demands, and at the same time to preserve the effective sovereignty of China in that region. The fact that such a solution is utterly impracticable need not deprive the Commission of the credit of having done their best to devise a formula which might invest it with the appearance of practicability. The ten constructive recommendations which follow the

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Commission's general survey of the situation, are all undeniably fair-minded and well-meant, whilst its specific proposal that China and Japan should agree to take part in another 'advisory Conference,' with the assistance of neutral observers, conforms to Geneva's traditional procedure in such emergencies. Critically considered as a whole, however, the Report offers no prospect of a solution of the Manchurian problem, for the reason that, by the very nature of its mandate, it was compelled to overlook certain paramount realities of the quarrel between China and Japan; its proceedings were therefore pervaded by the same atmosphere of unreality which has persistently stultified all the deliberations of the League on Far Eastern affairs. The Commission, deriving its mandate from the League, has been compelled to assume the possibility of applying the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Washington Treaties to China, whereas, under existing conditions (as Count Uchida recently declared), these instruments do not, and cannot, provide a solution of China's differences with other nations. As the Japanese Foreign Minister has pointed out, the realities of the problem are recognised in practice by the Powers chiefly concerned, inasmuch as they are compelled to maintain naval and military forces in China, for the security of their nationals and the protection of their commercial interests. In a speech addressed to the Diet on 24th August, Count Uchida observed that

"it has been the practice of the Powers, demonstrated on innumerable occasions, to repair or prevent injuries to their important rights and interests in China, by direct application of force, without relying upon these instruments of peace."

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This statement is undeniably true and the issue which therefore confronts the League (as the Japanese see it) is whether, the use of force being admittedly necessary under existing conditions, Japan has exercised it in excess of the reasonable requirements of her legitimate position. Broadly speaking, the Commission's Report evades this important aspect of the problem, and the fact that the present condition of China makes it impossible to apply there the peace-preserving machinery of the Kellogg Pact. In this connection, it is only fair to remember, that the unavoidable difficulty of the position in which the Commission found itself, must be regarded as a direct legacy from the unpractical idealism of the Washington agreements, a direct result of the unfounded assumption that a politically disorganised Asiatic State could be admitted, on terms of absolute equality, to participate in the responsibilities and benefits of the international pacts designed by the Powers as safeguards for the peace of a civilised world.

Conforming to this idealism, the Report of the Lytton Commission submits a number of theoretically admirable recommendations which, in practice, become mere counsels of perfection, by reason of their insistence upon observance of the basic principles of the Washington Pacts. When for example, it suggests that commercial relations between China and Japan can be placed upon an equitable basis by a new Commercial Treaty, or that the results of the proposed 'advisory Conference' should hereafter be embodied in "a declaration by the Government of China constituting a special régime for the three Eastern Provinces, to be followed by a Treaty of conciliation, arbitration, non-aggression and mutual assistance," it simply ignores the funda-

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mental truth that there does not exist in China any government, nor any immediate prospect of a government, capable of fulfilling its obligations under any such Treaties. True, the Commission recommends "temporary international co-operation in internal reconstruction," as a remedy for "the present political instability of China," but it fails to recognise the dominant fact that, pending the necessarily long process of this reconstruction, China cannot be regarded as an organised State, within the meaning of the Covenant of the League; nor does it realise that the measures taken by Japan to defend her interests in Manchuria and at Shanghai, have been to a considerable extent a direct result of the Kuomintang's belief that, under the protection of the Washington Pacts, it could maintain a policy of hostile and provocative acts without fear of retaliation.

Again, in suggesting that internal order in Manchuria should be secured by means of a local *gendarmerie*, which should be the only armed force within the territory, the Commission doubtless intended to propose a reasonable form of compromise, whereby Japan's economic interests might be preserved without undue loss of 'face' to China. But when they went on to advise that "two foreigners of different nationalities should be appointed under the League, to have supervision of the constabulary and fiscal administration," they ignored the crucial fact that Japan has repeatedly declared her unwillingness to accept any such solution and that, in the present temper of the nation, any attempt to insist upon its application can only lead to hostilities.

The appointment of the Lytton Commission was essentially a time-saving device, adopted by the League

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as a possible means of escape from an embarrassing situation, which was largely the result of its own ignorance of, or indifference to, the actual condition of China. The problem with which the Commission was confronted, involved not only the restoration of "the good understanding upon which peace depends between China and Japan," but the continued validity of the Covenant and its peace-making machinery. Charged with the duty of "reporting to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan," the Commission was handicapped from the outset in the performance of that duty, by the knowledge that any solution which it might propose, must conform to the principles of the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty. It was therefore compelled to continue to regard China as an organised State, capable of fulfilling her obligations under these pacts. At the same time, Lord Lytton and his colleagues were well aware, that the League's endeavours to preserve the world's confidence in the efficacy of the Covenant in the Far East, depend *au fond* upon the undetermined policies of the two nations—the United States and Russia—which are not parties to the Covenant. Its findings were therefore necessarily expressed in resolutions that are ultimately dependent for their validity upon forces and influences beyond the control of the League. From all of which it may fairly be concluded, that the League would have been better advised had it refrained from intervening in the affairs of the Far East and allowed the solution of the Manchurian problem to be undertaken by the Powers signatory to the Kellogg Pact and the Washington Treaties. *Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*

CHAPTER XIV

IS THERE A RED PERIL IN CHINA?

EVER since Sun Yat-sen, that restless dreamer in quest of power, called in the help of Soviet Russia in 1924 to enable him to overthrow the northern warlords, a great deal has been written and spoken concerning the alleged growth of Communism in China and the possibility of the Republic framing its political and social institutions on the Muscovite model. Even the Japanese, who from their long and intimate experience of things Chinese, understand their nature better than most other nations, have lately begun to show signs of apprehension at the growth and increasingly efficient organisation of the "Red" armies, which have imposed their authority in various districts of southern and Central China, and set up the frame-work of a Soviet form of government in Kiangsi and Fukien. Whether this apprehension be genuine or assumed, is hard to say, but it certainly figures with increasing frequency in the Japanese Press. A pamphlet recently published, under official auspices at Tokyo, takes the matter very seriously. It describes the origins of the Chinese Communist party, the relations between it and the Russian Government, the extending area of the "Red" armies' activities, and the effect of their Soviet methods of administration upon the masses of the population. The writers of this pamphlet consider it unlikely that the present government of China can ever become strong enough to make an end of these Red armies and that,

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should they increase and extend sufficiently to establish direct geographical contact with the Russian forces on the borders of Siberia, outer Mongolia or Turkestan, the sovietisation of all China is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility. They profess to regard with anxiety the possible combination of a Red China disposing of 400 million inhabitants and vast resources, with Soviet Russia, controlling a sixth of the earth's surface, and they see in it a real menace—a Red Peril—to the rest of the world, and especially to the security of Japan.

Amongst the facts and figures set forth in this pamphlet there appears a report, issued by the Chinese Communist party, which puts the total strength of the Red armies in April, 1930, at 79,000 men, of whom 50,000 were armed with rifles. Since then, as the result of the failure of Chiang Kai-shek's three punitive campaigns in 1931, and of desertions *en masse* from Government forces to the Red armies, the numbers of the insurgents would seem to have considerably increased, and their spheres of influence expanded. In January, 1932, according to Chinese Press reports, their predatory activities extended over large areas in seven provinces. On the South Honan border their forces, sometimes described as Communist and sometimes as bandits, amounted to 40,000 men. In Hupeh, according to the same reports, the number of people killed in 'Communist' raids since 1930 amounted to 164,000; nearly a million more had abandoned their homes and 78,000 were being held to ransom. Except in a few settled "Soviet areas" in Kuangtung, Kiangsi and Fukien, these Red armies have no definitely fixed territories under their control; they consist of mobile forces,

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with headquarters and places of retreat usually located in the mountains. So soon as the Government forces have been driven out of any important district, the Communist political party, consisting largely of Russian and Chinese agents of the Comintern, sends its representatives to organise a political department for the Red army concerned, and so to direct its raids, that they may serve the purposes of Communist propaganda and lay the foundations of their administrative organisation. Thus the proceedings of these armies, in the territories and cities which they occupy, are frequently of a nature to give them a status superior to that of ordinary bandits; under the influence of their political department, unmistakably inspired, if not directed, from Moscow, they reveal constructive, as well as destructive, activities. A locality having been occupied in force, the propaganda agents proceed, by means of Communist slogans and mass meetings, to enlist the sympathies of the poorer sections of the peasantry and workers, by confiscating and redistributing all the property of the wealthier class, by proclaiming reductions in the price of food, by promising to abolish taxes, by organising trade unions, etc., etc. They loot and destroy banks, public offices and foreign establishments, but leaving the poorest classes of the community undisturbed and encouraged to hope for relief from Kuomintang oppression, they succeed, for a time at least, in gaining the sympathy of the "have nots" in support of this 'Communitic' programme and in opposition to the established government. During the past year, the agents of the Comintern, Russian and Chinese, have greatly added to their influence, not only with the 'stupid people,' but with the student class and

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the younger politicians, by denouncing Nanking's failure to prevent Japanese encroachment upon China's sovereign rights in Manchuria. Thus the impression has been created, and widely disseminated, that the Chinese people are turning to Russia for political guidance and relief from misrule and that the prospect of a Soviet Republic for all China is something with which the world must reckon as seriously as with Moscow's 'Five Years plan.'

This impression, as I propose to show, is erroneous. It is partly due to the calculated policy and cumulative effect of Kuomintang propaganda (to the furtherance of which the League of Nations has more or less unconsciously lent itself) and partly to the fact that the Press in England and America persistently ignores the immutable nature of Chinese politics and the deep-rooted forces which determine their tendencies. But before proceeding to examine the nature and record of the 'Communism' produced in China since Sun Yat-sen first allied himself with Bolshevik agents in 1924, I propose to refer to an authority who, writing at a time of chaotic misrule very similar to the present, explained very clearly the symptoms which invariably mark the beginning and growth of rebellion in China against authority, when ineffectively or tyrannously exercised. The writer in question was Thomas Taylor Meadows, a member of H.M. Consular Service, who, in addition to being a scholar and a student of history, was something of a social scientist. His book, *The Chinese and their Rebellions*, interprets the conditions of China as he saw them at a critical stage of the Taiping Rebellion (1856). The following somewhat lengthy extracts are quoted for two reasons. First, because the genesis and

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objects of the 'Red' forces, which at present control certain districts in Southern and Central China, are in all essentials precisely the same as those of the Taiping armies, their parade of 'Communism' possessing no more real significance than the Christianity professed by the Taiping leaders. Secondly, in order to remind and convince the reader of the important truth that—no matter what the political professions of its rulers—the life of the Chinese people follows certain definite lines, imperatively determined by the structure of its society. The catastrophic consequences of any visible weakening or collapse of the Central authority are therefore the same to-day, and will be the same to-morrow, as they have been since China's civilisation became static, two thousand years ago.

In the chapter from which the following passage is taken, Mr. Meadows describes the methods of passive resistance commonly used by the Chinese people in resisting and checking oppressive measures of misrule, and observes that the ultimate efficiency of these methods depends on the existence of an authority superior to that of the oppressors, *i.e.*, the Throne, whose punishments eventually fall on all parties. Meadows, at that date, could not envisage the possibility of China attempting to exist without the Throne as the rallying point and centre of the Confucian system, nor could he foresee that the western world would set itself, as a matter of deliberate policy, to uproot and destroy the foundations upon which China's unity and stability have been so successfully based throughout the ages. Assuming the continued existence of the Throne, he therefore proceeds:

"But when the superior authority itself, or its agents, com-

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mits tyrannies, there remains nothing but a resort to force. Even these appeals to force, however, are at first not rebellious movements, but merely local insurrections, having for their ultimate object the death of certain tyrannical mandarins. Some few men literally sacrifice their lives for the good of the community; they lead a rising against the oppressors. . . . There is neither hope nor thought of overturning the dynasty in these risings; they are in the best of times not infrequent in China. But when the necessity for them becomes very frequent, the people are naturally led to think of resistance by force, unaccompanied by the self-sacrifice of nobler-minded individuals. In that case, these same men, the very people who are most likely to be the very first in incurring oppression by being most prompt to refuse compliance with tyrannical demands, instead of organising and leading some such local insurrection as has just been described, take vengeance as far as they can with their own hands, and then become outlaws—bandits or pirates—having more or less of the sympathy of the public, upon whom they from the first levy blackmail, rather than plunder of all their property, as mere robbers would. This is one way in which prolonged resistance to the general Government takes place.

“Another way is as follows: a man, originally a mere thief, burglar or highwayman, whose sole object was the indiscriminate plunder of all who were unable to guard against him, finds it possible, in the state of general apathy to public order produced by continued oppression, to connect himself with a few fellow thieves, etc., and at their head to evade all efforts of the local authorities to put him down. As the band increases, he openly defies these authorities, pillages the local custom houses and treasuries, levies a tax on passing merchandise and a blackmail from the wealthier residents, but refrains from plundering anyone outright; and while, by exempting the great bulk of the population from all exactions, he prevents the rise of a general ill-feeling towards him, he, as the scourge of the oppressors, gains the latent or conscious sympathy of all classes. Now, these captains of bandits, whatever their origin, do not, it is true, while their followers amount to a few hundreds, choose to make themselves ridiculous or to rouse the general Government to more serious efforts against them, by issuing dynastic manifestos or assuming the state of royalty. But when they begin to count their followers by thousands, forming a regularly governed force, they declare openly against the hitherto reigning sovereign, whom they denounce as a usurper, and from the very first, when merely at the head of a small band, no

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Chinese acquainted with the history of his country can refuse to see in such a man a possible, if not probable, founder of a dynasty.

"The misconception that exists among foreigners in China on this subject, and the consequent differences of opinion as to whether the various bodies now in arms against the government are rebels, or mere robbers and pirates, forms another example of the thralldom in which language holds us, and of the confusion and mischief that may arise from mistaking the meaning of a single word. The word in this case is tsih, applied by the Chinese to the bodies of men just alluded to. The real meaning of this word is very comprehensive, signifying all persons who set the authorities at defiance by acquisitive acts of violence, and as the object which it is sought to acquire may be a bag of money or may be the Empire, it follows that this one word is, in fact, equivalent to the three words, robber, bandit and rebel, but its primary meaning is to rebel, rebel and rebellion.*

"From the above, the reader will be able to see how it is that most foreigners in China have fallen into the error of ridiculing the Chinese authorities for inducing large bodies of men to lay down their arms by bestowing on their leaders and older adherents military and naval commissions and by dismissing the rest with a little money; for their own history and their own codified legislation of 2,000 years' standing, makes it impossible for the Chinese authorities to see in the tsih anything but what they really are—political opponents."

Needless to say that, from the point of view of the law-abiding and defenceless masses, the Red armies of to-day are only distinguished from other *tsih* by reason of their superior numbers and organisation; also that, by virtue of these and of immemorial tradition, they are regarded as the political opponents of the existing government and claimants *in posse* to the reversion of its authority. Needless also to say that the leaders who attract large bodies of malcontents and succeed in organising them into disciplined forces are men of exceptional intelligence and initiative, quite as capable as their opponents of perceiving the advantage of a

* In the mandarin dialect pronounced *tsei*.

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policy of expediency and of giving to their movement a complexion calculated to gain for it the effective support of any important foreign Power. In the eyes of the Chinese, expediency of this kind is wholly in accordance with the traditions of Celestial statecraft—means to an end—to be discarded whensoever its purpose has been served. The Bolshevik doctrines and institutions proclaimed by the leaders of the Red armies in Kiangsi and elsewhere are therefore to be considered simply as moves in the political game, no more to be regarded as evidence of genuine political convictions and affinities than the conversion of Chiang K'ai-shek to Russian Communism in 1926, or the professed Christianity of Sun Yat-sen and Feng Yu-hsiang. It is safe to assert that any *generalissimo* of Red armies who should succeed in overthrowing the Kuomintang Government and replacing it by one of his own making, would purge it of all Soviet influences as speedily as Chiang K'ai-shek himself did, so soon as he found himself strong enough to stand on his own feet.

By manifesting the outward and visible signs of Bolshevism, the leaders of the Red armies have undoubtedly achieved a measure of importance abroad and prestige at home, which justifies their political acumen; at the same time, following the example of the Cantonese Kuomintang, they have obtained sinews and munitions of war from Moscow. But in all other respects, their proceedings conform faithfully to the type prescribed by tradition for insurgents against a weak or unpopular government. They seek the good will of the 'stupid people' and the good money of the equally stupid 'outer barbarians.' With the latter, when available, they suborn the forces of the government.

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They establish their own Customs stations on the high-ways of trade and levy taxes on a scale slightly lower than that of the government collectors, whom they dispossess. Thus in Kiangsi, early this year, the Red forces were increased by the defection of more than 20,000 men belonging to General Sun Lien-chun's 26th Army Corps, whose pay was six months in arrears. Large sums of money were paid on this occasion by the rebel leaders and the army thus purchased, with a propaganda department, run by Chinese students educated at Moscow, was despatched in the service of its new employers to the Kuangtung border. At about the same time, one of the Kuomintang generals, named Yüeh Wei-chun, was captured by the Reds in South Honan. Taken to the headquarters of the 'Soviet' Government, he was treated as an honoured guest (the rules of the rebel game, as played by the Chinese, conforming faithfully to Confucian principles), but compelled to address mass meetings on the evils of Kuomintang 'militarism.' Finally, the leaders of the 'Socialist Soviet Republic of China,' like Chiang K'ai-shek in 1927, are already busy with counter-revolutionists in their own ranks; with an eye to the future and the spoils of office, they are consolidating their political position by eliminating doubtful elements of the 'petty bourgeoisie' and other opportunist place-seekers. For the rest, they combine these diplomatic and political amenities with highly organised propaganda, and with ruthless terrorism applied to irreconcilable opponents and to treachery in their own ranks. Their assassination branch, under the direction of experienced international agents working in Shanghai, and lavishly supplied with funds, has applied the methods of the Cheka with more than

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Russian ruthlessness, and frightful atrocities have been perpetrated by individual leaders upon landowners and merchants—notably around Swatow. Nevertheless, in spite of the Russian affinities and unpleasant activities of Red leaders, and notwithstanding that the growth of ‘Communism’ is viewed with grave concern, by authorities as notable as *The Times* correspondents in China or the Chairman of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the truth is that (as at the time when Meadows wrote) public opinion has been misled with regard to the fundamental causes and objectives of the “Red” movement, which is actually a normal and natural result of the absence of effective authority in China.

The movement itself, the forces behind it, and the phenomena which it produces, represent, in fact, ideas and objectives wholly different from those commonly implied by the word Communism; in no part of China does there exist a force of opinion capable of creating the type of social organisation produced in Europe by the economic doctrines of Karl Marx or the political principles of Lenin. The Socialist ideas propounded in Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Three Principles’ were, like his conversion to Christianity, an imported *‘article d’occasion,’* an opportunist faith, unmistakably influenced by his personal ambitions and necessities; since his death, his formulae for the modernisation of China have been invoked by the Kuomintang for tactical purposes, but they have never appealed to the Chinese mind as rational, nor visibly affected its political thoughts. The principles which determine the workings of a revolutionary or rebellious movement remain unchanged. Behind them lie the two paramount instincts of Chinese social life, i.e., the desire for posterity and that of family enrich-

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ment at the expense of other families. The two Chinese characters usually displayed on the banners of the 'Red' armies mean, in plain English, 'Divide Property,' an economic doctrine which has appealed to landless and lawless members of every community from time immemorial; but the idea of a division of property for the benefit of the community, and not of the individual, is one which could never enter the Chinese mind. Every Chinese of the 'have-nots' Class, every desperate victim of the present anarchy, is a 'Communist,' in the sense that he is ready to support any faction which promises him a chance of transferring other people's property to himself, and the landless survivors of civil war, flood and famine are naturally disposed to support a "Revolution for the protection of land." But their conception of Communistic principles begins and ends with the individual and the family. In this sense there have always been Communists, and to spare, in China.

The organisations of Labour Unions and other manifestations of political consciousness, attributed by the Soviet's agents to the Chinese proletariat, are explicable, like the Communist manifestos issued by Chiang K'ai-shek at the instance of Comrade Borodin in 1926, as temporary expedients; they result from the willingness of the politicians and war-lords concerned to allow those who pay the piper to call these unimportant tunes. The sums of money disbursed by Moscow's agents at Canton from 1923 to 1926, would have secured followers, in large numbers, for any and every creed or campaign. When, moreover, it was instilled into the minds of peasants and other manual labourers, that the Bolshevik gospel meant more money for less work, and that refusal to accept it would involve grave personal

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risks, the popularity of 'Communism' increased by leaps and bounds. But the growth of the movement displays at every stage the unbroken continuity of purely Chinese traditions.

The "Red Peril" is real enough in China to-day, and it will continue to make life a burden and a terror to millions, until, in Heaven's good time, benevolent despotism in the hands of a strong ruler shall have restored China's ancient ways of stability. But the 'Red Peril' with which the Kuomintang propagandists would make our flesh creep, the vision of China's 400 millions organised to Communism for Russia's purposes of world-revolution, may be dismissed as impossible, for the reason that the intensely conservative race-mind of the Chinese has always been impervious to political principles undreamt of in its own philosophy, and that it would need centuries to modify this race-mind to acceptance of the social philosophy which Bolshevism represents.

CHAPTER XV

A SURVEY OF REALITIES

“We should treat China with the forbearance, consideration and respect due to a Power Sovereign in its political aspect, but possessing an organisation incompatible with absolute equality.”—(*J. Ross Browne, American Minister to China, July 1869.*)

IN the chapter dealing with the genesis and results of the Washington Conference, it was observed that the resolutions and agreements recorded on that occasion by the Nine-Treaty Powers, amounted to a general acceptance of the visionary idea that a nation, unfitted by its character and circumstances for representative government, may rapidly become equipped with the qualities and political machinery requisite for the successful working of democratic institutions. To the powerful influence of this idea and of others, equally delusive, arising out of it, historians will assuredly ascribe the accelerated process of disintegration which has taken place in China during the past ten years. At the time of the Conference, the vision of an enlightened and prosperous China rapidly emerging from mediæval conditions, as the result of her people's enthusiastic adoption of American ideals and democratic institutions, was generally prevalent throughout the United States; in it were curiously blended the nation's natural pride in America's recognised leadership, vaguely benevolent sentiments, and an amazing ignorance of Far Eastern affairs, displayed even by the leaders of public opinion.

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Thus, for example, Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, representing the Morgan interest in the International Consortium, publicly defined America's new policy towards China, some time before the Conference, in the following words:

"China herself has, in the five years of the war, undergone great changes. Outwardly, to be sure, she bears an appearance of disorganisation, but underneath there flows a new and powerful current of nationality, a spirit fostered by the great and influential student bodies, by many earnest Intellectuals, former pupils of American missionaries, who are now giving their lives to develop China from a people into a nation, so that the Powers recognised that it was no longer a slumbering giant with which they had to deal, but one waking into a national self-consciousness."

So strong was the current of this opinion at that time that any attempt to draw attention to facts which might cast doubts on its wisdom, was foredoomed to failure. Washington's political circles were greatly impressed, as I had occasion to observe, shortly before the Conference, by the presence in their midst of a young Chinese lady doctor, who regaled them with "perfectly thrilling" descriptions of the wonderful progress of the Chinese Republic; it was generally waste of time to point out that the real and immediate problem of China lay in the predatory methods of self-determination adopted by the rival political factions and warring Tuchuns, or to suggest that amidst the treasons, stratagems and spoils of their unceasing civil wars, there had never yet emerged any party or individual leader associated with any definite principle or constructive policy. American official opinion was irretrievably committed to an endeavour to gain the confidence and friendship of the Chinese by "liberality in policy and

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generosity in action." There was therefore no hope, pending wiser counsels, of that united international intervention which alone could arrest the process of disintegration, actually much more rapid in 1921 than it had been in 1911. In its zeal for "generous action," the State Department was disposed to overlook the real crux of the Far Eastern problem—(of which many were well aware)—to disregard the fact that the invincible money-lust of the men in power constituted a permanent cause of China's national weakness, and an insuperable obstacle to the creation of that "stable and effective government" for which the Conference undertook to provide "the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity."

As one crying in the wilderness, I expressed at Washington the opinion that there could be no hope of permanent improvement in the condition of China, unless steps could be taken for the restoration of law and order by concerted action of the friendly Powers, and for an imposed introduction of those financial and administrative measures, which would make an effective government possible. I predicted that the Conference, by proclaiming its belief in the policy of benevolent non-interference, could only accelerate the process of disintegration and add to the grievous burden of affliction already borne by the Chinese people. Few will deny that this prediction has been amply fulfilled.

In thus adopting a policy which substituted an experimental theory for the practical experience of a century, the Governments of the United States and Great Britain were both to blame, but there was more excuse for America than for ourselves. For we, as an Asiatic Power, have sinned against the light, whilst

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America has had little experience to teach her. Utterly misguided though it be, there is nothing really surprising in the American attitude, for, when all is said and done, the State Department represents the mass-mind of an electorate which knows and cares very little about foreign affairs and derives most of its ideas of modern China from observance of the only Chinese type which come within its ken, the artificial product of Western education. True, the inhabitants of the Pacific slope have some working knowledge of things Asiatic, but the mentality which ultimately determines the actions and utterances of the American Government, is that which flourishes in the 'Bible Belt' of the Great Mississippi plain, a mentality compounded of Puritanism and hustle, of simple benevolence and invincible prejudices. There is nothing remarkable in the fact that this determinant body of public opinion should accept the sentimentalists' interpretation of Young China's fervid gestures, and regard them as evidence of a new and politically conscious patriotism. In a democracy, as de Tocqueville says, there is no time for meditation, and many of the Bible Belt's ideas on political economy still emanate from an undigested Pentateuch.

But we, whose forbears builded up the Raj and gave the Pax Britannica to Ind, cannot plead ignorance as an excuse for the things which we have left undone in China since the Washington Conference. We should know, for we have paid heavily to learn, that it is futile to attempt to conciliate the greed or the anger of the Oriental. We should know that the masses in China, as in India, are wholly unfitted for representative government, and that therefore, as the greatest of our political economists has said, whenever the constituted

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authority is suddenly overthrown, "the class of political adventurers which contrives to obtain control of the machinery of government, will use it solely as a means of advancing its own fortunes." Knowing these things, we have nevertheless chosen, or been compelled by force of circumstances, to follow America's lead down the path of sentimental delusions, and despite the ten years of humiliating experience, we have continued to stumble aimlessly down this path. Even when, in 1925, the Cantonese Government made common cause with Bolshevism, in undisguised hostility to Great Britain, we persisted in turning the other cheek to the smiter, with the inevitable result that the spoliation of British traders and murderous assaults upon British subjects soon came to be regarded as regrettable, but normal, incidents. If, after the unprovoked attack on the British Concession at Shameen in June, 1925, the China squadron had been permitted to destroy the Pearl River forts and the Whampoa Military Headquarters, the Cantonese would speedily have seen the error of their ways and (as we subsequently learned) their Soviet instructors would have abandoned the field and retired, with loss of 'face,' to the great advantage of China's best interests, and our own. But British policy, left by successive Secretaries of State to the direction of the Foreign Office, clung to its faith in patient conciliation and professed to see glimmerings of the long-deferred dawn even in the 'enlightened despotism' of the Kuomintang. After the surrender, in January, 1927, of the British Concession at Hankow to a hostile mob, *The Times* correspondent, describing that irreparable blunder, observed that every sign of a conciliatory disposition on our part immediately provoked renewed

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aggression, whereas a show of firmness produced much better results. A hundred years before, Lord Napier, invoking all the East India Company's experience of the Cantonese, observed that "*in every instance*, nothing but humiliation and failure had ever followed attempts to obtain any just and reasonable demand by a show of moderation; while vigour and determination had as invariably led to better results." Nevertheless, the official attitude, maintained from one administration to another, continued to express optimistic belief in the good-will and good intentions of the Kuomintang leaders, Sir Austen Chamberlain's policy in particular, as I have already shown, being very similar in its inspiration to that recommended by the 'Hands off China' friends of Bolshevism in the Labour Party. The natural result, clearly foreseen by the men on the spot, was to encourage the baser sort of Chinese politician, the professional loot-hungry agitators, in a valour of ignorance unlimited in its pretensions, and to render the position of British subjects almost as precarious and undignified as it was at Canton before the war of 1842.

One of the few concessions to realism recorded in the records of the Washington Conference, lay in the recognition by the Powers of the fact that there could be no hope of a stable and effective government so long as China's provincial chieftains continued to maintain their vast rabble armies. But the resolution adopted by the Nine-Treaty Powers, which urged upon China the necessity for a drastic reduction of these armed forces, was essentially a pious resolution, unaccompanied by any indication of a desire to make its fulfilment a test case of the Kuomintang's professed ability to set China's house in order. It was received by the Chinese dele-

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gates, Mr. Alfred Sze and Mr. Wellington Koo, in the academic spirit in which it was offered. They were not slow to perceive that in denouncing the wicked 'militarism' of the recalcitrant Tuchuns of the Northern and Central Provinces, while at the same time appealing for protection against the 'militarism' of Japan, they were likely to kill two valuable birds with one stone. The disbandment of China's rabble armies they cheerfully took for granted and professed their determination, having abolished them, to establish, with America's benevolent assistance, a government on Wilsonian principles, one in which "right will reign, reason will rule, justice will prevail and happiness will be the pursuit of life." But as these vast hordes, perpetually engaged in plundering the defenceless peasantry, still constitute a major cause of China's disorder and distress, it is pertinent to consider what has actually been said and done in the matter of their disbandment since 1922.

When the Washington Conference met and the Chinese delegates claimed to speak in the name of a united China, civil war was actually being waged, not only between North and South, but between East and West; five super-Tuchuns and seventeen lesser satraps had then their armed forces in the field. None of these forces were seriously engaged in any regular campaign for the assertion of definite political principles; their strife was simply the same old struggle, which has always taken place, after the overthrow of constituted authority, for power and pelf. Prior to the Conference, the four-Power financial Consortium had made the disbandment of these armies, under foreign supervision, an essential condition of new loans. At an abortive

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Peace Conference held at Shanghai in 1919, a scheme had been submitted by an ex-Minister of the Interior, for a reduction by half of the existing number of troops (which he estimated at 1,300,000) at a cost of 200 million dollars, this money to be borrowed abroad. Incidentally, he referred to the "Reorganisation" loan of 1913, as the result of which some thirty army corps were alleged to have been disbanded at a cost of a million dollars each. The new scheme of 1919, served merely to bring to light the fact that the Chinese authorities were only too ready to borrow money for disbandment schemes, but that they were unanimously opposed to the effective supervision and audit of loan funds expenditure; without such supervision, however, it was evident that the scheme could only mean new opportunities for mandarin "squeeze." It was evident, long before the beginning of the Cantonese campaign against the North, that no disbandment scheme financed with foreign capital could possibly do any good, unless it were accompanied by definite stipulations and united action, in the matter of supervision, by the Powers; but as every suggestion of such supervision was denounced by all Chinese officialdom as an intolerable encroachment upon the nation's sovereign rights, the remedy could not be applied by the Powers pledged to non-interference. So the rabble armies grew and multiplied and the evil plight of the people grew steadily worse.

The Cantonese forces, aided by Moscow, having defeated their Northern rivals, taken Peking, and transferred the capital to Nanking, the unification of China under the Kuomintang Government was proudly proclaimed to the world as an accomplished fact. Following the capture of Peking (June, 1928) the Minister of

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Finance of the New Government, Mr. T. V. Soong—(an able administrator who has always recognised the advisability of maintaining what remains of China's credit abroad)—presided over an economic Conference at Shanghai at which the question of disbandment was discussed. It was there decided to organise a National Commission, with a view to reducing the total number of armed forces from their estimated total of 2,100,000 to a maximum of 715,000, employment to be found for the disbanded men in various ways, and the cost to be defrayed by a domestic loan. At the first official disbandment conference, held at Nanking a month later, Chiang K'ai-shek, as President of the State Council, proposed certain drastic reductions of regional forces, but as all the other military commanders made no concealment of their suspicion that this was simply a move intended to increase his personal power, nothing came of it. At the end of the year, sixteen Chinese business organisations at Shanghai, headed by the General Chamber of Commerce, addressed an urgent memorial to the Government, urging the immediate disbandment of superfluous troops and the framing of a national budget. The memorial recalled the fact that resolutions to the same effect, adopted by the Economic Conference in June, had been fully endorsed by Chiang K'ai-shek as Commander-in-Chief and by the commanders of all the group armies.

“During the past few months, though there has been much talk of military reorganisation, no actual disbandment has taken place, various national and provincial revenues continue to be detained and no national Budget has been promulgated. Our debts have mounted higher and higher, taxes have become heavier and heavier, and still the Treasury remains empty.”

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As the Shanghai correspondent of *The Times* observed,* the Memorial was an indication of the business community's increasing restiveness under the prevailing wastefulness and inefficiency of the Nanking executive; it was subsequently reinforced by a resolution of the native bankers to refuse all further financial assistance to the Government until some proof of good intentions had been given.

Accordingly another Disbandment Conference took place at Nanking on January 1st, 1929, at which all the high commanders were present. Its proceedings, conducted with impressive secrecy, finally produced a scheme for disarmament which, when published on January 17th, was received with general satisfaction as the first definite indication of remedial measures. Detailed plans were drawn up, with the approval of the war-lords concerned, for the abolition of all the independent commands of the regional forces, these forces to be placed under a central Disbandment Commission, operating under the direction of Nanking. The idea of the scheme was to reduce the army to a strength of 65 divisions, estimated to cost 192 million dollars a year. All arsenals were to be placed under the control of the Central Government and the manufacture of arms and ammunition stopped forthwith. Commenting optimistically on this programme, *The Times* correspondent at Shanghai observed that the cost of financing the proposed vast undertaking of public works for the employment of disbanded troops presented an obvious difficulty, but thought that "the obstacle might be surmounted, if the principal generals really mean what they say."

Even had the 'dominant morality' of the men in

* December 16th, 1928.

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power not asserted itself, as it promptly did, the disbandment plan was manifestly impracticable, without concerted measures of assistance and financial reorganisation from the foreign Powers. To turn loose hundreds of thousands of soldiers in a land already impoverished by banditry, flood and famine, could only mean adding to the number of lawless and desperate men. The scheme, however, began and ended as a splendid gesture, primarily intended to impress public opinion abroad. The only result of the Conference was to emphasise the fact that Chiang K'ai-shek's rise to power had excited keen jealousy and suspicion amongst many of the other commanders and even in the ranks of his own following. Within a month after the adjournment of the Conference, the Commander-in-Chief and nearly all the regional commanders were busy recruiting new levies and buying new armaments. Another series of desultory and abortive campaigns followed between Nanking and the recalcitrant war-lords, most of whom were gradually persuaded to a semblance of amity by promises of liberal subsidies from the Central Government's exchequer. The last of these wars, in 1930, was brought to a sudden conclusion by the intervention, on the side of Nanking, of the Manchurian forces under Chang Hsüeh-liang. But all these wars and rumours of war mean money; within the past ten years, the Nanking authorities have therefore raised two domestic 'Disbandment' loans, amounting to a total of 100 million dollars. In the summer of 1930, the total number of men under arms, not including bandits and Communist armies, was estimated at 2,500,000, and their annual cost to the nation about 900 million dollars, or twice the amount of Nanking's

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visible revenues. Since a rigorous censorship has been imposed on the native Press, public opinion is debarred from expressing its views on this subject, but there is evidence to show that the nation has ceased to cherish any lingering hopes of a sincere attempt on the part of its rulers to diminish the evils which they suffer at the hands of these vast hordes of plunderers under arms. If public opinion could find expression, if the bitter cry of the oppressed people could reach the outside world, it would undoubtedly be found ready to welcome any and every measure of intervention by the Powers which would give them protection from robbery under arms and security in their daily lives.

Writing in the spring of 1930, Hallett Abend, correspondent of the *New York Times*, a thoroughly competent critic, pointed out that as yet none of these huge armies had given any indication of being imbued with a genuine nationalistic spirit. All are entirely mercenary in their composition, fighting without question on any side their leaders happen to support, and the leaders changing their allegiance with bewildering suddenness and frequency. Most of the armies are chronically in arrears for their pay—in other words, they are bandit armies, and openly used as such. “A Chinese general,” he observes, “who captures a city and demands from the citizens a lump sum of money within a given time, under threat of turning his 50,000 men loose to loot if his demands are not met, is just as much a bandit as is a gunman in Chicago. . . . In China, a Continental area is being terrorised and bled white by these super-gunmen, and there is no power nor authority that can check their depredations.”

Proscribed by the Nanking Government for his out-

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spoken statement of the situation, Mr. Abend was compelled to leave China. In the higher circles of American political idealism his book, *Tortured China*, was generally regarded as a manifestation of the die-hard's incorrigible lack of vision.

Much more comforting to them were the utterances of the Nanking Government's delegate to the Preparatory Commission for the Geneva Disarmament Conference, who solemnly announced that "his Government's practical work in the field of disarmament will certainly have the technical value of statements by governments; it may also have considerable moral effect: his Government was following with sympathy the schemes for the federal organisation of States, which economic conditions and conflicting interests are impelling to fratricidal strife." Finally, he drew a picture of present-day China, which for cynical audacity has rarely been equalled.

"China," he declared, "is a true democracy; it is consequently peaceful. It has its declaration of the Rights of Man, the Three Principles of the People. It knows how to fight against war by practising justice. It must succour the weak and help the fallen. After many years of internal strife, my country has quite recently achieved national unity and political stability."

But in spite of lavish window-dressing of this kind and the benevolent optimism extended to Kuomintang propaganda at Geneva and elsewhere, there are now indications in England and in America of an increasing disposition to recognise the realities of China's pitiful condition. One hears but little to-day in the English Press of the 'patriotic aspirations' of the Cantonese faction. *The Times*, for example, whose faith in the good intentions of the Southern Nationalists during the

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stormy days of 1927-28, was almost as robust as that of any American University, has recently had occasion to publish reports from its correspondents in China, which amply vindicate the accuracy of Mr. Abend's presentation of the facts. Thus its 'correspondent in China,' well-known throughout the East as a trustworthy and ever-friendly observer, summed up the facts of the situation, as it stood at the beginning of June, 1932, in an article which leaves no further room for optimism of the kind which had been inspired by Sir Frederick Whyte's articles in the same columns four years before. After commenting on China's unwillingness or inability to give effect to the reduction of superfluous troops, as advised by the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty at Washington, he summarises the realities of the existing situation as follows:

"There is little doubt that the volume of the foreign trade is diminishing. World depression is having its effect, but few will dispute that the biggest factor is internal insecurity and excessive irregular taxation, which reduces the export trade and consequently affects the purchasing power of the people.

"Politically, China appears to make little progress. The great floods of last summer did not prevent Canton breaking away from Nanking and if the menace from Japan has brought them together again, there is little cordiality in the union, and even now, when the Shanghai situation is not yet cleared up, and the future of Manchuria is still an outstanding national problem, there are signs of further differences, liable to lead to renewed conflict. The North is full of troops, whose allegiance can be retained only by lavish expenditure. All over China the military commanders are looking for means to maintain their forces and any kind of combination between them, for this purpose, is possible. Jealousy and rivalry are outstanding, and patriotic motives are seldom apparent. . . .

"Education is being starved; the law is effective in operation almost nowhere; Communism, after two years of military effort on a large scale to suppress it, is rampant in four or five provinces; banditry afflicts nearly every province to

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an extent never paralleled in history and there is no real State effort to better social conditions or improve administrative methods. There are extensive plans for reform in all branches of the administration, and eager desire by those who prepared them to put them into operation, but little evidence to show that anything profitable has been done. Lack of funds is largely responsible for failure in this respect, but behind that there is the plain indication that the leaders, inspired by party and personal interest, have been using the available resources much more for ephemeral political objects than for solid national purposes. The conclusion is irresistible that patriotism is still a weak growth, that political and administrative ability is deficient and that the leaders in general lack the qualities necessary to the guidance of the country out of the utter confusion into which its affairs have fallen. . . .

"Such is the China of to-day, with which Japan has to deal in the future at closer quarters than before. The foreign interest in China is very great, for present and potential trade, because of money lent and because of large investments in property and enterprise. Foreigners therefore view with profound regret the inefficacy of Chinese policy and the shortcomings of the statesmanship of recent times. . . ."

Such, indeed, are the realities of China's present situation, and the sooner they are generally recognised the better for China and for all concerned. But this recognition will be delayed, and its beneficial results restricted, so long as the *mot d'ordre* persists in the official world to speak only smooth things; so long (for example) as the educative talks about China broadcast by the B.B.C. continue to be confined to speakers who are vocationally disposed to emphasise Young China's intellectual gifts and to ignore the unrestrained nepotism and corruption which reduce to futility any and every attempt to reform the public service. In the face of the existing grim realities, what good purpose can be served by an optimistic attitude, based on the merits of the Literary Renaissance or the Ting Hsien movement for mass education? Nobody who has lived in China

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would think of denying the existence of admirable qualities and excellent intentions to be found in every walk of Chinese life; no one denies that occasionally, even amidst the present chaos, a 'Model Tuchun' may prove his ability and determination to maintain law and order *à l'orientale* within the limits of his satrapy. But no one with a sense of realities can deny that the dominant morality of the Chinese official class, and the paramount motive* which inspires it, remain to-day what they have always been, and that their results have been greatly aggravated since the abolition of the authority of the Throne in 1911.

The devising of effective measures for disbanding the regional commanders' armies constitutes one of China's major problems to-day, one which must be solved before any real improvement in the general condition of the country can be hoped for. This, then, is the first of the realities to be faced. Another, second only in importance in its effect upon the health and economic conditions of the people, lies in the enormous increase which has taken place during the past ten years in the production and traffic of opium. Certain aspects of this problem have already been discussed, in the chapter dealing with Kuomintang propaganda at Geneva, but there are others deserving of notice, which go to prove that China's official attitude in the matter has no relation whatsoever to the realities of the trade, and that the Nanking authorities have tolerated, if not openly encouraged, this trade because of the revenues which they derive from it. The actual facts and statistics of opium-growing, as compiled for the China Year Book of 1931 by trustworthy eye-witnesses,

* *Vide supra*, quotation from Mallory, p. 25

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provides sufficient evidence of the lamentable truth that, in many districts, and notably in some under the direct control of Nanking, opium is grown, not only with the connivance of the officials, but often by their orders. Prior to the meeting of the Opium Suppression Committee of the League of Nations in January, 1931, the Nanking Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. C. T. Wang, had created a good impression by announcing that his Government had promulgated new regulations for the inspection of poppy-growing areas by district Magistrates and the imposition of fines; but as the Year Book figures subsequently proved, and as many later reports have shown, the 'fines' are regularly collected by the authorities for cultivation which is frequently compulsory; in other words, they are simply taxes, levied under another name. A report from Wengan, in Kueichou, published by the *North China Herald* in May, 1932, showed that 70 to 80 per cent. of the six districts visited by the writer were growing poppy, for which the authorities were collecting these 'fines.' The estimated revenue derived from opium in Kueiyang alone is eight million dollars per annum.

The cynical insincerity displayed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in this case is typical of the attitude and proceedings in regard to opium, not only of the Nanking Government, but of every political group that has held power in China since the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Relying upon the complaisance of the friendly Powers, China's representative on the League's Advisory Commission on opium, supported by the American delegate, recently carried this attitude to a pitch of audacity which finally compelled the British delegate, Sir Malcolm Delevigne, to remind the Commission of certain reali-

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ties which it had persistently overlooked. The incident arose out of a statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion above referred to. On the principle of carrying the war into the enemy's camp, Mr. C. T. Wang had deplored the existence of an illicit traffic in drugs conducted in China by foreigners, and thereafter proceeded to appeal to the Governments having colonies in the Far East, to desist from raising revenue from their opium monopoly policy:

"In the South Sea Islands," he said, "there are several millions of Chinese residents suffering from the bondage of addiction to opium, and the problem there presents a totally different aspect. The Colonial Governments of the British Straits Settlements, the Malay Straits, Hongkong, the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, Macao and Formosa, have adopted the Government opium monopoly policy; the greater portion of their revenue is necessarily derived from the Chinese residents. To them, the Chinese Government are helpless in bringing relief. It will, therefore, be most difficult for China to succeed in her task of opium suppression until the interested Powers are prepared to make a real sacrifice, and, to that end, co-operate with her in the fullest measure."

The argument, it will be observed, is precisely similar to that which ascribes China's failure to reform the administration of justice to the handicap of the 'unequal Treaties.' In this case, its real nature was exposed by the Nanking Government's refusal to send a delegate to the Conference on opium-smoking in the Far East, which was convened by the League of Nations, and held at Bangkok last winter. This Conference was admittedly not so successful as it might have been, if the world's largest producer of opium had been represented, but it might reasonably have been expected that as China has refused to attend it, her delegate on the Advisory Committee at Geneva would refrain from criticising its find-

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ings. Such restraint, however, would not have fitted in with modern China's conception of diplomacy: the recommendations adopted by the Conference, for official control of the sale of opium in opium-using countries, were sharply attacked by Dr. Woo Chi-tsai. But patient conciliation has its limits; Sir Malcolm Delevingne exposed the insincerity of the Chinese delegate's criticisms, by reminding him that something more than the promulgation of regulations is required to put an end to the officially encouraged cultivation of the poppy in China, and the notorious connivance of the Chinese authorities in the opium traffic. As regards China's breaches of her repeated assurances and undertakings, reports from all parts of the country indicate that this traffic is steadily increasing. Witness the following typical extract from a report by a correspondent of the *North China Daily News*, from Luchowfu, in Anhui, in May, 1931:

"A new road is now almost finished extending all the way from Anching, the capital of the province, on the Yangtze, to Bumpu on the railway. This important road passes through a lot of opium country. Your correspondent recently took a trip on a bus from Chowhsien to Luchowfu. Anyone making this trip while the poppy is in flower would be amazed at the magnitude of the opium business so close to Nanking. Apparently more than twenty per cent of the best agricultural land in this rich district is devoted to raising opium.

"From the moment the opium is raised it is the centre of a whirlwind of graft. Local bandits or 'bad men' are demanding as much as fifty per cent of the value of the crop before it even gets to the market town. Next, the provincial tax must be collected, together with as much more as the district collector can squeeze out for himself.

"The exceptionally heavy rains this year are reported to have ruined a large proportion of the opium crop, and this, together with the increasing taxes, will increase the price of opium to the consumer.

"It is to be hoped that this part of central Anhui, so near

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to Nanking, will soon come in for a little attention from those sections of the Government which are said to be interested in opium suppression."

Let us consider next the realities of the situation in respect to the administration of justice. At the Washington Conference China pledged herself to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, and the Powers, in return, declared their readiness to relinquish extra-territorial rights "when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant them in so doing." Apologists for the Kuomintang since 1925 have continually declared that, by the compilation and promulgation of new criminal and civil law codes, based on Western models, China has given proof of her willingness and ability to effect the required reform of her judicial system, and is therefore entitled to demand the immediate and complete abolition of extra-territoriality. In so doing they necessarily assume that these codes are, in fact, a 'living reality,' despite the fact, apparent to every impartial observer, that the prospect of real reforms, effective to secure clean-handed and equal justice, either for natives or for foreigners, is more remote to-day than it was twenty years ago; furthermore, that in the matter of arbitrary and illegal proceedings, the Nanking Government continually sets a conspicuous example. Its modern courts and prisons, its codes and statutes, resemble its disbandment schemes and opium abolition programmes—impressive gestures all, and nothing more. In practical working they merely go to prove that its methods and conception of justice remain unchangeably Oriental, and that none of these multi-

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itudinous codes has any real bearing upon the proceedings and judgments of Chinese tribunals. A memorandum on the working of the 'modern' Chinese Courts, issued in January, 1931, by the British Committee of Information at Tientsin, supplies detailed evidence of a kind which emphasises and illustrates the dangers to which British subjects would be exposed if brought within the jurisdiction of these Courts as defendants. Similar evidence, compiled from a number of reliable sources, was given by Mr. Woodhead, editor of the *China Year Book*, in his book *The Truth About the Chinese Republic*,* under the heading of "extra-territoriality." The facts need no stressing: it is notoriously and incontestably true that life and property have never been more insecure in China, or justice more conspicuously a matter of human volition, than they have become under the Kuomintang régime. Despite its unconcealed readiness to yield at the earliest possible moment to Young China's insistence in the matter, the British Government has been compelled to state distinctly (August, 1929) that it would not be safe to abandon the "Treaty-port system" and its corollary, Consular jurisdiction, until

"The Courts which administer these laws shall be free from interference and dictation at the hands, not only of military chiefs but of groups and associations, who either set up arbitrary and illegal tribunals of their own, or attempt to use legal courts for the furtherance of their political objects, rather than for the administration of equal justice between Chinese and Chinese, and between Chinese and foreigners."

This aspect of the situation is habitually ignored by

* *The Truth About the Chinese Republic*. By H. G. W. Woodhead. (Hurst and Blackett, 1925.)

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the propagandists, Chinese and foreign, who assert that "the free development of China's judicial and administrative machinery" is being hindered by the refusal of the Powers to expose their nationals to the risks of Chinese justice; but it is one of the realities of the situation which is fully recognised, not only by the General Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai and the foreign communities at the Treaty Ports, but also, indirectly, by the political opponents of the party in power at Nanking. Denouncing the dictatorship of Chiang K'ai-shek, a manifesto of the Cantonese "Reorganist" party, in 1930, put the matter rather more bluntly than the British Government had done—"Ever since the establishment of Chiang K'ai-shek's Government," it declared, "there have been many cases of illegal murder and confiscation of property to satisfy the blood-thirst and greed of its corrupt officials." To do them justice, the Chinese themselves, rulers and ruled, are under no delusions as regards the prospect of making the administration of justice conform to Western ideas of legality. No one is surprised or disturbed, for example, by the fact that, while the Foreign Minister proclaims the efficacy of China's judicial reforms, the head of the State sees nothing improper in arresting and imprisoning a prominent member of his own Government, without indictment or trial, and holding him as a political hostage, at his own discretion. No one for a moment imagines that, by the promulgation of these modern codes, the men in power have forsworn that 'higher law,' which entitles them to deal as they may think fit with those who incur their displeasure. All of which brings us back to the unchanging reality that in China—indeed, throughout Asia—it is not the form of Govern-

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ment which matters, but the men who administer it. And because it is in the nature of things that, in the upheavals of successful rebellion against constituted authority, a good deal of scum rises to the top, it is probably true that many of the men who control the Government of China to-day, at Nanking and in the provinces, recognise fewer moral restraints than their predecessors, the officials of the old régime. Writing from the capital of Hunan, four years ago, a special correspondent of *The Times* summed up this aspect of the situation in a few sentences. "The rulers of the country," he wrote—"their name is Legion—could not easily be worse. The people, despairing of justice and order, find that violence is the only weapon with which to oppose violence, and a whole generation seems to be growing up with the motto, 'What I want, I take.' The only concern of officials like these is to line their own pockets during their short stay in power." Referring to conditions in the interior generally, he added that "the unscrupulousness and venality of the officials and the misery of the people make it hard to imagine that prosperity and peace are really in sight."*

To return to the administration of justice. When, as a graceful concession, the Mixed Court in the International Settlement at Shanghai was replaced, in January, 1927, by the new Provisional Court, which forms an integral part of China's judicial system, the Chinese authorities were placed in a conspicuous position in which to prove the sincerity of their professed intention to conform to Western standards of procedure

* The correspondent may possibly have had in mind Sir Austen Chamberlain's vision of the Nationalist Government "freed from foreign domination and thus enabled to devote itself to the single-minded service of the interests of the Chinese."

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and to administer clean-handed justice. The manner in which they have availed themselves of this opportunity is sufficiently indicated by the unsavoury record of the Provisional Court for the past five years. Commenting on its record, in December, 1928, the *North China Daily News* (a journal which cannot be accused of any lack of sympathy for Chiang K'ai-shek's government) observed: "The new order of the Kiangsu provincial Government violates the Rendition agreement at half a dozen points. But it is the future which calls for earnest consideration; conditions at the Provisional Court are becoming more and more intolerable. Experience proves only too clearly that, in the present state of politics, Chinese administration is impossible."

In a despatch from the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council to the Senior Consul, the intolerable nature of the conditions produced by the administration of the Provisional Court, and their effect in undermining the safety of life and property in the Foreign Settlements were plainly stated. By the Rendition agreement, all death sentences passed by the Court require to be confirmed by the Kiangsu provincial authorities. Between January, 1927, and March, 1928, sixty death sentences were passed; in only one of these cases was the death penalty confirmed, eleven were returned for re-trial on frivolous grounds, and of the rest nothing more was heard. Small wonder that the record of violent crime in 1927 was the worst in the history of the Settlement. No fewer than 123 persons were murdered, of whom 15 were foreigners. Fourteen members of the Police Force were killed, and 22 wounded, by armed criminals. The increase in all forms of violent crime

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during the year, as compared with 1926, was 320 per cent. The Council's despatch pointed out that, as the executive authority, it is dependent upon a properly administered judiciary; and that, so long as the provincial authorities are in a position to interfere with the lawful execution of the Provisional Court's judgments, the situation is impossible. The spokesmen of the Kuomintang, with their wonted cynicism, actually invoked the prevalence of crime in the Settlement as a fact justifying the immediate retrocession of the Municipality to unrestricted Chinese control. Under these conditions, matters grew steadily worse, with the result that Chinese residents in all walks of life suffered continually at the hands of criminal gangs. An article on "Gangsters at Shanghai" and the "unsafe lives of Public Men," by *The Times* correspondent in China (April 7th, 1931), shows with what amazing audacity and impunity kidnappers, gangsters, and other criminals have now organised their operations in the foreign Settlements. He observed that "many men of wealth pay heavy fees to mysterious agencies which guarantee immunity from molestation, a sinister indication that the principals behind the scenes are persons in positions of authority"; moreover, he drew attention to the highly significant fact that:

"Those in official positions and others, not officially employed, but financially and otherwise connected with official circles, do not find it necessary to maintain personal guards, and are not subject to the attention of kidnappers."

In other words, that the criminal elements in the Foreign Settlement conduct their operations under what amounts to a working agreement with officials who are

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connected with the inner policies of the Kuomintang, and who therefore affect, or determine, the attitude and decisions of the local Chinese Courts.

A recent example of Chinese methods of justice may be cited, to emphasise the truth that, except for purposes of propaganda, the modern law codes have no bearing whatsoever on the realities, nor any influence on public opinion. A certain Cantonese merchant, Pang Cho-lap, a leader of the local anti-Japanese boycott society, was suspected and denounced by the students for having imported Japanese goods. The correspondent of the *North China Daily News*, who reported the case at the end of May, 1931, observed that Pang was quite probably mixed up in the wholesale traffic in Japanese products, but as he was never brought to trial, the charge remain unproven. What actually happened was that the students, having obtained his arrest, gave notice to the authorities that if he were not brought out and done to death before their eyes, they would suspend their studies until he had been executed. They had arranged to hold a memorial service on May 29th in honour of the men of the Cantonese army who had lost their lives in fighting against the Japanese at Shanghai; they thought it highly appropriate, therefore, that Pang should be put to death on that day, as a fitting sacrifice in expiation. The Government refused to subscribe to the students' idea of a Roman holiday, but assured them that Pang would surely die; he was duly shot in his prison on the 29th. No legally established tribunal had cognisance of the case; the prisoner was not confronted with his accusers, nor given aid of counsel. "He could not quote law in his favour, for the Government made no pretence of using the trial methods laid down in the

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'Code of Criminal Procedure.'” The Government authorities sent a communiqué to the Press, intended to convey the impression that Pang had been in league with bandits, but as there was no public trial, the victim probably died in ignorance of the accusation. The significance of the case lies in the fact that, so far as the students, the judiciary, and the general public were concerned, the Code of Criminal Procedure might never have promulgated.

Every student of political economy is aware that it is futile to look to legislation—and particularly legislation of foreign origin—to produce any rapid modification in the structural character of a people. The realities underlying China's conception and administration of justice lie deep-rooted in the nation's social system. The modern Law Codes, like the New Factory Regulations or the Public Health Ordinances, remain dead letters simply because there does not, and cannot, exist, any body of public opinion sufficiently concerned with public interests, to make such legislation effective. But the most conspicuous and pervasive of all the unpleasant realities (there are, needless to say, many pleasant ones) produced by China's social system, are the incorrigible nepotism and corruption of the official class and of all who attain to positions of influence and authority. It is a reality which accounts not only for the chronic emptiness of the Government Treasury, but for the vast fortunes which have been accumulated by the great majority of war-lords and politicians who have held high office under the Republic. It accounts also for the failure of the Chinese to organise and conduct large-scale business enterprises, shipping companies or railways, on European lines. It is unnecessary to demon-

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strate in detail this universally recognised (though seldom mentioned) root cause of China's political and financial disabilities, or to trace the connection between China's social system and the national science and art of "squeeze." Suffice it to observe, that this passive people, haunted throughout its long history by the chronic menace of hunger, has inevitably developed acquisitive and hoarding instincts which, transmitted through countless generations, have become the ruling passion of the race. China's moralists, and therefore her rulers, have always recognised, and eloquently denounced, this national characteristic. In the matter of moral exhortations and fulminations, the Government of the Republic conforms to the unbroken continuity of classical tradition; Chiang K'ai-shek has repeatedly issued Mandates, announcing the Government's determination to eliminate corruption from the public service. On the other hand, one of the most distinguished scholars in the foremost rank of Kuomintang officialdom, Hu Han-min, candidly observes that "squeeze is in the blood of Chinese officials," and being modern in his political ideas, holds that the only remedy for it lies in educating the masses to resist its abuses. It is a remedy which calls for centuries of organised effort; pending its application, we are confronted with the undeniable truth that the blood which runs in the veins of the masses is of the same composition as that which shapes the ends of mandarins; in other words, that the squeezing instinct is as old as Asia and that the range of its activities, with the masses as with the classes, is a matter of opportunity and impunity, limited only in its application by fear that the "squeeze" may be exasperated to the point of personal violence. Under

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the Monarchy, if the wealth of a provincial Viceroy or Governor was thought to exceed the limits proscribed by a proper sense of the fitness of things, the offender was invited to audience at Peking and relieved of a portion of his unearned increment; but, as I pointed out ten years ago,* it was estimated by competent Chinese observers at that date that, in the course of the preceding eight years, the twenty-two Tutchuns and the Metropolitan officials between them had accumulated sufficient wealth to pay off four-fifths of China's national debt. Three years ago, the Christian General, Feng Yu-hsiang, in one of his characteristically outspoken moods, expressed his opinion that the increasing corruption of public morals and the nation's financial distress were chiefly due to the "heartless officials of the present unprincipled Government," whose methods he proceeded to describe as follows:

"Those who handle public funds wax rich, while all around them unscrupulous persons fawn on them, so as to divide the spoils. . . . The public payrolls are padded to enrich the relatives or friends of officials, while military commanders pocket the pay of the troops they are supposed to train for purposes of national defence."

Fulminations of this kind cause no flutterings in mandarin dove-cots. Feng Yu-hsiang, himself no half-hearted squeezer, is well aware that Chinese public opinion regards them in the same light as the virtuous Mandates of the Government which he thus denounces. It would never expect the men in power to regard Western innovations, such as budgets and auditors, as practical politics, for the reason that it is the immemorial right, and invariable practice, of every mandarin (and,

* *Vide China, Japan and Korea*, Chapter V.

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for that matter, of every son of Han) to put money in his purse as fast as he can and by all possible means. All Chinese economics centre, *au fond*, in the eternal question of the food supply; "the enrichment of the family at the expense of other families" remains, therefore, the paramount motive of Chinese politics. When all is said and done, the difference between the activities of the mandarin in the matter of illegal taxation, and those of the predatory soldiery and bandits, is merely a difference of technique. Both emphasise the dominant instinct of the Asiatic for laying up treasure on earth, and, wheresoever the individual rises superior to this instinct, conformity is sooner or later imposed upon him by his environment.

Such being the reality, it is pertinent to suggest that the engagement of foreign experts, whether supplied from the League of Nations or elsewhere, cannot possibly fulfil any good purpose, unless this aspect of the problem be frankly recognised. Hitherto, as witness the proceedings at the Washington Conference and recent correspondence between Nanking and Geneva, the subject has by common consent been delicately avoided, with the result that all the many schemes proposed, and advisers engaged, to give relief to the afflicted Chinese people, have failed to effect any improvement either in their condition or in the administration of public affairs. Sooner or later the truth must be acknowledged, that the country's sorry plight is not due to 'militarism,' but to the incurable money-lust of the men in power, and that no amount of advisers, no matter how highly qualified or well-meaning, can check the evils arising out of official corruption, unless means can be found to invest these advisers with a measure of effective control

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over the collection and expenditure of public funds.

This aspect of the question has recently been emphasised by the condition to which nepotism and corruption have brought the administration of the postal service, whose native staff went on strike in May, 1932. A leader in the *North China Herald* (26th May) described the strike as "an expression of the employees' apprehension at the increasing development of that insecurity of tenure, from which the Postal Service, as an off-shoot of the Customs Service, was for many years exempt." The Peking correspondent of the same paper observed that the underlying motive of the strikers was "to try and remove the Service from the control of the politicians, who, it is claimed, have been milking it for their own benefit, like so many public services." As to the deterioration which has taken place in the postal administration under the Kuomintang régime, there is no difference of opinion; a former annual surplus of one to two millions has been converted into a deficit of ten millions. In other words, the Postal Service is rapidly going to ruin in the same way, and for the same reason, as the national railways.

The editorial comments of this severely-restrained British journal carefully avoid any direct reference to the venality of officials, but its reflections in leaders dealing with the origin of the strike, point to a state of mind which has almost reached the limits of polite forbearance on this subject. The following passages may usefully be quoted, as they present an accurate description of the existing condition of affairs, in a region which Nanking claims to control, and throw light on its immediate causes:

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"The Finance Minister has long given proof of his sense of the importance of a reliable civil service to China's progress. He has been eloquent in his tribute to the great services of the Maritime Customs and the Salt Department, which derive their strength and efficiency from the faithful regard paid, on the whole, to the principle of security of tenure. The Postal Department was handed over from the Customs in a high state of departmental *esprit de corps*. Its wonderful work in covering the vast country from the China Sea to Tibet, from Canton to Harbin, with an organisation functioning to the benefit of the people in the midst of all sorts of physical and political difficulties, has fully earned its preservation in the same state as its sister services.

"Now, by the pressure of political desperation in search of financial aid, the Postal Service is gravely menaced. No more sinister portent could appear to demonstrate the rapidly deteriorating condition of the Government generally. If the Post Office administration is thus attacked, who can say where the process will end? Already the inability of the Government to maintain its obligations towards its employees has been grimly revealed in the unhappy history of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company. There employees and Chinese shareholders alike have good cause to repine—and to be critical of the Government's sense of duty. Notorious, too, is the case of the Army. Into the recent fighting near Shanghai there was thrown from Nanking a regiment to which, before setting out after paying its respects to the Sun Yat-sen Memorial, its officers had ruefully to announce that the Government could not produce the money for the soldiers' food. Is it to be wondered at that, on arrival at Quinsan, that regiment, sent to defend its fellow-countrymen, indulged in looting? It is a waste of breath for the Government to talk of rehabilitation and restoration, if it does not take steps to ensure the payment of wages to its soldiers. It is equally futile to expect to be able to re-condition the administration, if the services on which that administration depends are to be undermined by the destruction of their continuity of employment and by the introduction into them of political nominees who, besides being ignorant of the work, are merely concerned with snatching profits for themselves during the time—brief as it may be—that the service remains for them to exploit. The present strike is wrong—utterly wrong—but the measures to be taken to end it must be framed with due attention to this serious aspect of recent Government policy."

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There is no aspect of the national life in which the effect of official corruption is more clearly marked than in the failure of the central and provincial authorities to prevent or relieve the condition of famine, which has become chronic in many parts of the country. Here, be it said, we touch again on the crucial reality—the *causa causans*—of most of the ills which afflict the Chinese people—viz., the unceasing pressure of over-population on the available food supply. Seldom has this reality been more clearly stated than in the Report of the American Red Cross Commission, appointed by the Central Committee to examine into the causes, relief and prevention of famine in China, during the summer of 1929. The Commission's Report, dated 27th August, 1929, constituted, in effect, a severe indictment of the men in power. Its premises and conclusions, accepted by the Central Committee, were summarised by the latter as follows:

"1. That this Committee learns with deep satisfaction that, as the result of abundant rainfall, conditions in the principal famine areas are rapidly improving in so far as the restoration of a normal climatic régime can promote that result;

"2. That the destitution which prevails in the famine areas is the cumulative result of the chronic conditions of disorder, the crushing exactions of the war-lords, the depredations of bandits, the enforced payment of confiscatory taxation and the crippling and consequent inability of the railways to function beyond a fraction of their normal capacity—to these was added a severe drought which brought the whole to a tragic climax;

"3. That these conditions do not present a situation which can adequately be dealt with by a foreign emergency relief agency; hence do not warrant an appeal by the Red Cross to the generosity of the American people;

"4. That Chinese leaders would no doubt give more thought to the removal of the causes which impoverish their people and bring on such tragedies, if they realised the neces-

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sity of assuming full responsibility for resulting relief needs; any acceptance of that responsibility by foreign agencies cannot but retard this all-important result;

"5. That the American Red Cross is convinced only a wise, strong, stable, central government can command the power and resources and continuity of policy necessary to lead China out of her condition of disorder into a new era of peace, security and prosperity; and is further convinced that disastrous conditions leading to continued suffering will constantly recur until such a government comes into being."

Attached to the Commission's Report are several instructive appendices. In one of these, the reasons are set forth which led the American Advisory Committee on Famine Relief at Peking to adhere to the definition of famine as "a failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes." The Advisory Committee, consisting of missionaries and business men of wide experience, realised that, without the protection of this definition, "the relief effort would be launched on a shoreless sea. The extent of destitution had no definable bounds. It was the result of a multitude of causes, which no relief organisation could remove, overcome, or neutralise."

Then follows a simple, straightforward description of "the artificial or unnatural causes which have combined to play the leading parts in the story of 'famine.'" The civil war waged between rival ambitious 'generals,' each in control of his own personal army and greedy for wealth and power. These armies, living off the country and ruthless in their relations to the population, "sweeping the towns, villages and farms bare of everything which an army could use." The 'major scourge' of banditry, resulting in the complete destruction of farm implements and animals." "American readers," says this Report, "are familiar with the stories of banditry in China. It is doubtful whether

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these stories convey any adequate idea of the prevalence of this intolerable evil.”* A petition presented to General Chiang K'ai-shek by a Famine Relief Committee of Kansuh, stated that 70 out of the 78 districts in the province had been ravaged by bandits. Next comes the devastating part played by crushing taxation. “The generals in control of the provinces have levied exorbitant taxes for the support of armies or for personal enrichment. In some provinces, these taxes have been ruthlessly collected for several years in advance. All of a man's belongings may be seized to meet these payments, if he is unable to pay cash.” Lack of transportation is another unnatural cause of famine: railways have been reduced to a fraction of their normal carrying capacity by the activities of these armies. Thus, the survey concludes:

“. . . it becomes plain that the famine of 1928-1929 does not fit into the definition, ‘Famine is a failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes.’ On the contrary, natural causes here and there have intensified the breadth and depth of the destitution which years of civil war and lawlessness and general disorganisation have created. Also, it becomes plain that the line between normal and famine living conditions is often imperceptible; and equally plain becomes the reason for the wide discrepancies among estimates of the famine's extent and severity.”

Finally, the Commission quotes from an article on “Population Pressure and the Growth of Famine in China,” contributed by H. P. Howard to the *Chinese Economic Journal*, which fairly presents the economic

* “The impression produced by this scourge of banditry on the mind of a transient observer, vocationally disposed to benevolent optimism, is typically illustrated by the Dean of Canterbury, writing in *The Times* of a flying visit to Kansuh. ‘It is easy,’ he writes (June 26th, 1932), ‘to make too much of the bandit menace. Bandits are only an incident; they do not occupy the whole field; a bigger factor is the orderly industrious life of the community.’”

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conditions—of which chronic ‘famine’ is one—arising out of, and inseparable from, China’s social system. Mr. Howard sets forth the basic facts of this, China’s fundamental problem, on much the same Malthusian lines as I had occasion to present them twenty years ago,* with certain valuable additions in the way of information concerning the vital statistics of the distressed areas, which have attracted special attention and assistance from foreign countries in recent years. After discussing the various methods proposed for the relief of famine, he arrives at the unavoidable conclusion that “if all proposals which may be regarded as in any way practicable were put into operation in the fullest possible degree at once, they would not do more than take care of a fairly large fraction of the yearly increase.” Therefore “proposals to avoid the population excess by preventive measures go more directly to the root of the problem,” and he suggests that if the establishment of clinics and education in birth control could be carried out on a large scale, in combination with economic reforms, “it might be possible in a decade or two, under the most favourable political and social conditions, to check the steady decline towards famine conditions.” He recognises the fact, however, that there are at present no hopeful signs of such a general campaign to cope with the pressure of population on the means of subsistence, and that therefore “the famine area seems likely to include most of China long before the end of the present century.” He might have added that any effort on the part of foreign nations to help and advise the Chinese in this direction—the only direction from

* *Vide Recent Events and Present Policies in China.* (Heinemann, 1912.)

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which permanent relief can come—is precluded in advance by the attitude towards preventative measures of the Christian churches (notably the Roman Catholic), whose benevolent activities are all calculated to counteract nature's "positive checks" and thus to increase the severity of the pressure of population. Therefore, as another writer observes:

"... famine remains the most effective of all the checks. It stalks abroad through the length and breadth of the land. Now and again some great catastrophe, such as a flood or a drought, increases the number of its victims in one locality and the outer world hears of 'a famine' in China. But 'the famine' is existent in China every day. No sun goes down but marks the passing of thousands dead from starvation. The numbers of the people must be cut down and if disease, war and plague are not sufficient, famine may be depended upon to fill up the toll. Herein lies the paramount reality of the China problem."*

In its concluding pages the Report refers to the effect of arbitrary and confiscatory taxation, as an important contributory cause to the extreme destitution prevailing in many parts of the country, and to the famine conditions which have appeared in a number of widely separated areas. "All who have given attention to the taxing practices in China, see in their drastic and comprehensive reform one of the most humane and practicable means of lightening the wretched economic plight of the farmers." Here again the Commission might well have added that no one who has given attention to the taxing practices of Chinese officials has yet suggested any 'practicable' means of lightening the grievous burden of the people, except by measures involving some form of moral tutelage and financial control, imposed from without, during the period requisite

* From *China and the Powers*. By H. K. Norton. (New York, 1927.)

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for carrying out this difficult but fundamentally necessary reform.

The conclusions recorded in the Report of the Red Cross Commission in 1929 were confirmed and amplified in the following year by Mr. H. S. Aldrich, one of two Americans in charge of the International Famine Relief Commission in Western China. His report, emphasising the futility of relief work under existing conditions, advised a cessation of American support, on the ground that most of the money subscribed was being wasted.

In the words of *The Times* correspondent in China, he attributed:

“ . . . the failure of the well-meant efforts of the International Commission largely to the Chinese military and civil officials, who at best are indifferent and at worst actually interfere with the work. The Commission succeeded in getting 3,000 tons of grain into Shensi, but says it is the conclusion of all those interested that, during the same period, Feng Yu-hsiang's agents took that much grain, if not more, out of the province for the use of his troops. In other words, benevolent contributors were in effect helping to underwrite the present war.

“Furthermore, Mr. Aldrich expressed it as his belief that the physical weakness of the Shensi people is due more to opium smoking than to lack of food. Prominent employees of the Commission are opium smokers, and definite proofs of extensive corruption among them were found, such as holding grain for ‘private accounts,’ and taking commission on transportation charges.

“Various counties in Shensi sent agents long distances to buy grain, and the grain having been bought could not be transported and was resold locally, with the result that only a quarter of the funds provided got back to the subscribers. The Commission had an elaborate road-building project to employ famine sufferers, and recruiting agents on salaries were appointed, but in two months, while Mr. Aldrich was there, they had not enlisted a single worker, though a living wage had been offered. Labour was short because the spring harvest was good and the province had been drained of men

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for Feng Yu-hsiang's armies.

"The famine was not universal in Shensi, but serious in certain areas, and Mr. Aldrich has no hesitation in stating that it was mainly due to military depredations, which in 1926 and 1928 stripped the province of grain and of grain reserves. The famine area corresponded almost exactly to the main billet areas and lines of march of the armies retreating from, and advancing to, the civil wars in the East."

All these grim realities centre, it will be observed, on the basic problems of security for life, and of food to sustain it. Their chronic results have been summed up by an observer already quoted, Mr. H. K. Norton, as follows:

"It is estimated that thirty million Chinese are continually attempting to sustain life on less than the minimum required for subsistence. Thousands of these die daily; yet it is only when some great catastrophe such as a flood or a drought concentrates millions of starving in one area that we hear of a famine in China and are asked to contribute to rescue work. Of the famine that is present every day we hear little; and the three million or more that die each year of starvation, due to lack of adjustment to changing conditions, are accepted as representing the normal mortality of the Chinese people."

The outside world has little or no conception of the depths of despair to which vast numbers of China's defenceless peasantry have been brought by the addition of tyrannous misrule to the heavy burdens imposed by the chronic pressure of over-population. They have come to exist, not only under the menace of hunger—to which the race is inured—but under the abiding shadow of fear. As it has been throughout the ages during similar periods of lawlessness and in the absence of effective authority, the people "eat bitterness," reduced to the lowest depths of silent misery. "The sons of Han are far from safety; they are crushed in

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the gate, neither is there any to deliver them; whose harvest the hungry eateth up, and taketh it even out of the thorns, and the robber swalloweth up their substance.”* Some idea of the pitiful conditions under which these simple, kindly-natured people contrive to exist, some idea of the grim realities that make up their daily lives may be gathered from the remarkably truthful picture of one typical peasant’s life, given by Mrs. Buck in *The Good Earth*, to which I have already referred, and from Mrs. A. T. Hobart’s description of ‘troubled Hunan’—a vision of the life of the common people, continually terrorised by lawless troops—(*Within the Walls of Nanking*), and especially from Mallory’s work *China, Land of Famine*. Seen against the moving background of the life-and-death realities which these writers describe, all the incessant talk of our intellectuals and philanthropists about educating China to become a modern democracy under free institutions, becomes of no more significance than the twitterings of sparrows on the house-tops.

* Job v, 5.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSION

“In the firm adherence to principle which distinguishes the British character, lies the only hope of winning and retaining the confidence of the Chinese, a confidence which is our best ally in all our differences with them.”—(*Sir George Stanton*).

BEFORE proceeding to summarise the conclusions which may justifiably be drawn from this survey of the course of events in China during the past decade, and before discussing the possibility of measures calculated to check the process of disintegration and restore the nation to orderly government and stability, I think it necessary to explain the critical attitude adopted in the foregoing pages towards the Westernised Intellectuals of Young China and their political activities. I should be reluctant to leave the reader under the impression that this attitude is inspired by any motive or feeling, other than an earnest desire to assist in lessening the burden of undeserved affliction which oppresses the Chinese people, for whom I cherish a very sincere admiration and affection. As I see it, there can be no other way of relieving that burden, than by leading public opinion in England and America to fuller knowledge and a clearer perception of the real condition of present-day China; in particular, with regard to the disastrous results of the disruptive education which has been imparted to Young China since the beginning of the century. At the same time, I should like to make it clear that, in insisting upon the incapacity and

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the instability of the product of this disruptive education, I am not indicting the pupil, so much as those who have taught him, and the manner of their teaching. 'Western learning,' *per se*, need not necessarily unfit a Chinese student from becoming a good citizen or an efficient public servant. The foreign-educated officials produced by Yung Wing's first experimental sending of students to America, the men who rose to high office under the Monarchy (*e.g.*, Tang Shao-yi, Liang T'un-yen and Jeme Tien-yu), afforded sufficient evidence to the contrary. Chang Chih-tung, and other wise elder statesmen of the old régime, knew and admitted that the nation had everything to gain by the instruction of its youth in western science, history and political economy; but they and the reformers of K'ang Yu-wei's following, realised also that, if this education was to be a constructive, and not a destructive, force, it must carefully retain the basic elements of China's national culture and native institutions. They realised, in fact, that it was vitally important to keep continually in mind "the reservation necessary in all things which have for their object improvement, or progress; namely, that in seeking the good which is needed, no damage, or as little as possible, be done to that already possessed."* It was manifestly desirable that China should add a superstructure of western science to the ancient framework of her House Celestial, so that the nation might gradually adapt itself to cope with the new conditions forced upon it by contact with the outside world. The tragedy of modern China, and the pity of it, arises in great measure from the lamentable fact that, since the beginning of the century, much of the education of the younger genera-

* J. S. Mill, on *Representative Government*, Chapter II.

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tion has been in the hands of foreigners. Many of these, well-meaning enthusiasts, have believed, and acted upon the belief, that by an abrupt and complete break with the past, by ruthlessly discarding the parental despotism of the Confucian system and the teachings of the Sages, Young China might swiftly attain to mental liberty and enlightened individualism; and that the nation would thus be enabled to develop "the free institutions of a self-governing Republic." Discussing this subject, shortly after the birth of the Republic,* I endeavoured to show how delusive was the belief that the most conservative race on earth could be suddenly translated, on a magic carpet of political formulæ, from Asia's middle ages to the forefront of European civilisation; at the same time, I observed that "the sympathetic optimists whose opinions and advice flatter the vanity and encourage the pretensions of the Chinese student class, incur a serious responsibility." Already at that date, the younger generation was beginning to display, by their indiscipline and hot-headed valour of ignorance, the inevitable results of an education which encouraged them to despise the wisdom of their forefathers and to discard their dignified standards of conduct; in fine, to cast off that parental authority and the respect for tradition, which constitute the corner-stone of China's social system and the stability of the State. It was not possible for any serious student of history and sociology to believe that a system of education, thus conceived, could bring the educated class to a fitting sense of the nation's real needs, or imbue it with the elements of wisdom in social and political economics. To-day, it has become even more evident than it was in 1912, that

* *Recent Events and Present Policies in China.* (Heinemann, 1912.)

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any education which tends to diminish the authority of the country's rulers, and that of parents, can only aggravate the dangers and difficulties inseparable from a period of acute political and economic disorganisation. As has been shown, the government of the country, even in matters of high policy, is to-day literally at the mercy of students and school children. And the tragedy of it is, that the ardent educationalists who are chiefly responsible for this state of affairs, the enthusiasts who persist in the perennial delusion that "it only needs this kind of instruction or that system of culture to bring society into a much better state," appear to be entirely satisfied with their achievement and intent upon increasing still further their output of high explosive material in furthest Asia. Theirs is the proselytising fervour which takes pride in disturbing the 'pathetic content' of Asia's passive non-resisting races, in uprooting the foundations of a civilisation which had proved its enduring worth long before the Christian era. It may safely be asserted that a large proportion of those who have taken part in the education of the westernised section of Young China, have never seriously studied the thing which they set out to destroy, that they do not possess the knowledge which would enable them to appreciate how fittingly the Confucian code of ethics represents and epitomises the living but often inarticulate reality of the Chinese race-mind. In their eyes, it is merely pagan; therefore the process of rapid modernisation, howsoever perilous, must be pursued to the end, howsoever bitter.

Professor Roxby in a broadcast talk on 'Teaching Young China,'* has fairly expressed the satisfaction with

* *Vide The Listener*, June 29th, 1932.

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which evangelists and educationalists regard the results of their well-meant but misguided labour of years.

"In an earlier talk," he said, "I described the great influence and prestige which scholars and scholarship enjoyed in the old historic civilisation of China. But now 'the old order changeth, yielding place to new' . . . The customs and conventions, accepted without question for thousands of years, are being challenged on every hand. The huge households or joint families are tending to break up and to be replaced by 'small family' groups of a western size. The young people are claiming freedom from the old restraints, to choose their own partners in marriage and to act as individuals. I think that the cleavage between the older and the younger generation is probably greater in modern China than in any other country in the world. Age and parental authority no longer command that almost unique respect which they enjoyed under the old régime and the clash between old and new loyalties is sometimes very pathetic. It is essentially the day of young men, of new movements and experiments of every kind."

Professor Roxby admits that these 'sweeping changes' may be superficial, inasmuch as they apply mainly to the relatively small section which has come into contact with western ideas, but it is evident that he shares Mr. Lionel Curtis's opinion that "the mere handful of educated people who are breaking away from the past, are the vital and dominating factor." The pity of it is, that this handful, the class to which the 'stupid people' naturally look for leadership, should have been encouraged to break away from the past in a spirit so impatient of moral restraint, that it has become a serious menace to the stability of the State. There can be little or no hope of a restoration of peace and stability in China, so long as the government of the country remains in the hands of this class.

Even if we assume that China's modern Intellectuals

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are right when they declare that ancestor worship is dead and reverence for parents no longer regarded as a sacred duty by the younger generation, it should be obvious that the relaxation of the restraints imposed by the Confucian code cannot possibly conduce to a better state of society, so long as the deep-rooted instincts, inbred in the race by centuries of adherence to that code, retain most, if not all, of their primitive force. In other words, so long as the procreative instincts of the race, expressed in early marriages, unlimited offspring and polygamy, remain unrestrained, the nation's chronic malaise of severe economic pressure can never be materially diminished; at the same time, the tendency to disorder and unrest, arising from this pressure, must be intensified by the weakening of those moral restraints which formerly served to keep the elements of disorder in check. It would therefore appear to be logically indisputable that, if our educationalists aspire to teach China a 'new doctrine of life,' if our humanitarians hope thereby to bring a 'new China' into being, and our economists to give it a higher standard of living, then this 'new doctrine of life' must begin with elementary education in vital economics. The collective intelligence of the race must be led to perceive that most of its disasters and discontents are direct and inevitable results of its patriarchal social system. If, by education or propaganda of an intensive kind, we could alter the outlook of the race-mind, which accepts with equanimity an infant mortality of 70 or 80 per cent; if we could convince Young China—and through it, Old China—that there is no particular merit in being a grandfather at forty—the way would be prepared for the birth of a new Chinese nation; really new, because freed at last

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from the chief cause of all its suffering and unrest, the ever-present spectre of famine. This remedy is neither easy, nor capable of rapid application, since it must involve a vital change in the state of mind which constitutes the Chinese type of civilisation and in the attitude of its vast population towards the problems of life and death. Incidentally, also it must involve a radical modification, or the cessation, of many of the present activities of our religious and educational organisations. To persuade a fifth of the human race of the necessity for modifying its primordial ideas on life and living, would seem indeed to be a desperate venture, requiring centuries of painful educative processes; yet, until it is done, China's vital problem can never be permanently solved, and nature's 'positive checks' of famine and disease must continue to adjust the nation's numbers to its means of subsistence. All human experience would appear to make the prospect of any such solution infinitely remote; nevertheless, as a matter of practical politics, it is not wholly inconceivable. For the Chinese, although inherently conservative, are a reasonable and adaptable race, and, as Borodin's propaganda campaign proved in 1927, they are not impervious to mass suggestion, in any direction which holds out a promise of improvement in their material conditions. If an organised campaign, starting with the school textbooks, and advocating later marriages and a reasonable limitation of the birth-rate, could be carried out with the approval and assistance of the Chinese educated class, as a purely national movement, the masses might in time be led to accept such modifications of their social economy as would reduce the severity of the food problem, without destroying the principle and ethics

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of ancestor worship.

For the present, however, the heavy penalties of China's patriarchal system remain, greatly aggravated during the past twenty years by the unchecked activities of the lawless elements that prey upon every form of productive industry. One of the most discouraging features of the situation is, that, during these twenty years of senseless strife between the rival groups of political adventurers and warlords, no leader has emerged to achieve pre-eminence of the kind which would win the respect of the *litterati*, the goodwill of the merchants and gentry, and the obedience of the masses. Since the death of Yuan Shih-kai, there has been no figure on the Chinese stage to compare with the great Viceroys of the old régime, no commanding personality to serve as a rallying point for the law-abiding majority of the nation; and the present condition of the country, resulting from the cumulative consequences of these twenty years of disorder, justifies at every point the conclusion that the nation cannot hope to recover stability and prosperity as the result of its own unaided efforts. The process of demoralisation has gone so far, that only by a benevolent intervention of the friendly Powers can final ruin and disintegration be averted. Therefore the vital question which confronts the civilised world in China to-day is, whether disinterested international co-operation for the good of humanity comes within the range of practical politics? Discussing this aspect of the problem shortly before the Washington Conference, I expressed the opinion* that, given genuine goodwill and a self-denying determination on the part of the Powers to protect the manifest helplessness of the

* *Vide China, Japan and Korea*, Chapter IV.

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Chinese people through the necessary period of administrative reconstruction, there should be no insuperable difficulty in restoring law and order, peace and prosperity, throughout most parts, if not all, of the country. But the goodwill must be genuinely active and ready, without ulterior motives, to co-operate in a common cause of benevolence; at the same time the 'organised opinion of mankind,' which found expression in the Washington Treaties, must have the moral courage to recognise firstly, that the policy of non-interference prescribed by those Treaties was illogical and ill-founded; and secondly, that the westernisation of China is by no means a foregone conclusion.

Sixty-three years ago, Mr. J. Ross Browne, American Minister to China (already quoted in an earlier chapter), discussed the already apparent difficulty of reconciling the policy of non-interference with the maintenance of commercial and other relations with China. In so doing, he questioned whether it was

"... good policy to proclaim, in the solemn form of a Treaty, that we will not interfere in the internal affairs of the Empire, when our very presence is an interference; or whether anything is to be gained by an unconditional admission of the right of the Chinese Government to determine the time and manner of introducing improvements. . . .

"China," he said, "is not going either to be seduced by fair promises into making concessions repugnant to her established policy, or to make them of her own accord. In that respect, she has been consistent from the beginning, and so, I doubt not, will continue to the end. Of this we have no right to complain. All I contend is that, having forced obligations upon her, we must compel her to observe them or recede from the position which we have undertaken to maintain."

As the problem was in 1869, so it remains to-day. Quite recently, Mr. Castle, American Under-Secretary

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of State, has supplied a confirmatory footnote to Mr. Ross Browne's prophetic exposition of its fundamental issues, as follows:—

“A nation which cannot rule itself, must always be a menace to the rest of the world. With Japan, England, and the rest, we can only look sadly at the chaos in China. At the same time we must always be ready to lend a helping hand. Though we must stand aside now, it does not mean that we shall allow our nationals in China to be killed or our property to be destroyed. No nation has ever forwarded the cause of peace by weakness when a moral principle is involved. No nation can help build a united and prosperous China by permitting the Chinese to destroy the principles upon which international society stands. By protecting our own nationals, we actually help to forward the aims that we share with Japan and England—I speak of them because they are most deeply concerned—the aim to help China stand on her own feet, free, prosperous, unified and happy.”

The problem to-day lies therefore in the difficulty of reconciling the doctrine of self-determination with “the principles upon which international society stands,” and it is not simplified by the fact that China's history during the past twenty years fully justifies Mr. Ross Browne's prediction, that self-determination, in her case, must mean ‘retrogression and a final relapse into barbarism.’ There is no denying that China was never weaker than she is to-day, and that her continued existence, as an independent nation, depends entirely upon the goodwill of other nations; nor is any good purpose served by shutting our eyes to the truth that the process of disintegration is rapidly acquiring increased momentum, as time goes on. Therefore, if there be anything of vitality in the ideals which the Anglo Saxon race professes, anything dynamic in the political faith of the League of Nations, the world's collective conscience must face the realities and urgency of the problem and

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set itself to solve it by regarding the Chinese people as a 'ward of civilisation.' In other words, there must be an end of the fetish of non-interference and the friendly Powers must devise and impose measures, during a period of tutelage, first for the restoration of law and order, and thereafter of the nation's commerce and credit. What China needs, before all else, is ten years of uninterrupted peace and security, and this she cannot possibly achieve, except with material assistance from without. The civilised Powers owe it to the unfortunate Chinese people to abandon the formula of non-interference and to recognise the truth that the doctrine of self-determination is inapplicable in the case of a people which is manifestly incapable of self-government. If we admit that the nation's present difficulties and dangers are largely due to the creation by the western Powers of a new condition of things, to which the Chinese were unwilling, or unable, to adapt themselves, we must also admit that we owe them, therefore, a moral debt of reparation; and that debt can only be discharged by such concerted action as shall help them to put an end to the present disastrous condition of affairs. The future of China as an independent State, and as a market for international trade, depends to-day upon whether the Powers (and more especially America, England and Japan) are capable of uniting in a policy of disinterested co-operation for the benefit of the Chinese people; in other words, whether there exists a spirit of altruistic internationalism sufficiently vital to outweigh conflicting national interests and conceptions of national security. Considered in the light of current history, and contemporary opinion, it is difficult to discover, in the actual relations of the Powers chiefly concerned, good

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ground for hoping that such a solution of the problem is likely to be attempted in the near future. The truth stands out clearly, from the history of the past half-century, that the international rivalries and jealousies which have repeatedly enabled China to escape dismemberment and foreign domination, have also served to prevent her from receiving at the hands of any single Power that effective aid and guidance, whereby the present chaos might have been averted. 'Tis pity, but 'tis true, that the Washington Conference policy of non-interference, traced to its sources, was inspired and dominated by purely national interests. That policy having conspicuously failed to benefit China, the world now stands confronted with new dangers and difficulties in the Far East. The future of China, as Mr. Lionel Curtis justly observes, "has now become a question of major importance, which cannot be further ignored without risk to the whole structure of human society." The urgency of the matter has now come to be generally recognised, but the measures and methods suggested for dealing with it remain one and all pervaded by the same reluctance to abandon the shadowy shibboleth of 'self determination' and to recognise the realities of China's parlous state.

The proposal which at present finds most favour in intellectual and official circles is, that China's feet should be gently set in the way she should go, by experts and advisers appointed for the purpose by the League of Nations. Apart from the fact that the League, lacking Russia and the United States, can carry no weight of real authority in the Far East, it has been sufficiently demonstrated during the past fifty years that foreign advisers can leave no permanent mark on China's administrative

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methods, nor introduce any administrative reforms, unless invested with executive authority and direct responsibility, more especially in the field of finance. It has also been made unmistakably clear since 1921 that the men who rule China to-day will never voluntarily permit foreign advisers or technical experts to exercise any such authority or to fulfil any executive functions. The number of such advisers and experts at present employed in various official capacities at Nanking was recently stated to be nearly two thousand, but in determining the Chinese Government's policy, when dealing with the things that really matter (such as disbandment, opium, banditry, etc.), their combined influence is practically nil, and was never intended to be more. The League's nominees, no matter how distinguished and learned, could never speak with authority, for the simple reason that their utterances are unsupported by effective force in reserve. If, under existing conditions of world politics, it is not possible to apply to China, as a ward of civilisation, that compromise of the Wilsonian conscience which the League of Nations adopted in the Mandate system, it would seem that the only means by which China can be relieved of her present burden of affliction would be for the Powers signatory to the Washington Agreements, or the Kellogg Pact, to confer together, with or without representatives of the Nanking Government, for the imposition of remedial measures. Whether public opinion in America and England, too long misled in regard to the real state of affairs in China, can now be persuaded to recognise the necessity for such a period of benevolent tutelage, is doubtful; but if not, the Chinese people must continue to tread the path of affliction, until such time as further

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experience leads to wiser counsels. Japan, whose best interests are more closely identified than those of any other nation with the restoration of orderly government and normal channels of trade in China, should welcome any and every proposal of concerted action directed to that end, unless the wisdom of her Elder Statesmen has been definitely subordinated to the aggressive tendencies of the Military Staff. As for the Chinese, there is, I think, no doubt that any measures devised by the friendly Powers for the suppression of military tyranny and the protection of trade, would have the grateful, though inarticulate, support of all the solid elements in the country—of every class, in fact, except the warlords, professional politicians and the more turbulent element amongst the students.

Public opinion throughout the civilised world is unmistakably well-disposed towards the Chinese people; the sympathy with their political aspirations expressed in the Washington Treaties and other instruments, represents widespread and genuine feelings of goodwill and a very general desire to see them relieved of their present difficulties and dangers. It should not be a task beyond the resources of statesmanship for the friendly Powers to manifest this goodwill in a combined effort, an international 'doctors' mandate,' for the restoration of order and security. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that American and Japan can overcome their mutual rivalries and distrusts, and provide the 'harmonious co-operation' of President Harding's vision, for China's good, the application of the most urgently requisite remedial measures need not be regarded as impossible, either from a military or a financial point of view. Those who have had practical experience of the rapidity and ease

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with which the Chinese accept the inevitable, when imposed by competent authority (no matter what its origin) will be disposed to concur in the opinion that, given clear-cut purposes and the right men to execute them, the restoration of normal conditions could be achieved throughout most of the central provinces in a comparatively short space of time. So far as the masses of the people are concerned, the new national consciousness, which, according to the propagandists who invoke it, precludes all idea of foreign intervention, would speedily prove to be a figment of the highbrow mind, and the arrogant attitude assumed by Young China since 1921, in natural response to the conciliatory deference of the Powers, would evaporate with a rapidity as dramatic as that which distinguished its first manifestations. How little this 'national consciousness' counts with China's toiling millions, when weighed against the realities of life, was clearly demonstrated when three years ago, Wei-hai-wei was restored by Great Britain to Chinese jurisdiction. There was no mistaking the pathetic and plainly-confessed desire of the inhabitants of that leased territory to remain under the British flag, nor any doubt as to the sincerity of the apprehension which they displayed at the prospect of being restored to the tender mercies of their own officials.

Assuming, firstly, the possibility of a concerted policy of intervention; assuming secondly, a refusal on the part of the leaders of the Kuomintang to co-operate in, or permit, the application of such remedial measures as the situation requires; assuming, finally, that after due warnings and the expiration of a reasonable time limit, no effective steps have been taken, or guarantees given, for the suppression of banditry and the disbandment of

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superfluous troops, the Powers might proceed to devise and apply a definite scheme of concerted operations. In other words, they would agree to abandon the policy which has deprecated as 'unthinkable,' the idea of any intervention other than that of moral support and cultural advice.

The political, military and economic aspects of a comprehensive scheme of intervention, calculated to improve the conditions of life for a fifth of the human race, are evidently matters calling for the mature consideration of technical experts, prior to a conference of the Powers concerned. A brief outline of the general principles, upon which such a scheme might be expected to proceed, by paths of 'harmonious co-operation' to fruitful ends of good, may, however, be suggested.

It being by common consent acknowledged that no improvement can be expected to take place in China's trade and finances and general condition until effective measures have been taken to diminish the numbers and activities of the armed forces of the rival warlords, the first step in any helpful scheme of intervention should be an organised plan for the policing of China's railways. Such a plan was first seriously discussed by the Powers, as the result of the Lincheng outrage, in 1923; since then, proposals in the same sense have been put forward, at various times and from several quarters, as offering the best and quickest means of putting a stop to the destructive activities of the rival chieftains. In the course of a public lecture delivered at Tokyo, in August, 1927, Mr. Yoshizawa (then Japanese Minister at Peking and subsequently Minister for Foreign Affairs) declared that, there being no prospect of any improvement in the existing intolerable condi-

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tions of affairs, he foresaw that the Powers would ultimately be compelled to come to an agreement for the temporary occupation and control of Chinese railways, a line of action which (before the Military party had assumed direction of Japanese statesmanship) undoubtedly represented a carefully considered opinion of the Tokyo government, and had probably been discussed with other Governments concerned. The idea behind this proposal, based on Japan's experience in Manchuria, was that the Powers should proceed, after formal intimation to the Nanking Government and the provincial war-lords, to declare the railways of Central China, and the Yangtze region in particular, 'out of bounds' for all movements of armed bodies. The creation of 'neutral zones' around and about these railways, from which all military adventurers and freebooters would be excluded, would not call for any large military force, inasmuch as united action of this kind on the part of the Powers, would have an immediate and sobering effect upon the wealthy and essentially timid individuals, whose trade is civil war; also because it would receive the moral support of all the best elements in the country. If, during the necessary period of recuperation and reconstruction, the financial administration of the railways were vested (in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the earlier loan agreements) in the hands of responsible foreign accountants and engineers-in-chief, the lines would rapidly be restored to efficient working order and become once more, as they were before the revolution, important sources of national revenue and promoters of inland trade. The cost of maintaining the necessary military railway guards and police could easily be met out of the profits

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of any one of the trunk lines, efficiently administered. The railway police would be a Chinese force under European officers, responsible to, and paid for by, the Chinese authorities, under a system similar to that of the Maritime Customs. Determined opposition on the part of any individual warlord, or combination of warlords, might at first necessitate military operations, but few who have knowledge and experience of the material from which China's modern armies are composed, will be disposed to credit more than a very small minority of disciplined troops, with the desire or the determination to die for political principles on the stricken field. It is also conspicuously true, and worthy of consideration, that the allegiance of the majority of military commanders is usually purchasable at prices which would not greatly disturb the equilibrium of an 'interventional' balance sheet. In the event of major military operations being required, against the better organised Cantonese troops, for example, or the elusive forces of the 'Christian General,' it would no doubt be advisable to rely chiefly upon air forces, at the same time, cutting off all supplies of munitions of war, by occupying the more accessible arsenals and preventing all importation of arms by sea. The position of the intervening Powers would be greatly strengthened if these measures could be taken with the consent, and in support, of the *de facto* central authority, and it should not be beyond the resources of diplomacy to persuade that authority, by arguments which appeal to the Oriental mind, to make a virtue of necessity, and to discern in the foreigner's helpful intervention an opportunity for consolidating its own position, together with the restoration of normal, prosperous conditions.

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Simultaneously with the occupation and control of the railways and arsenals, steps should be taken to suppress the piracy which has infested the South China seas of recent years, and played havoc with the native coasting trade and fishing fleets. It need hardly be said that the pirates' chief base in Bias Bay, distant only 65 miles from Hongkong, would long since have been cleaned up, to the great relief of all peaceful mariners, had it not been for the protection indirectly afforded to them by the Kuomintang's peculiar conception of the rights and duties of a sovereign state. If the Powers were now to decide to occupy Bias Bay with a small permanent garrison, there would be an immediate end of the plundering of steamships, and the junk traffic would be relieved of a menace against which at present they have no defence.

We come next to the question of the disbandment of the large regional forces, those private mercenary armies controlled by the various provincial chieftains, which are nominally loyal to the Kuomintang régime. To approach this question in the spirit in which it has hitherto been approached by the Powers represented in the Bankers' Consortium, is manifestly futile. For reasons which I set forth ten years ago,* none of the political parties or warlords in China will ever accept the financial co-operation of the Powers, unless assured in advance that they will be able, as on former occasions, to reduce to a dead letter any conditions of a loan agreement which stipulate for strict supervision over the expenditure of loan funds, and especially in the case of funds borrowed for the disbandment of troops. But assuming the effective localisation of these regional

* *Vide China, Japan and Korea*, Chapter VI, page 95.

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armies, by excluding them from all access to the railways, and assuming that by this means, not only would every provincial war-lord be unable to invade his rivals' territories, but that he himself would feel increasingly secure from attack, the chief *raison d'être* for these vast hordes of armed men would lose most of its force, and the lucrative profession of civil war be deprived of its chief attraction for ambitious leaders. Troops, to the war-lord, are simply the means by which he achieves wealth and power. Debarred from the use of the railways for his aggressive or marauding expeditions, he (being usually a reasonable man) would probably be disposed to confine himself, as Yen Hsi-shan has done, to the exploiting of his own satrapy. The results might well be (as Tang Shao-yi put it in 1920) that many of them 'would like to resign, so as to have time to attend to their investments.' As for the rank and file, the raw material of the political adventurers' power, it must always be remembered that most of these mercenary soldiers (and, for that matter, most bandits) are at heart decent, law-abiding men, torn from their families and their farms, and swept into the tide of civil war, by forces beyond their control. They are soldiers *d'occasion*, not *de métier*, and given a reasonable prospect of enjoying the fruits of their labours in peace, the great majority would ask nothing better than to be allowed to return to their homes and the tilling of their fields. Every armed force and every bandit troop contains, of course, its proportion of landless and lawless men, and the condition of poverty and general unrest to which the country has been reduced by twenty years of disorder must necessarily intensify for a time the difficulty of checking their predatory activities. But

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given control of the railways, and a clearly manifested determination to introduce measures of effective disbandment, beginning with the Central Provinces, which would enable the well-disposed majority to return to their homes with a modicum of cash in hand, the chief of China's problems would be in a hopeful way towards its ultimate solution.

Finally, we come to the problem presented by the large and rapidly increasing hordes of armed men, who profess and call themselves 'Communists,' and whose leaders' purpose it is to overthrow the Government at Nanking and establish themselves in its place. In the chapter which dealt with the 'Red Peril' in China, I explained that the Bolshevik doctrines and institutions proclaimed by the leaders of the 'Red' armies in various provinces, should not be regarded as evidence of any definitely Communistic convictions or affinities; they are simply moves in the political game, played in accordance with the traditions of Chinese statecraft, as prescribed for insurgents against a weak or unpopular Government.* The manifest inefficiency and disorganisation of the Kuomintang administration afford in themselves sufficient explanation (and in the eyes of the Chinese, justification) for the increasing strength and boldness of these rebel and bandit forces. Without a concerted intervention of the Powers, there is every reason to expect that these forces will continue to grow, for all China knows that the Nanking Government's manifest un-

* The manner in which public opinion instinctively recognises the traditional rights to rebellion, and the attitude of the *de facto* Government towards the insurgents, were curiously indicated in a manifesto recently issued by Wang Ching-wei, as head of the Nanking executive. Therein he deprecated the bandit armies' lack of patriotism, for not having desisted from attacking the Government at a time when its armed forces were engaged in resisting those of Japan at Shanghai.

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willingness to take the field against them in a serious campaign, arises from recognition of the fact that any weakening of its own fighting strength would immediately expose it to a combined attack by its political opponents. As matters stand, Chiang K'ai-shek's minor campaign this summer, though partially successful in clearing the Han river region, has resulted in a considerable strengthening of the so-called 'Soviet Government' position in Hupeh, Honan and Anhui; and simultaneously has produced symptoms of increasing restlessness amongst the free-lance chieftains of the Northern Provinces.

Assuming, however, the possibility of intervention, on lines such as I have endeavoured to indicate, the same observations hold good, with regard to the mentality and purposes of the rebel or bandit armies, as in the case of the ostensibly loyal regional forces. There is, in fact, little or nothing to distinguish the individual military unit, living for his pittance of pay and prospects of loot under a Kuomintang Commander, and his opposite number in any one of the 'Red' armies, except it be that the 'Outs' have generally a wider range of hopeful expectations than the 'Ins.' But in both cases, the great majority of these armed forces consist of homeless, famine-stricken peasants, survivors in desperate straits from devastated districts, of men, in fact, whose chief concern is to keep body and soul together and who are ready to march under the Soviet, or any other, flag which offers them a chance of so doing. The leaders and organisers of these 'Red' armies, the men who control the Revolutionary Committee and its seven sub-committees, include a large number of Russian-taught cadets from the Whampoa Military

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Academy at Canton, aspirant officials, for whom no employment offered in the service of the Kuomintang, and who, like the rank and file, have therefore turned to the Red Armies for a livelihood. Finally, the fighting capacity of these Red armies has frequently been stiffened, and the number of their rifles increased, by desertions of Government troops during the past two years. It needs but little knowledge of China to realise that armies thus constituted, would readily yield to persuasion of the right kind, expressed in terms of cash, and that most of these 'rebels' would be only too glad to return to their farms and trades if assured that they would be allowed to do so in peace, and with a reasonable prospect of immunity from oppression hereafter. The business of persuading their military leaders, and the Intellectuals who supply the brain power of the Red organisation, to transfer their allegiance to the side of constituted authority and to hand over their military equipment, would, of course, require delicate negotiations of the kind to which the commanders of China's armed forces are notoriously susceptible. The amount of capital required to dissolve the 'Communist' organisation and eliminate the present Red menace from the Yangtze provinces, would in any case be trifling as compared with the immediate benefits which the restoration of law, order, husbandry and trade would confer upon the people of this fertile region. The entire operation would probably cost less than the Rockefeller Foundation has spent in China during the past twenty years; once cleared of 'rebels,' the railway guards and military police, under competent foreign supervision, should be in a position to prevent any recrudescence of the bandit trouble on a large scale. For purposes of

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efficiency and smooth working, it would probably be advisable for the Powers to avoid intervention effected by means of mixed international forces, and to proceed upon an agreed system of specific and temporary Mandates, whereby the rehabilitation of each of the principal railway zones would be entrusted to the separate care of this or that Power, under the general auspices of the League (America consenting) and a pre-arranged scheme of centralised finance.

Failing the intervention of the Powers, in some form calculated to check effectively the forces now making for disintegration, all the facts of the situation point to the probability of an early declaration of an independent Northern Government at Peking, controlled by the chiefs of the old Anfu and Peiyang political groups, and that this move will be followed by a similar declaration for the South on the part of the Cantonese leaders. The attitude and sentiments recently displayed by Chiang K'ai-shek and the Nanking Executive Committee, indicate philosophic acceptance, on their part, of these Separatist tendencies and of the fact that the unity of the country is a consummation which they can no longer hope to impose upon their opponents by force of arms. Their declarations to the effect that they will in future be content to seek unity by means of persuasion, rather than by military coercion, are generally construed by the Chinese to mean that, so long as they control the Maritime Customs and other important sources of revenue in the Yangtze provinces, the Kuomintang central executive are now prepared to regard with equanimity the break-up of China into a federal system of practically independent states. According to Chinese opinion, if the Northerners now

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decide to abandon all further pretence of unity, the blame for this *dénouement* must rest chiefly with Chiang K'ai-shek and with the well-meaning but misguided foreign opinion which so warmly welcomed the imposition of his authority upon the North, when effected by means of armed forces of the cordially-detested Cantonese. Had Chiang K'ai-shek left well alone, they say, after he had reached the Yangtze; had his Government been content to hold the scales equally between Peking and Canton, all might have been well. At is it, since the capital was removed to Nanking, the North considers that it has been deprived of its fair share of government posts and revenues, for the benefit of the Cantonese. There is no reason to doubt that the North, always the centre of gravity of Chinese policies, would heartily welcome the restoration of Peking to the dignity of a capital, with or without the South, and that its regional troops would now be delighted to serve once more under Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuang-fang and other old-time Tuchuns. The Cantonese, on their side, have already given unmistakable indications of their dissatisfaction with Chiang K'ai-shek's Government, which they confidently expected to control, and (for reasons explained in an earlier chapter) their separatist tendencies are bound to increase, as time goes on, *pari passu* with the increase of wealth and importance of the Cantonese communities overseas.

If effective intervention by the Powers in the near future should prove to be unattainable, these separatist tendencies may be expected to produce results of a nature to make the present confusion worse confounded and eventually to confront the western world with a number of new and complicated problems in the Far

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East. The political leaders of the Northern and Cantonese parties respectively are, no doubt, sufficiently astute to defer the definite proclamation of autonomous States until the League of Nations' Commission has presented its report on Manchuria, in the expectation that this instrument may be the means of creating ever-welcome dissension among the Powers. But competent observers of public opinion, North and South, are inclined to the belief that, if the present chaotic conditions are allowed to continue, it cannot be long before all semblance of national unity in China is definitely dispelled. To an educated Chinese mind, there would be nothing catastrophic, or even surprising, in such a *dénouement*; on the contrary, it would be in accordance with the proverbial saying which epitomises the history of the race, "long united, divide; long divided, unite." But for the foreign Powers, it would mean a dramatic end to the fond hopes and conceptions which found expression in the Washington Agreements, and the immediate necessity for new policies in China, based on realities no longer deniable.

To conclude. Whether China is destined to become a politically organised State, within the meaning of the Covenant of the League, or to break up into a number of autonomous satrapies, remains matter for surmise, on the knees of the gods. But the pitiful conditions under which the people live and suffer are no longer matter for surmise, but stern realities, deserving beyond all peradventure of the civilised world's active sympathy and assistance. Whether assistance can possibly be rendered, in such a manner as to alleviate these conditions, and to inaugurate a period of recuperation and reorganisation, must now depend upon the attainment

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of a good understanding and a common purpose of disinterested good-will by the Western Powers, and this, in the last resort, resolves itself into the problem of reconciling the divergent Far Eastern policies and interests of the United States and Japan. In a word, the immediate destinies of the Chinese people depend upon the sincerity of the civilised world's professions of concern for their unhappy state and the possibility of devising practical measures for its alleviation by making the ideal of 'harmonious co-operation' a living reality.

THE END

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